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POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

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4 September 1984

EAST EUROPE REPORT

POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

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DECREE ON PRELIMINARY TRAINING, SELECTION FOR ARMED FORCES

Sofia DURZHAVEN VESTNIK in Bulgarian 26 Jun 84 pp 609-610

[Ukase of the State Council of the People's Republic of Bulgaria Governing Basic Military Training of the Youth and the Training of Specialist Recruits for the Armed Forces of the People's Republic of Bulgaria]

[Text] The State Council of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, on the basis of Article 94, Point 2, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution of the People's Republic of Bulgaria promulgates the following:

Ukase No 1923 Governing Basic Military Training for the Youth and the Training of Specialist Recruits for the Armed Forces of the People's Republic of Bulgaria

Article 1. Basic military training and the training of specialist recruits for the Armed Forces are aimed at assisting in indoctrinating the youth in a spirit of socialist patriotism and internationalism and in preparing them to carry out their military and civil duty of defending the socialist motherland.

Article 2. (1) Basic military training of the youth is carried out jointly by the Ministry of National Education, the Ministry of National Defense, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Public Health, the Defense Assistance Organization, Civil Defense, the Bulgarian Red Cross, the people's councils, the economic and public organizations and bodies.

(2) The Komsomol together with the leadership of the military field camps are entrusted with the leadership of military patriotic indoctrination of the youth and the organizing of ideological indoctrination, mass cultural and sports activities.

Article 3. The people's councils provide and maintain the necessary training facilities for military patriotic indoctrination, for basic military training of the youth and for training specialist recruits for the Armed Forces.

Article 4. (1) All young men who are Bulgarian citizens must take basic military training.

(2) Students from the 9th and 10th grade (the first and second course) of all secondary schools take basic military training as a regular training subject, and this includes military field instruction.

(3) Young men and women from 16 to 18 years of age who do not study in secondary schools take their basic military training once during a period of 30 days at the Defense Assistance Organization.

Article 5. The Ministry of National Education plans, organizes, supports and carries out basic military training in the schools.

Article 6. The Central Council of the Defense Assistance Organization plans, organizes, supports and carries out basic military training for young men under Article 4, Paragraph 3.

Article 7. The Ministry of National Defense:

1. Provides procedural leadership and supervision over basic military training of the youth and the training of the specialist recruits for the Armed Forces;
2. It organizes and directs the military field training of the students.

Article 8. (1) After passing basic military training, the young men stipulated by the okrug (city, rayon) military directorates are required to undergo training as specialist recruits for the needs of the Armed Forces.

(2) The number of specialist recruits is set annually by the Council of Ministers, upon the recommendation of the Minister of National Defense.

(3) The training programs under Paragraph 1 are approved by the minister of national defense, the minister of national education and the chairman of the Central Council of the Defense Assistance Organization. These programs provide a civilian profession and a military specialty.

Article 9. (1) The training of the specialist recruits, including the drivers of motor vehicles for the needs of the Armed Forces, is organized, supported and carried out by the Defense Assistance Organization.

(2) The calling up of the specialist recruits and the assigning of them for instruction in the Defense Assistance Organization are carried out by the appropriate military directorates according to a procedure established by the minister of national defense.

(3) The training of students as specialist recruits with 12th-grade instruction is to be carried out during the third level of the unified secondary polytechnical school according to a special curriculum.

Article 10. (1) Young men and women called up for basic military training involving the leaving of their job are considered on official paid leave and from the enterprises, institutions and organizations where they are employed receive their labor remuneration in the amount set for the regular paid annual leave.

(2) For unemployed young men and women under Article 4, Paragraph 3, for the period of instruction the people's councils pay the minimum wage set for the nation.

(3) The time which is paid for also includes the time for traveling to the training area and back.

Article 11. (1) The conditions and procedure for granting and the amounts of single monetary compensation, including compensation for nonmaterial harm to participants in basic military training and the training of specialist recruits, when they have sustained medium or severe bodily injury which has come about either in carrying out their obligations as well as compensation to members of their families when they have been killed in carrying out their stipulated obligations, are to be determined by the Council of Ministers.

(2) Persons who have received compensation under the preceding paragraph cannot seek other compensation for material and nonmaterial losses.

(3) When the injury has been caused in a motor vehicle accident and the injured person was under compulsory insurance, compensation or nonmaterial losses under Paragraph 1 is not required, if its amount equals or is less than the insurance amount, but when the amount of compensation is greater than the insurance amount, the received insurance amount is reduced.

(4) Compensation under Paragraph 1 is paid by the appropriate okrug (rayon) people's council upon the recommendation of the chairman of the okrug (rayon) council of the Defense Assistance Organization and for students by the chairman of the okrug (rayon) Public Education Council.

(5) Young persons who are injured in their basic military training or training for specialist recruits are granted military disability pensions for the corresponding disability group as privates.

Article 12. (1) Anyone who prevents a person called up under the appropriate procedures from reporting for basic military training or for training as a specialist recruit can be punished by a fine up to 200 leva.

(2) Violations of the previous paragraph are established by statements from officials of the appropriate military directorates or the Defense Assistance Organization under the proceedings of the Law Governing Administrative Violations and Punishments.

(3) The punitive decrees are issued by the chairman of the executive committee of the okrug (rayon) People's Council or by an official authorized by him.

Article 13. The Council of Ministers is to pass a regulation for applying the ukase, an ordinance for military-field instruction of secondary school youth and an ordinance for financial, material, technical and routine support for basic military training of the youth and for training the specialist recruits for the needs of the Armed Forces.

Transitional Provision

§1. Prior to the introduction of 12th grade instruction of students, training of the specialist recruits (not including the drivers of motor vehicles) is to be carried out in the 10th grade (second course) of all secondary schools with

4 hours weekly as a required extracurricular activity at the expense of the elective hours as well as during the time of the secondary school brigades and military field instruction.

Concluding Provision

§2. The execution of the ukase is entrusted to the Council of Ministers.

Promulgated in Sofia on 19 June 1984 and signed with the state seal.

Chairman of the State Council
of the People's Republic of Bulgaria:
T. Zhivkov

Secretary of the State Council
of the People's Republic of Bulgaria:
N. Manolov

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NEW LAWS REVISE IDENTITY DOCUMENTS, REGISTRATION PROCEDURES

Interior Ministry Announcement

Warsaw DZIENNIK USTAW in Polish No 32, 30 Jun 84 pp 385-390 item 174

[Text] Item 174. Minister of Internal Affairs Announcement Dated 15 June 1984 on Publication of a Uniform Text of the Law Dated 10 April 1974 on Population Records and Personal Identity Cards.

1. Based on art 2 of the law dated 26 April 1984 on a change to the law on population records and personal identity cards (DZIENNIK USTAW No 26, item 132), a uniform text of the law dated 10 April 1974 on population records and personal identity cards (DZIENNIK USTAW No 14, item 85) is published in the annex to this announcement, taking into account the changes introduced by the law dated 26 April 1984 on a change to the law on population records and personal identity cards (DZIENNIK USTAW No 26, item 132), as well as changes ensuing from regulations issued prior to the publication of the uniform text, and using sequential numbering of chapters, articles, paragraphs and points.

2. The uniform text of the law published in the annex to this announcement does not include:

1) art 60, art 61 pt 2 and art 62 of the law dated 10 April 1974 on population records and personal identity cards (DZIENNIK USTAW No 14, item 85) which read as follows:

"Art 60. 1. In art 2 pt 3 of the decree dated 7 December 1954 on chief organs of state administration dealing with internal affairs and public safety (DZIENNIK USTAW No 54, item 269, 1956; No 41, item 188; and No 54, item 241) a comma is inserted after the word 'population' and the words 'personal identity cards' are added.

2. In art 11 of the law dated 29 March 1963 on foreigners (DZIENNIK USTAW No 15, item 77), par 4 will read as follows:

'4. Irrespective of the duty to register, a foreigner is subject to the arrival and departure registration obligation in accordance with regulations on population records.'"

Art 61.

- "2) Art 6 pt 11 of the decree dated 21 December 1955 on the organization and scope of operations of the Citizens Militia (DZIENNIK USTAW No 46, item 311),"

"Art 62. The law goes into effect on 1 January 1975,"

- 2) art 3 of the law dated 26 April 1984 on a change to the law on population records and personal identity cards (DZIENNIK USTAW No 26, item 132), as follows:

"Art 3. The law goes into effect on 1 July 1984."

3. The uniform text published in the annex to this announcement is effective as of 1 July 1984.

Minister of Internal Affairs: /s/ C. Kiszcza

Annex to Minister of Internal Affairs announcement dated 15 June 1984, item 174:

Law Dated 10 April 1974 on Population Records and Personal Identity Cards.

Chapter 1. General Provisions

Art 1. 1. The law regulates population records and personal identity cards.

2. Population records consist of registered data on places of personal residence, births, changes in marital status, citizenship, first names and surnames, and on deaths.

3. A personal identity card is a document attesting to the identity of a person and certifying his Polish citizenship.

Art 2. A person staying in the Polish People's Republic is required to register as specified in the law.

Art 3. Persons who are Polish citizens and persons whose Polish citizenship has not been ascertained, who live in Poland, are required to have the identity document specified in the law.

Chapter 2. Registration Obligation

Art 4. The registration obligation consists of:

- 1) registering upon arrival at a place of permanent or temporary residence,
- 2) registering upon departure from a place of permanent or temporary residence,
- 3) registering the birth of a child,
- 4) registering a change in marital status,

5) registering the death of a person.

Art 5. 1. A person who has Polish citizenship and is staying permanently in the Polish People's Republic is required to register his arrival at a place of permanent residence.

2. There can be only one place of permanent residence at the same time.

Art 6. 1. Permanent residence is living in a specific place at a designated address with the intent of staying there permanently.

2. The place of permanent residence of a person employed on an inland navigation ship, who lives permanently on board ship, is the place at which the navigation enterprise which employs this person has its headquarters.

Art 7. 1. Temporary residence is staying without intent to change the permanent place of residence in another town at a designated address or in the same town but at another address.

2. The place of temporary residence of a person employed on an ocean-going ship or a person who in connection with performance of his work stays for a specific time in a mobile housing installation outside his place of permanent residence is the place in which the workplace employing this person has its headquarters.

Art 8. 1. A person registered for temporary residence and staying in the same town uninterruptedly for over 2 months is required to register for permanent residence unless circumstances occur which indicate that this residence has not lost its temporary-residence character. The particular circumstances which justify registration for temporary residence of over 2 months' duration are regarded to be:

- 1) performance of work outside the place of permanent residence,
- 2) stay connected with education, medical treatment, rest, or family reasons,
- 3) performance of active military service,
- 4) stay in penal and correctional institutions, detention centers, juvenile shelters and upbringing institutions.

2. The appropriate local organ of state administration resolves questions as to the nature of the stay.

Art 9. 1. In fulfilling the registration obligation, a document attesting to identity should be presented and, in justified cases, another document which would permit establishment of identity.

2. In registering for permanent residence or temporary residence of over 2 months' duration, confirmation of the right to stay in the premises (rooms) in which the arrival registration is to take place, must be presented.

Chapter 3. Arrival Registration

Art 10. 1. A person who stays in a particular town at the same address longer than 3 days is required to register for permanent or temporary residence no later than the expiration of the fourth day, counting from the day of arrival.

2. A person who comes to a hotel or to an establishment granting accommodations in connection with work, study, medical treatment, or social care, is required to register for permanent or temporary residence within 24 hours of arrival.

Art 11. 1. A person required to register for permanent residence submits the data required for registration to the local organ of state administration at the primary level applicable from the standpoint of the new place of his residence.

2. In place of the person required to register, the data may be reported by a member of the family, a legal or factual guardian, or another person.

Art 12. 1. Registration for temporary residence is accomplished in the manner described in art 11 at the place of this residence, at the same time reporting the intended duration of this residence.

2. A person who extends his temporary residence in the same town beyond the reported duration time, who changes his address or changes his temporary residence to permanent residence, is required to accomplish the required registration within 24 hours.

Art 13. Registration for permanent or temporary residence in a hotel, or in an establishment furnishing accommodations in connection with work, study, medical treatment or social care, is accomplished with the manager of the establishment or a person authorized by him. The provisions of art 9 par 2 do not apply.

Art 14. 1. If data pertaining to a birth, change in marital status or first name or surname is reported to the appropriate Office of Registration of Births, Marriages and Deaths, in compliance with the law governing issuance of certificates on status changes, registration is not required.

2. Registration of change of first name or surname is accomplished by the local organ of state administration who issued the decision on the change.

Chapter 4. Departure Registration

Art 15. 1. A person who departs a place of permanent or temporary residence of over 2 months' duration is required to register his departure with the local organ of state administration at the primary level applicable from the standpoint of the present place of residence, no later than the day of departure from this place, giving his new place and address of residence.

2. The local office of state administration issues a decision, either at the request of a party or by reason of his office, on the registration of a person who lost the authorization referred to in art 9 par 2 and who left the present place of permanent residence without registering upon departure, or a person who left the present place of permanent residence without registering upon departure and who has not been staying in it for a period of at least 6 months, and whose new place of residence cannot be determined.

3. A person who goes abroad for a period longer than 2 months is required to report his departure or return to the appropriate, from the standpoint of place of personal residence, organ mentioned in par 1. Reports of departures abroad are made no later than the day of departure from the present place of residence, and reports of return no later than the expiration of the fourth day, counting from the day of return.

Art. 16. 1. If the period of temporary residence of up to 2 months' duration corresponds with the period reported at registration, the person leaving the place of this residence is released from the requirement of registering.

2. A person who departs a place of temporary residence of up to 2 months' duration before the expiration of the time reported at registration is required to register no later than the day of departure from this place.

Art 17. The report of a death to the Office of Registration of Births, Marriages and Deaths, in compliance with legal regulations governing certificates of births, marriages and deaths, replaces departure registration of the deceased person.

Chapter 5. Registration Duty of Vacationers and Tourists

Art 18. 1. A person who arrives at a vacation or rest home, boarding house, hotel, motel, tourist home, guest room, shelter, camping ground, or a guarded bivouac area, or another such establishment, is required to register for temporary residence within 24 hours of arrival.

2. Arrival registration is accomplished with the manager of the establishment or a person authorized by him.

Art 19. A person who stays in a particular town for tourism-rest purposes but not in the establishments described in art 18 is exempt from the registration, requirement provided that his stay in this town does not exceed 30 days.

Art 20. Participants of an excursion organized by a state or social institution, trade union, or other social organization of the working people, register for temporary residence through the excursion leader, who, at the time of arrival at the hotel establishment, reports the stay of the excursion group to the manager of the establishment or an employee authorized to receive the reports, presenting a list of the participants and proof of his authority to lead the excursion.

Art 21. 1. Participants at a youth summer camp or tourist-rest camp organized by a state or social institution, trade union or other social organization of the working people for school and college youth, are exempt from the registration requirement provided that their temporary stay does not exceed 30 days.

2. The summer camp or tourist-rest camp leader is required to maintain a list of the participants.

Art 22. The provisions of art 16 apply correspondingly at departure registration.

Chapter 6. Duty of Foreigners to Register

Art 23. A foreigner staying in the Polish People's Republic is required to register as described in the law if the provisions of this chapter do not state otherwise.

Art 24. 1. A foreigner who does not stay in a hotel or an establishment which provides accommodations in connection with work, study, medical treatment or rest, is required to register for temporary residence within 48 hours of arrival at a particular town and no later than 48 hours after crossing the border of the Polish People's Republic.

2. If the last day of the time limit for registration falls on a day that is by law a nonwork day, the next following weekday is considered to be the last day of the time limit.

Art 25. Participants of tours register for temporary stays through the tour leader, who is required to report the arrival (immediately) of the group at the hotel to the manager of the hotel or to the employee authorized to receive reports. The tour leader presents a list of the tour participants and documents authorizing their stay in the Polish People's Republic.

Art 26. A foreigner registering for permanent residence submits the data required for registration and presents a permanent residence card issued in compliance with regulations on foreigners and confirmation of registration for temporary residence.

Art 27. If reciprocity exists, heads and members of staffs of diplomatic agencies or missions, and consular offices of foreign states, together with household family members, are exempt from the registration requirement. Also exempt are other persons on the basis of laws, agreements, or universally accepted international customs, with the exception of foreigners with permanent places of residence in the Polish People's Republic.

Art 28. The provisions of art 18-21 do not apply to foreigners.

Chapter 7. Duties of Tenants, Owners of Houses and Apartments, Administrators and Caretakers of Houses, Workplaces, and Village Administrators

Art 29. 1. A landlord, tenant, person who has a cooperative right to an apartment, or owner of an apartment, is required to confirm the stay of a person

who is applying for permanent residence or temporary residence of over 2 months' duration. In addition, the owner (manager) of the building is required to show whether this person has the right to stay in the apartment at which the registration is to take place.

2. The persons named in par 1 are required to inform the appropriate local organ of state administration of the permanent or temporary stay of another person in their apartment (rooms) and about their leaving this apartment (rooms) if this person did not register. This report should be made immediately after expiration of the time limit specified for registration.

Art 30. 1. The caretaker of the house, and if there is no caretaker the administrator of the house, and if there is no administrator the owner of the house, is required to inform the appropriate organ named in art 11 par 1 about the failure of the person staying in this house to register upon arrival or departure.

2. In the countryside the duty specified in par 1 also lies with the village administrator.

3. The provisions of art 29 par 2 apply as applicable.

Art 31. 1. A workplace employing a person is required to determine whether this person has registered.

2. The workplace is required to immediately inform the appropriate organ named in art 11 par 1 of the failure of this person to register.

Chapter 8. Documents Attesting to Identity

Art 32. The documents referred to in art 3 which attest to identity of persons are: personal identity cards, temporary personal identity cards, and temporary certificates of identity.

Art 33. Documents attesting to the identity of persons cannot be retained in hiring that person for work or as insurance that services will be performed.

Art 34. 1. A person who is a Polish citizen and lives in Poland is required to have:

1) a personal identity after completion of 18 years of age,

2) A temporary personal identity card if he is between 16 and 18 years of age and is working, or is not living with his parents or with persons under whose care he is, or who is not under parental authority or care.

2. Persons referred to in par 1 who are between 13 and 18 years of age can obtain a temporary personal identity card.

3. A person whose Polish citizenship has not been ascertained obtains a temporary certificate of identity.

Art 35. A person who has not completed 18 years of age and does not have a temporary personal identity card is recorded in the personal identity cards or temporary certificates of identity of both parents, and if only one parent exercises parental authority, the person's name is recorded in only that parent's personal identity card or temporary certificate of identity; where there is no parental authority, that person's name is recorded in the personal identity card of temporary certificate of identity of the legal guardian.

Art 36. 1. A personal identity card is issued for an undesignated period.

2. A temporary identity card is issued for the period until the person completes 18 years of age.

3. A temporary certificate of identity is issued for a designated period.

Art 37. 1. The following entries are made in personal identity cards and temporary certificates of identity:

- 1) full name (names) and names of parents and maiden name,
- 2) day, month, year and place of birth,
- 3) marital status,
- 4) description,
- 5) name of organ issuing identity card,
- 6) names of the persons referred to in art 35.

2. The data specified in par 1, pts 1, 2, 5 and 6 are entered into temporary personal identity cards.

Art 38. The term "personal identity card", used hereinafter in the law, denotes personal identity card and temporary personal identity card.

Art 39. 1. In addition, the following entries are made in personal identity cards and temporary certificates of identity:

- 1) arrival registration for permanent residence or temporary residence of over 2 months' duration and departure registration from such residence,
- 2) changes in marital status and annotations on births and deaths of persons referred to in art 35,
- 3) name of workplace, date of employment and date of discharge,
- 4) date that soldier reported for basic military service, military training of over 3 months' duration, or service performed as candidate for professional soldier, and date of discharge from this service.

2. The Minister of Internal Affairs may specify the cases in which the entries mentioned in par 1 pt 3 are not made.

Art 40. 1. Personal identity cards and temporary certificates of identity must be replaced in the following instances:

- 1) change of first name or surname,
- 2) the documents are damaged or other circumstances exist which make it difficult to establish the person's identity,
- 3) there is no more space for making entries,
- 4) the validity period has expired.

2. The organs competent to determine whether a personal identity card or a temporary certificate of identity must be replaced for the reasons specified in par 1, as well as in other justified cases, are the organs which issue personal identity cards.

3. The Council of Ministers may order the replacement of personal identity cards issued for an undesignated period.

Art 41. 1. A person who has a personal identity card or a temporary certificate of identity and is obtaining a passport or travel document for travel abroad is required to turn in his personal identity card or temporary certificate of identity to the organ which issues his passport or travel document.

2. The person described in par 1 is required, within 14 days of his return from abroad, to take back his personal identity card or temporary certificate of identity from the organ which issued his passport or travel document.

3. The Minister of Internal Affairs may specify the cases in which turn-in of the personal identity card or temporary certificate of identity at departure abroad, for the period of stay abroad, is not required.

Art 42. 1. A person who loses a document attesting to his identity is required to report this loss to the nearest local organ of state administration at the primary level within 24 hours. This organ issues a certificate on the loss of the document attesting to identity which is valid until a new document is issued.

2. Should the document reported as lost be found, this should be reported, within 24 hours, to the local organ of state administration at the primary level at which the application for issuance of a new document was made, if a new document has not already been issued in place of the one reported as lost.

3. Should someone else's document attesting to identity be found, or one's own document attesting to identity in place of which a new document has already been issued, that document should be turned in to the nearest local organ of state administration at the primary level within 24 hours.

Art 43. Personal identity cards and temporary certificates of identity must be turned in in case of:

- 1) loss of Polish citizenship--immediately.
- 2) death of the owner of the document. In this case the person required to do this is the person required to report the death in accordance with legal regulations pertaining to death certificates.

Art 44. By way of orders, the Council of Ministers defines:

- 1) the organs, workplaces, and social organizations authorized to make entries in documents attesting to identity, the procedures for making entries, and, as necessary, data other than those specified in the law which can or should be recorded in these documents,
- 2) the procedures to be followed in issuance, exchange, turn-in, or loss of documents attesting to identity and the format of these documents.

Chapter 9. Competence of Organs

Art 45. Personal identity cards and temporary certificates of identity are issued by local organs of state administration at the primary level, competent from the standpoint of the place of permanent residence of the persons described in art 34.

Art 46. 1. Local organs of state administration at the primary level maintain population records.

2. The chairman of the Council of Ministers may define the organizational forms of maintaining population records by the organs referred to in par 1.

Art 47. 1. Based on reports submitted, the local organ of state administration who maintains population records is required to make the arrival or departure registrations by recording data pertaining to a person and the place of his residence, as well as other events included in the registration requirement.

2. If the data submitted give cause for doubt, the competent local organ of state administration settles questions on the accomplishment of arrival or departure registration.

Art 48. The local organ of state administration may demand that the person required to register submit, within a specified period of time, necessary data for updating the population records.

Art 49. The Citizens Militia exercises control over the performance of the duties described in the law by persons subject to arrival and departure registration.

Art 50. The local organs of state administration exercise supervision over the performance of the duties specified in the law.

Art 51. 1. The Minister of Internal Affairs will define, by way of an order, the range of data indispensable for arrival and departure registration, the method of reporting and receiving these data, the method of maintaining population records, and the rules and procedures for granting address information.

2. The Ministers of National Defense and Internal Affairs will define the range and method of arrival and departure registration for soldiers in active military service and the rules for maintaining population records in military buildings.

3. The Minister of Internal Affairs may, by way of an order, exempt specific categories of persons from the requirement of arrival registration for temporary stay.

4. The Minister of Internal Affairs may, in order to assure order and public safety, and also in case of natural disasters or threat of epidemics of diseases, introduce, by way of an order for a specific period of time, the duty of registering at the time of arrival in a given town, define in detail the method and time limit for the arrival and departure registration of persons, and the range of the data which should be submitted in arrival and departure registration.

Art 52. By the term "local organs of state administration" of a specific level, used in the law, it is meant the local organs of state administration of that level whose competence includes matters of population records and personal identity cards.

Chapter 10. Penal Provisions

Art 53. Anyone who sells his own or another's document attesting to identity
is subject to imprisonment for up to 2 years, restriction of freedom,
or a fine.

Art 54. 1. Anyone who steals or embezzles a document attesting to the identity of another person or who uses such a document

is subject to imprisonment for up to 3 years.

2. The same punishment applies to anyone who illegal transports, carries, or sends abroad a document attesting to identity.

Art 55. Anyone who:

1) evades the requirement of having a document attesting to identity,

2) retains a document attesting to identity in hiring for work or as insurance that services will be performed, or does not comply with his duty to make the required entry into this document,

3) does not comply with his duty to present a document attesting to his identity to an authorized organ or institution for the purpose of allowing the required entry to be made in it, or not being authorized to do so makes an entry in this document,

4) does not return a document attesting to identity in case of loss of Polish citizenship,

5) does not fulfill his duty to turn in the document attesting to the identity of a deceased person,

6) does not turn in a found document attesting to identity,

is subject to restriction of freedom up to 3 months or a fine of up to 20,000 zlotys.

Art 56. Transgressions against the registration requirement are subject to the law dated 20 May 1971-- Misdemeanors Code (DZIENNIK USTAW No 12, item 114, 1981, No 24, item 124; No 16, item 125, 1982; and No 44, item 203, 1983).

Chapter 11. Temporary and Final Provisions

Art 57. Personal identity cards and temporary certificates of identity issued under regulations in effect before the law goes into force remain valid.

Art 58. The law does not infringe upon regulations governing the stay of persons in the border zone.

Art 59. The following are now invalid:

1) the decree dated 22 October 1951 on personal identity cards (DZIENNIK USTAW, 1962, No 2, item 5),

2) the law dated 14 July 1961 on records and control of population movement (DZIENNIK USTAW No 33, item 164, 1963, No 15, item 77; No 44, item 220, 1967; and No 12, item 115, 1971).

Identity Documents Updated

Warsaw DZIENNIK USTAW in Polish No 32, 30 Jun 84 pp 390-404 item 175

[Text] Council of Ministers Order Dated 19 June 1984 on Documents Attesting to Identity.

Based on art 44 of the law dated 10 April 1974 on population records and personal identity cards (DZIENNIK USTAW, 1984, No 32, item 174) it is ordered as follows:

Chapter 1. Procedures To Be Followed in Issuing Documents Attesting to Identity

§ 1. 1. To obtain a document attesting to his identity the person involved submits an application and three photographs in the office of the local organ of state administration at the primary level, competent from the standpoint of the permanent place of residence.

2. The application for issuance of a document attesting to identity (together with the photographs) may be submitted through the office of the local organ of state administration at the primarily level, competent from the standpoint of temporary residence of over 2 months' duration; in such case an abstract of the appropriate marital-status certificate should be submitted.

§ 2. 1. The local organ of state administration investigating the application for issuance of a document attesting to identity may demand that an abstract of the marital-status certificate or another document necessary for the issuance of a document attesting to identity be submitted.

2. The organ referred to in par 1 cannot demand the submission of an abstract of the marital-status certificate if it was prepared in the Office of Registration of Births, Marriages and Deaths in the place in which the person requests the issuance of this document.

§ 3. 1. The organ investigating the application for issuance of a document attesting to identity verifies, on the application, that arrival registration for permanent residence has been accomplished and obtains, from the appropriate Office of Registration of Births, Marriages and Deaths, confirmation that the data in the application is correct, or confirms this data on the basis of the abstract of the marital-status certificate which was submitted.

2. The person submitting the application is given a certificate showing that the application has been made; this certificate must be returned when the document attesting to identity is received.

§ 4. 1. The document attesting to identity is received in person.

2. The persons receiving a personal identity card for the first time are handed this document in a ceremonial form.

3. A temporary personal identity card or a temporary certificate of identity made out for a person up to 16 years old is received by this person in the presence of his lawful representative or legal guardian.

§ 5. 1. A personal identity card is a booklet measuring 11.5 by 8.5 centimeters, with a dark-green cloth cover; it contains 20 gray-green pages.

2. Annex No 1 to the order illustrates a personal identity card.

§ 6. 1. A temporary personal identity card is a booklet measuring 10.5 by 8.5 centimeters, with a red cloth cover; it contains 12 pink pages.

2. A temporary certificate of identity is a booklet measuring 10.5 by 8.5 centimeters, with a gray paperboard cover; this certificate contains 12 light-gray pages.

3. Annex No 2 describes a temporary personal identity card and Annex No 3 to the order describes a temporary certificate of identity.

§ 7. 1. Local organs of state administration at the primary level maintain documentation connected with the issuance, exchange, return and loss of these documents.

2. The Minister of Internal Affairs defines the method of maintaining the documentation referred to in par 1.

Chapter 2. Entries in Document Attesting to Identity

§ 8. 1. In addition to the entries described in art 37 and 39 of the law dated 10 April 1974 on population records and personal identity cards (DZIENNIK USTAW, 1984, No 32, item 174), hereinafter called "the law", the following entries may be made in personal identity cards and temporary personal identity cards:

1) on the authority to cross the border of the Polish People's Republic into states with whom agreements have been concluded on facilitation of movement of travelers,

2) on issuance of currency-exchange booklets,

3) on blood type,

4) record number,

5) on having the right to conduct economic activity,

6) on conducting creative activity or performing the functions of an artist,

7) on working a farm, singly or jointly with someone else,

8) on issuance of ration coupons.

2. In temporary certificates of identity, in addition to the entries described in art 37 and 39 of the law, entries may be made on blood type, the record number, and on the issuance of ration coupons.

§ 9. 1. Entries on arrival and departure registration and entry of the record number are made by the local organs of station administration at the primary level in the spaces designated for these entries.

2. In case of change of permanent residence or temporary residence of over 2 months' duration the document attesting to identity should be submitted to the competent local organ of state administration for the purpose of making the appropriate entry in this document.

§ 10. 1. Entries about children or deletions of these entries are made by:

1) local organs of state administration at the primary level by issuance of a document attesting to identity, based on submitted or available marital-status certificates or legally valid court verdicts,

2) managers of Offices of Registration of Births, Marriages and Deaths when preparing or completing certificates of birth or death.

2. In order for entries to be made on one's own children, adopted children, or those under one's care, and on the changes related thereto, a document attesting to identity must be presented to the organ specified in par 1 within 14 days of the occurrence of the event.

§ 11. 1. Entries on changes in marital status are made by the managers of the Offices of Registration of Births, Marriages and Deaths applicable from the standpoint of the place in which the certificate of change of status was prepared, or by managers of those offices applicable from the standpoint of the permanent residence of the person involved, on the basis of available or submitted marital-status certificates or legally valid court verdicts.

2. Entries on changes of marital status are made on the "Official Annotations" page using a stamp like the one shown in Annex No 4 to the order.

3. In order for entries to be made on changes in marital status, a document attesting to identity must be presented within 14 days from the date of the change.

§ 12. 1. Workplaces make entries in documents attesting to identity as follows:

1) on date of employment and date of discharge of employees and persons working on a contract basis,

2) on date of conclusion and dissolution of an agency agreement or an agreement with a person working on a commission basis who is operating an establishment or performing services according to rules defined in specific regulations,

3) on the date of employment and date of discharge of employees working in the establishments of the persons referred to in pt 2.

2. Entries on date of employment and discharge from work of persons employed:

1) in private workplaces which have legal status, are made by this workplace,

2) in private workplaces which do not have legal status and by natural persons, and also by foreign legal persons (corporate bodies) and natural persons, are made by the local organs of state administration at the primary level applicable from the standpoint of the person's place of employment.

3. When being employed or discharged from work a document should be presented attesting to identity so that the appropriate entry can be made.

4. The persons employed in the workplaces described in par 2 pt 2, when presenting the identity document for entry of date of employment or discharge, also submit proof of their application for social security or proof that such coverage has ceased.

5. If a person is employed in more than one workplace, an entry on employment is made by each workplace. This provision applies also to entries made by local organs of state administration.

6. The entry is made on the page on the page "Employment Annotations" using the stamp described in Annex 5 to the order.

§ 13. 1. In the personal identity cards of soldiers the entries on performance of military service and discharge from this service are made by the appropriate military units.

§ 14. Entries on the right to cross the border of the Polish People's Republic are made by the appropriate passport offices of the place of permanent residence of the person who has a personal identity card or a temporary personal identity card.

§ 15. Entries on issuance of a currency exchange booklet are made by the Polish National Bank and other institutions authorized to issue such booklets.

§ 16. Entries on blood type are made according to the procedures and rules described in separate regulations of health service institutions designated by the Minister of Health and Social Welfare in consultation with the involved ministers.

§ 17. 1. Entries on the right to engage in economic activity are made in the personal identity cards of persons:

1) engaging in crafts on the basis of proof of an application or permission issued in accordance with regulations on the practice and organization of crafts,

2) engaging in economic activity in the fields of trade, catering (restaurant) and services on the basis of a license issued in accordance with regulations on the practice of trade, and some other types of activity by individuals in the private economy,

3) engaging in professional activity in the fields of construction design on the basis of a license issued in accordance with regulations on the issuance of a license for professional activity in the field of construction design,

4) engaging in profit-making road transport on the basis of a license issued in accordance with regulations on road transport and domestic forwarding of shipments.

2. Entries on the issuance or invalidation of proof of application, license or permission, referred to in par 1, are made by the local organ of state administration competent to issue these authorizations, at the application of the person involved.

3. The competent local organ of state administration may also make entries on the invalidation of proof of application, license or permission by virtue of his office.

4. The invalidation date of proof of application, license or permission is entered in accordance with the final decision made by the competent organ of state administration on withdrawal or expiration of the right.

5. The entries referred to in par 2 are made using the stamp described in Annex 6 to the order.

§ 18. 1. Entries on engaging in creative activity or practicing the profession of artist are made in the personal identity cards of persons:

1) who have a diploma from a higher art school, or from a secondary art school if no advanced art studies are offered in a given field,

2) who are members of an appropriate association of artists or who meet the membership requirements of such an association.

3) who have a certificate, issued on the basis of rules defined in separate regulations, attesting to their practice of the profession of artist.

2. The entries referred to in par 1 are made at the request of the person involved by the local organ of state administration at the primary level competent from the standpoint of the permanent place of residence of the person involved. The entry is made on the page "Official Annotations" using the stamp described in Annex No 7 to the order.

3. In case of loss of the right to practice the profession referred to in par 1, the personal identity card should be presented to the competent local organ of state administration for the purpose of making the applicable entry. The provisions of § 17 par 3 apply accordingly.

§ 19. 1. Entries on persons engaged in farming, singly or jointly, are made at the application of the person involved by the local organ of state administration at the primary level competent from the standpoint of the location of the farm. The entry is made on the page "Official Annotations" using the stamp described in Annex No 8 to the order.

2. Entries on cessation of farming, singly or jointly, can also be made by the competent local organ of state administration at the primary level by virtue of his office.

§ 20. Entries on issuance of ration coupons are made by the workplace or the local organs of state administration at the primary level. Entries are made on the page "Official Annotations" using the stamp described in Annex No 9 to the order.

§ 21. Local organs of state administration at the primary level, as well as the organs, offices, workplaces, health service institutions and organizations specified in § 10-12, § 14 and § 16-20 may summon persons to present documents attesting to identity for the purpose of making the appropriate entries or changes therein.

Chapter 3. Procedure in Case of Exchange or Loss of Documents Attesting to Identity

§ 22. 1. To exchange an identity document the document should be turned in to the office specified in § 1 par 1 together with an application and three photographs.

2. The provisions of § 3 par 2 apply accordingly.

§ 23. 1. In case of change in personal data contained in identity document, the request for its exchange should be made within 14 days of the day the document attesting to the change is received.

2. In case of damage to the identity document or the occurrence of another circumstance which would make it difficult to establish the identity of the owner of the document, a request for exchange should be made immediately.

§ 24. In issuing a new identity document in place of one that is lost the appropriate provisions on issuance of documents apply, except that issuance of a new document may take place after the identity of the person making the application is established.

Chapter 4. Procedure in Case of Loss of Polish Citizenship or Death of the Person Having the Document Attesting to Identity

§ 25. In case of loss of Polish citizenship the personal identity card or the temporary personal identity card should be turned into the office of internal affairs in which the duties ensuing from regulations on foreigners are fulfilled.

§ 26. In case of death of the person having the identity document, the document should be turned in, within 3 days of the death, to the Office of Registration of Births, Marriages and Deaths which is to prepare the certificate of death.

Chapter 5. Final Provisions

§ 27. Where reference is made in the order to a document attesting to identity, it is understood to mean a personal identity card, a temporary personal identity card or a temporary certificate of identity.


§ 28. Council of Ministers order dated 30 August 1974 on documents attesting to identity is no longer valid (DZIENNIK USTAW No 33, item 195; No 16, item 58, 1980; and No 23, item 120, 1981).

§ 29. The order is effective on 1 July 1984.


Chairman of Council of Ministers: (for) /s/ Z. Messner

Annexes to Council of Ministers' Order Dated 19 June 1984 (Item 175)

Annex No 1: Personal Identity Card



(okładka)
Front cover



(wewnętrzna strona okładki) —
Inside front cover

Personal Identity Card

Page 1

1. <i>Nazwisko</i>	Last name												
2. <i>Imiona</i>	Given name(s)												
3. <i>Nazwisko rodowe</i>	Maiden name												
<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 150px; height: 150px; margin: 0 auto; position: relative;"> <div style="position: absolute; top: 50%; left: 50%; transform: translate(-50%, -50%);"> <p><i>Miejsce na fotografii</i></p> <p>Photograph</p> </div> </div>	<p style="text-align: center;">RYSOPIS Description</p> <hr/> <p><i>Wzrost</i> Height</p> <hr/> <p><i>Oczy</i> Eyes</p> <hr/> <p><i>Znaki szczególne</i> Identifying marks</p> <hr/>												
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<i>Nr ewid.</i>													
<p>Record No. _____</p>													
<p>Signature _____</p> <p><i>Własnoręczny podpis</i></p>													

Page 2

4. *Imiona rodziców* Parents' names

5. *Data urodzenia* Date of birth

6. *Miejsce urodzenia / miejscowość - gmina*
Place of birth / town - gmina

7. *Województwo* Province

8. *Stan cywilny* Marital status

9. *Organ wydający dowód osobisty*
Office issuing personal identity card

pieczęć Seal

Data wydania
Date issued

Page 3

[illegible]

Page 4

POUCZENIE

1. Dowód osobisty należy chronić przed utratą lub zniszczeniem.
2. W razie utraty dowodu osobistego należy zawiadomić o tym w ciągu 24 godzin najbliższy terenowy organ administracji państwowej stopnia podstawowego a o nowy dowód osobisty należy wystąpić do terenowego organu właściwego ze względu na miejsce stałego pobytu.
3. W razie zmiany danych osobowych, uszkodzenia bądź wyczerpania się miejsca na dokonywanie nowych wpisów posiadacz dowodu osobistego jest obowiązany wystąpić z wnioskiem o jego wymianę.
4. Wpisy i skreślenia w dowodzie osobistym mogą być dokonywane tylko przez uprawnione organy i instytucje.
5. Posiadacz dowodu osobistego jest obowiązany okazywać ten dokument uprawnionym organom i instytucjom; w interesie zatem posiadacza wskazane jest noszenie dowodu osobistego przy sobie.

Dowód osobisty zawiera 20 stron.

(wewnętrzna strona okładki)
Inside back cover

INSTRUCTIONS


1. The personal identity card should be protected against loss or damage.
2. In case of loss, the nearest local organ of state administration at the primary level should be notified within 24 hours and an application for a new personal identity card should be made at the local organ competent from the standpoint of the place of permanent residence.
3. In case of change in personal data, damage, or lack of further space for new entries, the holder of the personal identity card is required to make an application for its exchange.
4. Entries and deletions in a personal identity card may be made only by authorized organs and institutions.
5. The holder of a personal identity card is required to show this document to authorized organs and institutions; therefore, it is in the interest of the holder to carry his personal identity card with him.

A personal identity card consists of 20 pages.

Annex No 2: Temporary Personal Identity Card

Polish People's Republic

**POLSKA
RZECZPOSPOLITA
LUDOWA**



**TYMCZASOWY
DOWÓD
OSOBISTY**

Temporary Personal Identity Card

(okładka)
Front cover


**TYMCZASOWY DOWÓD OSOBISTY
JEST DOKUMENTEM STWIERDZAJĄCYM
TOŻSAMOŚĆ OSOBY ORAZ
POŚWIADCZAJĄCYM OBYWATELSTWO
POLSKIE**

A temporary personal identity card is a document attesting to the identity of a person and certifying his Polish citizenship.

(wewnętrzna strona okładki)
Inside front cover

Polish People's Republic

**POLSKA
RZECZPOSPOLITA
LUDOWA**



**TYMCZASOWY
DOWÓD
OSOBISTY**

Temporary Personal Identity Card

Page 1

1. Nazwisko Last name

2. Imiona First name(s)

Miejsce na fotografię
Photograph

Nr ewid.

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Record No.

Signature

Własnoręczny podpis

Page 2

3. Imiona rodziców Parents' names	
4. Data urodzenia Date of birth	
5. Miejsce urodzenia (miejscowość - gmina) Place of birth / town - gmina	
6. Województwo Province	
7. Ważny do Valid until (date)	
8. Organ wydający tymczasowy dowód osobisty Office issuing temporary personal identity card	
pieczęć Seal	
Data wydania Date issued	

Page 3

Employment Annotations ADNOTACJE O ZATRUDNIENIU	
przyjęcia Date of employ- ment	zwolnienia Date of dis- charge

Page 8

Arrival registration ZAMELDOWANIE (dokładny adres)		
Full address		
Seal mp.	Date dnia	Signature podpis
Departure registration WYMELDOWANIE		
Seal mp.	Date dnia	Signature podpis
Arrival registration ZAMELDOWANIE (dokładny adres)		
Full address		
Seal mp.	Date dnia	Signature podpis
Departure registration WYMELDOWANIE		
Seal mp.	Date dnia	Signature podpis

Pages 4,5,6, and 7

Official Annotations ADNOTACJE URZĘDOWE

Pages 9,10,11,12

POUCZENIE

1. Tymczasowy dowód osobisty należy chronić przed utratą lub zniszczeniem.
2. W razie utraty tymczasowego dowodu osobistego należy zawiadomić o tym w ciągu 24 godzin najbliższy terenowy organ administracji państwowej stopnia podstawowego. O nowy dokument stwierdzający tożsamość należy wystąpić do terenowego organu właściwego ze względu na miejsce stałego pobytu.
3. W razie zmiany danych osobowych, uszkodzenia bądź wyczerpania się miejsca na dokonywanie nowych wpisów posiadacz tymczasowego dowodu osobistego jest obowiązany wystąpić z wnioskiem o jego wymianę.
4. Wpisy i skreślenia w tymczasowym dowodzie osobistym mogą być dokonywane tylko przez uprawnione organy i instytucje.
5. Posiadacz tymczasowego dowodu osobistego jest obowiązany okazywać ten dokument uprawnionym organom i instytucjom; w interesie zatem posiadacza wskazane jest noszenie tymczasowego dowodu osobistego przy sobie.

Tymczasowy dowód osobisty
zawiera 12 stron.

(wewnętrzna strona okładki)
Inside back cover

INSTRUCTIONS


1. The temporary personal identity card should be protected against loss or damage.
2. In case of loss, the nearest local organ of state administration at the primary level should be notified within 24 hours. An application for a new document attesting to identity should be made to the local organ competent from the standpoint of the place of permanent residence.
3. In case of change in personal data, damage, or lack of further space for new entries, the holder of the temporary personal identity card is required to make an application for its exchange.
4. Entries and deletions in temporary personal identity cards may be made only by authorized organs and institutions.
5. The holder of a temporary personal identity card is required to show this document to authorized organs and institutions; therefore, it is in the interest of the holder to carry his temporary personal identity card with him.

A temporary personal identity card consists of 12 pages.

Annex No 3: Temporary Certificate of Identity

Polish People's Republic

**POLSKA
RZECZPOSPOLITA
LUDOWA**



**TYMCZASOWE
ZASWIADCZENIE
TOŻSAMOŚCI**

Temporary Certificate of
Identity

(okładka)
Front cover


**TYMCZASOWE
ZASWIADCZENIE TOŻSAMOŚCI
STWIERDZA WYŁĄCZNIE
TOŻSAMOŚĆ OSOBY**

A temporary certificate of
identity attests only to
the identity of a person

(wewnętrzna strona okładki;
Inside front cover

Polish People's Republic


**POLSKA
RZECZPOSPOLITA
LUDOWA**



**TYMCZASOWE
ZASWIADCZENIE
TOŻSAMOŚCI**

Temporary certificate of
identity

Page 1

1. Nazwisko Last name																					
2. Imiona name(s)																					
3. Nazwisko rodowe Maiden name																					
 <p>Miejsce na fotografię Photograph</p>	Description RYSOPIS																				
	Wzrost Height																				
	Oczy Eyes																				
	Znaki szczególne Identifying marks																				
	Signature																				
Własnoręczny podpis																					
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Nr ewid.																					
Record No.																					

Page 2

Page 3Page 4Page 5

Pages 6,7

Employment Annotations
ADNOTACJE O ZATRUDNIENIU

przyjęcia	zwolnienia
Date of employment	Date of discharge

Pages 8,9

Official Annotations
ADNOTACJE URZĘDOWE

Pages 10,11,12

POUCZENIE

1. Tymczasowe zaświadczenie tożsamości należy chronić przed utratą lub zniszczeniem.
2. W razie utraty tymczasowego zaświadczenia tożsamości należy zawiadomić o tym w ciągu 24 godzin najbliższy terenowy organ administracji państwowej stopnia podstawowego. O nowe tymczasowe zaświadczenie tożsamości należy wystąpić do terenowego organu właściwego ze względu na miejsce stałego pobytu.
3. W razie zmiany danych osobowych, uszkodzenia bądź wyczerpania się miejsca na dokonywanie nowych wpisów posiadacz tymczasowego zaświadczenia tożsamości jest obowiązany wystąpić z wnioskiem o jego wymianę.
4. Wpisy i skreślenia w tymczasowym zaświadczeniu tożsamości mogą być dokonywane tylko przez uprawnione organy i instytucje.
5. Posiadacz tymczasowego zaświadczenia tożsamości jest obowiązany okazywać ten dokument uprawnionym organom i instytucjom; w interesie zatem posiadacza wskazane jest noszenie tymczasowego zaświadczenia tożsamości przy sobie.

Tymczasowe zaświadczenie tożsamości
zawiera 12 stron.

(wewnętrzna strona okładki)
Inside back cover

INSTRUCTIONS

1. The temporary certificate of identity should be protected against loss or damage.
2. In case of loss, the nearest local organ of state administration at the primary level should be notified within 24 hours. An application for a new temporary certificate of identity should be made to the local organ competent from the standpoint of the place of permanent residence.
3. In case of change in personal data, damage, or lack of further space for new entries, the holder of the temporary certificate of identity is required to make an application for its exchange.
4. Entries and deletions in temporary certificate of identity may be made only by authorized organs and institutions.
5. The holder of the temporary certificate of identity is required to show this document to authorized organs and institutions; therefore, it is in the interest of the holder to carry his temporary certificate of identity with him.

A temporary certificate of identity
consists of 12 pages

Annex No 4: Stamps Used to Make Entries in Identity Documents on Changes in Marital Status

Office of Registration of Births, Marriages
Urząd Stanu Cywilnego and Deaths
w in (town)
certifies that the person holding this
stwierdza, że osoba posiadająca niniejszy dokument
zawarła związek małżeński z ob.
document was married to (name)
dnia on (date) and now i nosi nazwisko
bears the name (name)
Akt nr
Cert. No.

.....
(date) (data)

Office Manager
Kierownik
Urzędu Stanu Cywilnego

Seal mp

Office of Registration of Births, Marriages
Urząd Stanu Cywilnego and Deaths
w in (town)
certifies that the marriage of the person
stwierdza, że małżeństwo osoby posiadającej
niniejszy dokument z ob.
holding this document to (name)
was dissolved by divorce (annulment)
zostało rozwiązane przez rozwód (unieważnione)
z dniem on (date)
wyrokiem sądu w by a court verdict in (town)
Sygn. akt Cert. signed by (signature)
Ob. nosi nazwisko Citizen's name

.....
(date) (data)

Office Manager
Kierownik
Urzędu Stanu Cywilnego

Seal mp

Office of Registration of Births, Marriages
Urząd Stanu Cywilnego and Deaths
w in (town)
certifies that the husband (wife) of the
stwierdza, że małżonek (ka) osoby posiadającej
niniejszy dokument ob.
(name) died on zmarł(a) dnia (date)
Akt nr
Cert. No.
(date) (data)

Office Manager
Kierownik
Urzędu Stanu Cywilnego

Seal mp

The stamps measure 75 mm by 30 mm.

Annex No 5: Stamps Used to Make Entries in Identity Documents on Employment and Discharge from Work

Name of workplace Nazwa zakładu pracy (town)(miejsowość) Employed on Przyjęt... do pracy dnia (date) podpis signature	Name of workplace Nazwa zakładu pracy (town)(miejsowość) Discharged on Zwolnion... z pracy dnia (date) podpis signature
Employed on *) Przyjęt... do pracy dnia ... (date) (miejsowość) (podpis) (town) (signature)	Discharged on *) Zwolnion... z pracy dnia .. (date) (miejsowość) (podpis) (town) (signature)

Stamps measure 25 mm by 15 mm.

*) Stamps used to make entries on employment and discharge from work, used by local organs of state administration who enters the type of workplace, e.g., crafts, farming or horticulture, church or convent, trade or restaurant establishment, household, or private-home servants.

Annex No 6: Stamps Used to Make Entries in Identity Documents on Issuance of Authority to Engage in Economic Activity or the Invalidation of This Authority

Name of organ of state administration (Nazwa organu administracji państwowej)	
Wydano uprawnienie do wykonywania rzemiosła Authority issued to engage in crafts	
..... (date) (podpis) (signature)
Authority invalidated on Uprawnienie utraciło ważność dnia (date)	
..... (date) (signature) (podpis)

Name of organ of state administration (Nazwa organu administracji państwowej)	
(1) Wydano zezwolenie (pozwolenie) na prowadzenie handlu, gastronomii, usług, działalności zawodowej w zakresie projektowania w budownictwie, transportu drogowego zarobkowego *)	
..... (data) (date) (signature) (podpis)
License invalidated on Zezwolenie utraciło ważność dnia ... (date)	
..... (data) (date) (signature) (podpis)

(1) A license (permit) has been issued for engagement in trade, restaurant services or other services, professional activity in construction design or profit-making road transport.

*) Cross out inapplicable words.

The stamps, which measure 60 mm by 30 mm, are made up of two parts divided by a horizontal line at a height of 10 mm.

Annex No 7: Stamps Used to Make Entries in Identity Documents on Practicing a Profession

Name of organ of state administration (Nazwa organu administracji państwowej)	
Wykonuje działalność twórczą lub zawód artysty *)	
Engages in creative activity or art profession	
..... (data) (date) (signature) (podpis)

Wpis o wykonywaniu działalności twórczej lub zawodu artysty utracił ważność *)	
Entry on engaging in creative activity or art profession has been invalidated	
..... (data) (date) (signature) (podpis)

*) Cross out inapplicable words; give field of activity or profession

Stamps measure 60 mm by 15 mm.

Annex No 8: Stamps Used in Making Entries in Identity Documents on Operating a Farm (Singly or Jointly)

Name of organ of state administration (Nazwa organu administracji państwowej)	
Engaged in farming (singly, jointly) in Prowadzi (współprowadzi)*) gospodarstwo rolne w (town, lowest territorial unit) /	
(miejscowość, jednostka podziału terytorialnego kraju stopnia podstawowego)	
..... (data) (date) (podpis) (signature)

Wpis o prowadzeniu (współprowadzeniu)*) gospodarstwa rolnego utracił ważność Entry on engaging in farming (singly, jointly) has been invalidated	
..... (data) (date) (podpis) (signature)

*) Cross out inapplicable word; by jointly it is understood to mean with spouse, progenitors, progeny, siblings, related persons in this same line or level, adopted person and his spouse, and also person with whom one is in actual cohabitation status, working on the farm.

Stamps measure 60 mm by 30 mm.

Annex No 9: Stamps Used in Making Entries in Identity Cards on Issuance of Ration Coupons

Name of workplace or organ of state administration Nazwa zakładu pracy lub organu administracji państwowej	
W dniu .On. (date)..... wydano (number)*) wkładek zaopatrzenia. ration coupons were issued. Podpis ... (signature)...	

*) Number of ration coupons issued is entered.

Stamp measures 50 mm by 20 mm. It is made up of two parts separated by a horizontal line at a height of 10 mm.

Registration Requirements

Warsaw DZIENNIK USTAW in Polish No 32, 30 Jun 84 pp 404-408 item 176

[Text] Minister of Internal Affairs Order Dated 28 June 1984 on Fulfillment of the Registration Requirement and Population Records-Keeping

Based on art 51 par 1 and 3 of the law dated 10 April 1974 on population records and personal identity cards (DZIENNIK USTAW No 32, item 174, 1984), it is ordered as follows:

Chapter 1. General Provisions

§ 1. 1. The registration requirement which consists of arrival upon registration and departure from place of permanent or temporary residence is fulfilled by submitting the information required in the order, within the time limits specified in the law dated 10 April 1974 on population records and personal identity cards (DZIENNIK USTAW No 32, item 174, 1984), hereinafter called "the law."

2. The data required for arrival and departure registration is submitted on registration forms, unless the provisions of the order state otherwise.

§ 2. His lawful representative or other person exercising actual care at the place of their joint residence fulfills the registration requirement for a minor.

§ 3. 1. Arrival registration for permanent or temporary residence takes place at a designated address.

2. The address is described by giving:

1) in towns: the name of the town (district), street, number of the house and premises (rooms), and in addition, in towns which are not the headquarters of the provincial authorities, the name of the province,

2) in gminas: the name of the town, the number of the house and premises (rooms), the names of the gmina and province.

3. The provisions of par 1 and 2 apply to the arrival registration of persons staying permanently or temporarily on an inland-navigation or ocean-going ship or other mobile housing accommodations.

§ 4. 1. A change of permanent or temporary residence in the same town must be registered.

2. A change of temporary residence to permanent residence, even if it is in the same town and at the same address, requires arrival registration for permanent residence.

§ 5. The office which keeps population records makes available to owners (managers) of buildings forms for notifications of departure registration from permanent residence and deaths within 7 days of the date that these notifications are received.

§ 6. The following are exempt from the requirement to register for temporary residence:

- 1) children up to age 7, for a period not exceeding 2 months,
- 2) parents coming to their children and grandparents to their grandchildren, for a period not exceeding 30 days.

Chapter 2. Arrival Registration

§ 7. 1. The following information should be submitted when registering for permanent residence:

- 1) surname (maiden name and name from former marriage) and given name(s),
- 2) full names of parents, including maiden name,
- 3) date and place of birth,
- 4) marital status,
- 5) full name of spouse,
- 6) surname, given name(s), date and place of birth of children up to age 18 and persons under legal or factual care, subject to registration and not having temporary personal identity cards or temporary certificates of identity,
- 7) address of new place of permanent residence,
- 8) date of arrival for permanent residence,
- 9) address of previous place of permanent residence,
- 10) education and acquired profession or trade,
- 11) place of work and occupation,
- 12) military obligation (subject to or not subject to), military grade, name and number of military identity document with indication of applicable military recruitment board in which the records of the person registering arrival are kept, or confirmation that pre-conscription registration requirement has been fulfilled,
- 13) designation of identity document,

14) confirmation of residence, made by landlord or renter, or person who has a cooperative right to the premises, or the owner of the premises,

15) confirmation of the right to reside in the premises (rooms), made by the owner (manager) of the building.

2. The information described in par 1 is submitted by filling out and signing a form "Report of Permanent Residence."

§ 8. If the person reporting permanent residence does not submit confirmation of the right to reside in the premises (rooms) in which the registration is to take place, he may register only for temporary residence of up to 2 months' duration if he is staying in these premises (rooms).

§ 9. 1. When registering for permanent residence, proof of departure registration from former place of permanent residence must be shown. Until this proof is shown, the person reporting residence can be registered only for temporary residence for a period of up to 2 months.

2. The proof of departure registration referred to in par 1 is not required at the registration of persons arriving from permanent residence abroad.

§ 10. Arrival registration for permanent residence on an inland-navigation vessel may be done through the manager of the navigation enterprise employing the crew member, or through an authorized employee of this enterprise.

§ 11. Registration for temporary residence of up to 2 months' duration is done verbally, giving date of arrival, address, and intended period of stay, and presenting a document attesting to identity or other document by which identity can be established.

§ 12. 1. When registering for temporary residence of over 2 months' duration, the information listed in § 7, par 1, pts 1-6 and 10-15 should be given, the address of place of permanent and temporary residence, the intended duration of stay and the circumstances justifying this stay. This information is submitted by filling out and signing a form "Report of Temporary Residence of Over 2 Months' Duration."

2. The provisions of § 8 apply accordingly.

§ 13. 1. Registration for temporary residence in the establishments specified in art 18 of the law and in establishments furnishing accommodations in connection with work, study or social care, is done verbally with the manager of the establishment or an authorized employee, giving the date of arrival, intended duration of stay, and presenting a document attesting to identity or other document by which identity can be established.

2. The employee receiving the report enters the following data into the registration book:

1) surname and given name(s),

- 2) parents' names,
- 3) date and place of birth,
- 4) address of place of permanent residence,
- 5) arrival date and intended duration of stay,
- 6) designation of identity document.

The person receiving the report confirms the data entered into the registration book by his signature.

3. If the intended duration of stay is to be longer than 2 months, the report of this residence is made by the method described in § 12 par 1.

§ 14. 1. Registration for temporary residence in an establishment furnishing accommodations in connection with medical treatment is done verbally with the manager of the establishment or an authorized employee, presenting a document attesting to identity or another document by which identity can be established.

2. The provisions of § 13 par 2 and 3 apply accordingly.

§ 15. 1. Registration for temporary residence on an ocean-going vessel or in a mobile housing accommodation, of the persons referred to in art 7 par 2 of the law, can be done through the manager of the workplace employing these persons or another authorized employee.

2. The provisions of § 12 par 1 and § 13 apply accordingly.

§ 16. When registering the arrival of the participants of a tour described in art 20 of the law, the tour leader presents a list containing the following information on the participants: surname and given name(s), date of birth, address of place of permanent residence, and designation of identity document.

§ 17. Persons fulfilling the registration requirement for temporary residence may, at their request, receive confirmation of the registration.

Chapter 3. Departure Registration

§ 18. 1. The following information should be submitted in registering departure from the present place of permanent residence:

- 1) surname (maiden name and name from former marriage) and given name(s),
- 2) surname and given names of parents, including maiden name,
- 3) date and place of birth,
- 4) surnames and given names, dates and places of birth of children up to 18 years of age and persons under legal or factual care, subject to departure and not having temporary personal identity cards or temporary certificates of identity,

- 5) address of present place of permanent residence,
- 6) date of departure from place of permanent residence,
- 7) address of new place of permanent residence,
- 8) military obligation (subject to or not subject to), military grade, name and number of military identity document with indication of applicable military recruitment board in which the records of the person registering departure are kept, or confirmation that pre-conscription registration requirement has been fulfilled,
- 9) designation of identity document,
- 10) designation of owner (manager) of building.

2. The information described in par 1 is submitted by filling out and signing a form "Report of Departure Registration From Place of Permanent Residence."

§ 19. Departure registration from place of temporary residence of up to 2 months' duration before the expiration of the period reported at arrival registration is done verbally.

§ 20. When registering departure from a place of temporary residence of over 2 months' duration, the information described in § 18 par 1, pts 1-4 and 8-10 should be submitted, the address of the place of permanent address, and also the address and date of departure from the place of temporary residence. This information is submitted by filling out and signing a form "Report of Departure Registration From Place of Temporary Residence of Over 2 Months' Duration."

§ 21. 1. When reporting departure abroad for temporary residence of over 2 months' duration, the following information is submitted:

- 1) surname (maiden name and name from former marriage) and given name(s),
- 2) surname and given names of parents, including maiden name,
- 3) date and place of birth,
- 4) address of place of permanent residence,
- 5) date of departure, intended duration of stay abroad, and address of place of this stay,
- 6) surnames, given name(s), dates and places of birth of children up to 18 years of age and persons under legal or factual care, departing jointly and not having temporary personal identity cards or temporary certificates of identity,
- 7) military obligation (subject to or not subject to), military grade, name and number of military identity document with indication of applicable military recruitment board in which the records of the person reporting departure abroad are kept, or confirmation that the pre-conscription registration requirement has been accomplished,

8) designation of identity document,

9) designation of owner (manager) of building.

2. The information referred to in par 1 is submitted by filling out and signing a form "Report of Departure Abroad for Temporary Residence of Over 2 Months' Duration."

3. Report of return is done verbally.

§ 22. In departure registration the provisions of § 10 and 13-6 apply accordingly.

Chapter 4. Fulfillment of Registration Requirement by Foreigners

§ 23. In the fulfillment of the registration requirement by foreigners, the provisions of the order together with the changes ensuing from this chapter apply.

§ 24. 1. When registering for permanent arrival the foreigner submits the information described in § 7 par 1, pts 1-11 and 13-15, gives his citizenship and presents his foreigner's permanent residence card, and if the former place of residence of the foreigner was abroad, he also presents confirmation of arrival registration for temporary residence.

2. Registration for permanent residence takes place in the town specified in the foreigner's permanent residence card.

3. The information referred to in par 1 is submitted by filling out and signing a form "Report of Permanent Residence."

§ 25. 1. When registering for permanent residence the foreigner submits the following information:

1) surname and given name(s),

2) date, place and country of birth,

3) citizenship,

4) surname, given name(s), and dates and places of birth of children up to 18 years of age subject to arrival registration,

5) date that border of the Polish People's Republic was crossed,

6) address of place of temporary residence and intended duration of stay,

7) date and purpose of arrival in that town (name of institution to which he is coming),

8) designation of document authorizing his stay in the Polish People's Republic.

2. The information described in par 1 is submitted by filling out a form "Report of Foreigner's Temporary Residence."

3. If the intended duration of a foreigner's stay exceeds 2 months, the provisions of § 7 par 1, pt 15, apply.

§ 26. 1. Registration for temporary residence in hotels or in establishments furnishing accommodations in connection with medical treatment or rest, by the foreigner, is accomplished with the manager of the establishment or an authorized employee, presenting a document authorizing his stay in the Polish People's Republic and submitting the information referred to in § 25 par 1.

2. The manager or employee of the establishment, based on the information submitted and the documents presented, fills out a form "Report of Foreigner's Temporary Residence." The form is signed by the person who receives the report.

3. During a period of high tourist traffic the method of registration described in § 13 par 1 and 2 can be used in relation to foreigners staying in the establishments referred to in par 1.

§ 27. 1. Tour participants are registered on the basis of passports or other documents authorizing their stay in the Polish People's Republic and also on the basis of a list of participants.

2. The list of participants presented by the tour leader should contain the following information on the participants: full names, dates of birth and designation of documents referred to in par 1.

3. The provisions of § 26 par 2 do not apply.

§ 28. When a foreigner registers his departure from a place of permanent residence, he submits the information described in § 18 par 1, pts 1-7, 9 and 10, gives his citizenship and presents a document authorizing his stay in the Polish People's Republic. This information is submitted by filling out and signing a form "Report of Departure Registration from Permanent Residence."

§ 29. 1. When registering departure from a place of temporary residence prior to expiration of the period of stay reported at arrival registration, the foreigner submits the information referred to in § 18 par 1, pts 1-4 and 9, giving his citizenship, date of departure and address of place of temporary residence, and presents a document authorizing his stay in the Polish People's Republic. He submits this information by filling out and signing a form "Report of Foreigner's Departure Registration."

2. If the foreigner's duration of stay exceeds 2 months, the provisions of § 18 par 1, pt 10 apply.

3. The foreigner verbally reports his departure from the establishments referred to in § 26, presenting a document authorizing his stay in the Polish People's Republic.

§ 30. The provisions of § 6 do not apply to foreigners.

Chapter 5. Keeping Population Records

§ 31. 1. Local organs of state administration at the primary level keep a register of permanent inhabitants in the form of individual personnel cards on all inhabitants.

2. The register of permanent inhabitants of towns is kept in a territorial form, broken down according to streets and buildings, and houses and apartments in those houses.

3. The register of permanent inhabitants of a gmina are kept in a territorial form, according to villages and houses, and also, if necessary, the apartments in those houses.

4. If the register covers inhabitants of a town and gmina, it is kept according to the rules described in par 2 and 3.

§ 32. 1. The register of permanent inhabitants covers all persons registered for permanent residence in a given area.

2. The registration for permanent residence is reported immediately to the organ competent from the standpoint of the present place of permanent residence.

3. In case of change of place of permanent residence, the organ keeping the register transfers the personnel card on the inhabitant to the organ competent from the standpoint of the new place of permanent residence after obtaining notification of registration for permanent residence. This notification is put into a separate record, called a "former-inhabitants' file." The former-inhabitants' file is maintained as described in § 31 par 2-4.

4. In case of a person's departure for permanent residence abroad, or his death, his personnel card is transferred to the former-inhabitants' file. If the person went abroad for a temporary stay and remained there permanently, his card is transferred to the former-inhabitants' file after receipt of notification, from the appropriate passport office, that he is remaining there permanently or has refused to return to Poland.

5. If a person registered for permanent residence in a given town stays permanently outside of this town and his place of residence is not known, the personnel card is transferred, after a clarifying procedure is conducted, to a records section called a "temporary file."

6. When a decision on departure registration, issued on the basis of art 15 par 2, becomes final, the personnel card is transferred to the former-inhabitants' file.

§ 33. Changes of information contained on the inhabitant's personnel card are entered as they occur on the basis of reports of arrival or departure registration or on notifications about changes in this information (change in marital status, surname or given name, citizenship, identity document, record number, the remaining of a person abroad permanently, changes relating to his

military defense obligation), and also on the basis of decisions made by the office maintaining the register of permanent inhabitants.

§ 34. 1. Local organs of state administration on the primary level maintain separate records on persons registered for temporary residence.

2. Records on persons registered for temporary residence are maintained in the form of a file or index of temporary residence.

3. The organ competent from the standpoint of the place of permanent residence is informed immediately about arrival registrations for temporary residence for a period exceeding 2 months.

§ 35. 1. Local organs of state administration on the primary level conduct an alphabetical address-records file on persons who register for permanent residence.

2. In towns divided into districts one combined address-records file is maintained for the entire town.

3. The provisions of § 33 apply accordingly.

§ 36. 1. The Central Address Office maintains an address file and record of temporary residences of over 2 months' duration for the entire country.

2. Local organs of state administration which maintain population records inform the Central Address Office or the Government Information Center for Computer Population Records, on persons to whom record numbers have been assigned, as to registration for permanent residence and temporary residence of over 2 months' duration, as to departure registration from a place of temporary residence of over 2 months' duration, as to departure registrations on the basis of art 15 par 2 of the law, as to changes in first or last name, changes in citizenship, departure for permanent residence abroad, and as to deaths.

Chapter 6. Keeping Population Records in Computer Form

§ 37. 1. Local organs of state administration may keep a register of permanent inhabitants, referred to in § 31 par 1, in the form of a computer data record, called a local population-records computer bank, if this system fulfills, at a minimum, the requirements described in the provisions of § 31 par 2-4, § 32 par 1, and § 35 par 1 and 2.

2. Local organs of state administration maintain a register in the form referred to in par 1 in consultation with the Government Information Center for Computer Population Records, whose principles of operation are described in separate regulations.

§ 38. The computer population-records system covers sets of personnel data for which record numbers have been assigned.

§ 39. Record numbers are assigned by the Government Information Center for Computer Population Records for sets of data on all persons residing permanently in the Polish People's Republic.

§ 40. Local organs of state administration at the province level may, in consultation with the Government Information Center for Computer Population Records, make a record number available to other state organs or institutions, or to units in the socialized economy, for the needs of personnel records maintained within the framework of their statutory obligations.

§ 41. The actions of the local organ of state administration maintaining population records, described in the provisions of § 32, par 2-6 and § 33-35, as regards sets of data covered by the computer population-records system, may be accomplished by computer methods.

§ 42. A computer printout containing the required data taken from the computer population-records system, bearing a seal and the signature of the organ maintaining population records or an authorized employee, replaces the document referred to in § 32, par 2 and 3 and § 34 par 3, as well as other notifications, certificates, confirmations and lists and registers prepared on the basis of population records certificates.

Chapter 7. Giving Out Address Information

§ 43. 1. Information on the address of persons registered for permanent or temporary residence is given out by the local organs of state administration maintaining population records in relation to their operational area, and by the Central Address Office in relation to the entire country.

2. The local organ of state administration at the primary level may specify the persons whose address will be reported only to state institutions.

3. The Central Address Office gives out address information for Polish consular offices and the consular offices of foreign states in the Polish People's Republic.

§ 44. Those wanting to obtain address information should fill out the applicable form and remit the government fee.

Chapter 8. Final Provisions

§ 45. Minister of Internal Affairs Order dated 20 September 1974 on fulfillment of the registration requirement and keeping population records (DZIENNIK USTAW No 33, item 196) is no longer in force.

§ 46. The order is effective on 1 July 1984.

Minister of Internal Affairs: /s/ C. Kiszczak

ROLE, SIGNIFICANCE OF INTELLIGENTSIA EXAMINED

Definition Questioned

Warsaw PROBLEMY MARKSIZMU-LENINIZMU in Polish No 2, Apr-Jun 84 pp 104-113

[Article by Jaroslaw Ladosz: "On the Scientific Value of the Concept of the Intelligentsia"]

[Text] The article by Prof Jaroslaw Ladosz below, as well as the subsequent article by Prof Jerzy J. Wiatr, represent edited versions of papers presented at a conference devoted to aspects of the intelligentsia which was held in February 1984 at the Institute of the Fundamental Problems of Marxism-Leninism (IPPM-L) of the PZPR Central Committee.

I am somewhat in a spot considering that recently I had taken part in a conference dealing with the same topic at the WSNS [Higher School of Social Sciences] and since then I have not developed new reflections on aspects of its theory. What is more, the paper I had presented at that conference is known to at least some of the comrades; in addition, it was published in ZYCIE LITERACKIE.

My merit-based approach also has not changed. I still express skepticism as regards the scientific value of the very category "the intelligentsia." Although this is a frequently employed socialist category, I believe that it is of limited applicability to understanding social processes. As for the other papers presented here, particularly those by Prof. W. Markiewicz and Prof J. Reykowski, I have doubts as to the validity of the concept of the ethos or ethic of the intelligentsia, both in view of the precariousness of the very concept of the intelligentsia and in view of the nature of the term "ethos" as applied to this social group. Even if something of the kind is distinguishable, in my opinion it belongs in the group of ideological illusions expressed in the language of Young Marxism. Illusions also should be investigated, but the point is that we should not only describe the nature of these values and their hierarchical rank within the ethos given but also answer to ourselves the question of what do they really mean, or are they

mystifications, and if yes, of what? We often confine ourselves to a superficial, purely descriptive characterization of ideological problems. I do not believe that this would facilitate our debate as to the intelligentsia's share in the socialist renewal.

So much for prefatory remarks. Now a couple of specific observations.

Above all, I believe that the existing theory of the intelligentsia under socialism, as it appears in the Marxist literature of not only our country but also the entire socialist community, needs to be critiqued. As known, that theory is based on a number of typical axioms such as the class alliance among the working class, the peasantry and the stratum of the intelligentsia, is part of the structural pattern of the socialist society. We are thus dealing with a triple entente, among two classes and one social stratum. In this accepted version of the intelligentsia it is said, in turn, that these three members of societal structure reach mutual rapprochement in the course of the building of socialism. In this process, the stratum of the intelligentsia is to be that "new" intelligentsia. Conferring on it the adjective "people's" or "socialist" is intended to make it clear that this intelligentsia differs in its very origin and nature from the former intelligentsia. And since the working class and the peasantry have undergone transformations, there are no antagonisms among these three members of societal structure. Thus often it is stated that their mutual relations are non-antagonistic. Lastly, it is usually said, especially in recent years, that the role of the intelligentsia grows in the course of social and economic transformations. This is one of the standard and already overprimitivized axioms of the social theory, a theory that is supposed to be Marxist.

In such a schematic treatment it is argued that the number of individuals with a higher or secondary educational background, or of "brain workers" in general, is steadily rising. For example, in the socialist countries--with the exception of Vietnam and China--the number of persons considered as belonging to the intelligentsia is at present much greater than the number of peasants. Formerly these proportions had been reversed. In view of this, the role of the intelligentsia is "growing," at least quantitatively. It is further argued that the role of the intelligentsia is growing owing to the scientific and technical revolution. As known, without technological progress socialism is doomed. Inasmuch as the intelligentsia--here sometimes the adjective "technical" is employed--is the bearer of scientific and technical progress, of the scientific and technical revolution, its role is "growing." It also is often said that the role of the humanist intelligentsia is growing, too, that there is no socialism without a cultural revolution, to which humanists are irreplaceable. Lastly, it is said that, by contrast with capitalism, socialism is not possible without social planning, without a deliberate application of science on an overall scale, and it is precisely the intelligentsia that is the bearer of science.

Thus the fundamental theses of that theory of the three-member societal structure can be very tersely presented as patterns of socialist construction. I believe though that this accepted theory encounters major problems when colliding with the reality of real socialism, particularly in view of the

present Polish crisis. The trend of the criticism of the behavior and attitudes of our native intelligentsia in face of this crisis may prompt the interpretation that the troubles with the intelligentsia are an historical accident which does not discredit theory itself, including the thesis of the rapprochement between the intelligentsia and the working class in measure with advances in building socialism. But if we consider thoroughly the history of socialism in other countries, it can be seen that the role of the intelligentsia in the Polish crisis is not something fortuitous and unique. In 1968 in Czechoslovakia the intelligentsia played a definite role; recalling that crisis, the most official representatives of the Czechoslovak party say that the intelligentsia initiated the counterrevolution and was the last to abandon counterrevolutionary positions (more precisely, not the intelligentsia in general but the academic intelligentsia). Troubles with the intelligentsia also have occurred in the history of the Soviet Union. Consider for example the boycott of Soviet power by the intelligentsia, as analyzed by V. I. Lenin, as well as troubles of another sort (in this case, intra-party) with the intelligentsia gathered at the Institute of the Red Professorship, etc.

Aside from the fact that, as expressed in numerous discussions of the behavior of various social groups during the Polish crisis, mention is made of the disappointment caused by the intelligentsia during that period, we also encounter views that are particularly reflected in the position of A. Schaff. He believes that, ever since the beginning of People's Poland, the Polish intelligentsia has been antisocialist and anti-Soviet by nature. I believe that this kind of theory of the intelligentsia and of its place in the process of the evolving socialism is not defensible. It displays major flaws and, when its intrinsic structure is analyzed more closely, it is found to contain a number of various contradictions of a theoretical nature.

These problems already begin at the point of departure, that is, with the definition of the intelligentsia as a social group. I have collected nearly 50 such definitions from various encyclopedias published in many countries. Their review and analysis point to the considerable confusion existing on this point both in the East and in the West, among Marxists as well as among their opponents. Even major publishers provide definitions that are either burdened by tautology or simply conflicting, while texts elaborating on the concept provide examples that conflict with the definition itself. Many instances of this kind could also be cited from Polish sociological literature. The confusion as regards definition is not, however, what matters most. What is noteworthy is that Marxist literature still continues to treat the intelligentsia as a suprahistorical category. This refers to the universal interpretation of the intelligentsia in the primitive, slave-holding, feudal society, in which all who work with their minds are termed the intelligentsia. The basis for this interpretation of the intelligentsia is the fact of the division of labor into mental work and physical work. This is one tendency while another, seemingly more "historical," already concerns the socialist societies. Recently I perused the definitions of the intelligentsia that occur most often in the pertinent literature in Poland and in the Soviet Union, or in Poland and Hungary on the one hand and in the Soviet Union on the other. Thus, in the Soviet Union the intelligentsia is most often defined as the totality of persons with specialized-secondary or higher educational

background, along with some nuances: an "intelligent" [member of the intelligentsia] is someone who does not necessarily have to do "mental" work (for example, a pensioner or a homemaker), so long as he or she has a specialized secondary or higher educational background. In Poland and Hungary, on the other hand, the intelligentsia are construed solely to be persons with a higher educational background.

I pondered the reasons for this difference: why is it that in the Soviet Union technicians are included among the intelligentsia but not in Poland? The reason is clear: it is simply that the structure of the ministries in these countries is different! In the Soviet Union there is a single ministry that administers both secondary and higher education, whereas in Poland and Hungary there exists a ministry of higher education separate from ministries of elementary and secondary education. At the same time, in all these countries there is a common tendency not to identify the intelligentsia solely with the professionals ["mental workers"]. Soviet literature states that it is precisely persons with higher and eventually specialized secondary education that are members of the intelligentsia. As for persons who perform various kinds of mental work but whose educational background is below secondary specialized education, they are not included among the intelligentsia. For example, the category of "service" workers (roughly speaking, service and clerical personnel) is isolated and all those in this category are excluded from the intelligentsia even though they perform mental work. Thus, in the Soviet Union, government employees do not automatically belong to the intelligentsia even though they perform mental work, unless they have a secondary specialized or higher educational background. Similarly, Polish statistics, which until recently had accepted the division into mental workers and physical workers, has at the same time pointed out that the number of persons with higher education among mental workers is the same as the number of persons with incomplete secondary education and sometimes with incomplete elementary education. Thus, the criterion of performing mental work is not a sufficient condition for classifying an individual as belonging to the intelligentsia.

These ambiguities promote, in socialist countries, the tendency toward making specific exclusions from the framework of the overall definition of the intelligentsia as the totality of persons engaging in mental work. Often, however, these exclusions are of an arbitrary nature that is sometimes contingent, as I have pointed out, on the structure of ministries. Given such an approach, the aforementioned formula of the triple entente of the two basic social classes and the stratum of the intelligentsia forfeits its consistency. After all, a tremendous number of people, often greater than the number of members of the intelligentsia "proper," or even greater than the number of peasants "proper," are caused by these exclusions to hang in the political void, as it were, if the class-and-stratum nature of that triple entente is to be consistently interpreted. In Polish sociological literature, too, there is no consistency in the interpretation and application of the category of the "intelligentsia." Now politicians are excluded from it and now enterprise directors. The latter are not infrequently "suspended" in between the intelligentsia and the working class, because according to certain definitions they belong to neither. If moreover we consider the question of the ongoing

intellectualization of the labor of workers in the course of the scientific and technical revolution, the lack of clarity in classifying various social groups as belonging in the stratum of the intelligentsia becomes exacerbated. What matters most, however, is that all "exclusions" from that stratum, such as those mentioned above, lack any justification in theory.

But these are not the only reasons for the lack of clarity in defining the scope of the term "the intelligentsia." There also exist evident problems in defining the relation of the intelligentsia as a social stratum to the two basic classes. The interpretations of this question reveal, besides, more or less explicit influence of the most varied non-Marxist theories. Similarly, the interpretations of this problem in the pertinent literature are not too clear. On the one hand it is stated that the Soviet intelligentsia is unified. Such an interpretation is of a somewhat supraclass nature, because traditional class analyses of the intelligentsia have introduced explicit distinctions: the feudal or bourgeois intelligentsia, the intelligentsia of the working class, etc. In general, the concept of the peasant and worker intelligentsia is not introduced in the existing class structure of the Soviet society, and instead the intelligentsia in general is considered--and this precisely produces that impression of the supraclass nature of the Soviet intelligentsia, of its existence above or beside, as it were, the basic social structure. The intelligentsia in this interpretation is something unified, coherent, uniform. However, in recent years certain Soviet authors have been attempting to surmount this inconsistency of interpretation. A Soviet book on the history of the evolution of the class structure of the Soviet society claims, among other things, that a kolkhoz intelligentsia also exists in the Soviet Union, on moreover isolating a discrete group of the intelligentsia which is to represent the intelligentsia itself. At the same time, that book does not isolate the category of the intelligentsia of the working class.

All these classifications are bound to raise doubts. Their analysis indicates that a thus construed stratum of the intelligentsia either exists outside the classes or is interpreted as a conceptual composite with adjectival distinctions of "people's" or "socialist," although then the adjective "people's" is to be construed as the sum total of the worker and peasant intelligentsia. But in this plane, what is the status of the kolkhoz intelligentsia or of the intelligentsia representing itself? Is that some other variety of the intelligentsia that is neither worker nor peasant? Note in this connection that Soviet sociological literature does not at all employ the concept of the intelligentsia of the working class, even though it employs the concept of the kolkhoz intelligentsia.

Another problem: is the intelligentsia a social stratum or a social class? The views exist that, inasmuch as the intelligentsia may, owing to its numerical growth, express its own political interests and represent itself politically, it should be termed a social class. This view was presented by Prof S. Dziecielska during the aforementioned WSNS conference on the intelligentsia. Such a view sometimes also is popular among Marxists outside the countries of the socialist community. This interpretation of the intelligentsia is most clearly reflected in the comments of Vasquez, a member of the leadership of the Communist Party of Paraguay. On analyzing the process of the numerical growth of the group of mental workers throughout Latin America, he concluded

that this is a separate group with its own political interests. Since that is so, when speaking of the possibility of an alliance between the intelligentsia and the working class in Latin America, this alliance has to be regarded as a class alliance, because only discrete classes have political interests specific to themselves. Viewed in this light, the lack of clarity in the concept of the intelligentsia becomes even greater. Let us consider yet again the aforementioned Soviet book. According to the concept it propounds, the kolkhoz intelligentsia expresses the political interests of the kolkhoz peasantry. But the book also operates with a most general concept of the intelligentsia which is par excellence socialist but which is neither worker nor peasant, nor does it express its own interests.

There thus arises the question of whether the intelligentsia under socialism expresses only the interests of particular classes or becomes a separate class of itself. This question is justified because, regardless of the fact that all Marxist studies point to the existence of two classes and the stratum of the intelligentsia, in reality, under the triple entente, the intelligentsia is often treated as the equal of the two other members of the entente. This prompts treating the intelligentsia as a discrete class. In particular, it is worth noting that inconsistencies of this kind also exist in the Polish literature on the subject (for example, in the works by Prof J. Szczepanski, in which the intelligentsia is sometimes referred to as a class and sometimes as a stratum). Thus, despite the official terminology (the intelligentsia as a stratum), the concept of the intelligentsia as a social class also arises, this being linked to the concept of discrete political interests of the intelligentsia. This appears logical considering that Marxist theory constantly stresses the thesis that separate political interests always are correlated with the class structure of the society, with the elements of that class structure. Thus if it is claimed that the intelligentsia as a whole, or even as a part, can have its own political interests, different from those of the other classes, then by the same token it is placed on the same plane with the classes and de facto treated as a class.

In turn, it is claimed that the worker-peasant-intelligentsia alliance, which represents the basic structural pattern of the socialist system, is the political foundation of socialism. In this context there appear, both in Polish literature and in that of the other socialist countries, reflections on which alliance is more important: the worker-intelligentsia or the worker-peasant alliance? It is sometimes concluded that the role of the worker-intelligentsia alliance is growing and that of the worker-peasant alliance declining. The basis for this claim is the thesis of the quantitative development of the intelligentsia and the growth of its role in the scientific-technical revolution, etc. In effect, we approach the position that it is simply the worker-intelligentsia alliance that is the political foundation of socialism, since the peasant class is quantitatively declining in measure with socialist transformations.

But I believe that theories of this kind display a fundamental flaw. Namely, they often imply that such processes are characteristic processes under socialism, whereas in reality they are general-civilizational processes, typical of both capitalism and socialism. Is it only in the socialist society

that the intelligentsia is experiencing a numerical growth and the peasantry a numerical decline? Is it only the processes of the scientific and technical revolution, and of the role of the intelligentsia therein, that differentiate socialism from capitalism?

The numerical growth of the group of mental workers, of employees of trade and the entire sphere of non-material services, as well as of the apparatus of state and the ideological-propaganda sphere, is, after all, a universal and, one can say, worldwide phenomenon. Thus it would be a mistake to characterize onesidedly the socialist system as the only one in which a "civilizational acceleration" is taking place as opposed to the capitalist system. Consider also that the existing trend toward a growth in the number of "white collars" (to use the well-known term of C. W. Mills)--a category corresponding to the general Marxist definitions of the intelligentsia--is exacerbating the dispute as to whether the intelligentsia should be regarded as a class or a social stratum. This dispute has far-reaching consequences to theory. For if we admit that the intelligentsia under socialism is a class in itself, we have to revise the theory of classes in the capitalist society as well, by regarding the intelligentsia in that society also as a discrete class separate from the working class and the capitalist class. I also believe that the existing theory of the intelligentsia under socialism, which I am critiquing, reflects echoes of ancient concepts advocated by the Social Revolutionaries (or more broadly, proper to the so-called peasant socialism), which were sharply opposed by V. I. Lenin. In his polemics with the Social Revolutionaries, he penetratingly considered problems of the intelligentsia, while at the same time refuting their view that it would precisely be the intelligentsia that would accomplish the revolution. At the same time, V. I. Lenin criticized one particular feature of the Narodnik [Russian Populist] and subsequently Social Revolutionary ideology, namely, the idea that the same principle applies to all working people: why should distinctions be made between the employed and the unemployed, or among the workers, the peasants and the intelligentsia, considering that together they all compose the societal whole? V. I. Lenin pointed to the fallacy inherent in this view.

First, this is a consequence of the absence of a class analysis, of failure to distinguish between the working class and the peasant class. To be sure, V. I. Lenin supports the worker-peasant alliance, but at the same time he shows that this is an alliance of two different classes and whoever does not perceive this cannot speak of the socialist revolution in the true meaning of the term. Secondly, V. I. Lenin pointed out, here we are dealing with an erroneous interpretation of the intelligentsia's political role. He demonstrated that the intelligentsia does not express its own particular political position but mirrors in its views the class structure of the entire society. In other words, even the most varied political views existing among the intelligentsia merely mirror the class interests of discrete classes and there is nothing in them that reflects any intrinsic or discrete interests of the intelligentsia itself. At the same time, according to V. I. Lenin, the intelligentsia should also be considered in terms of the class position of the individuals belonging to it, i. e., according to the criterion of attitude toward means of production. When the matter is so approached, the contemporary Russian intelligentsia is found to be mostly a petty-bourgeois intelligentsia, meaning

that its economic status is petty-bourgeois. Similar implications relate to Lenin's well-known analyses of [university] student youth, in which also he engages in a polemic against the Social Revolutionary concept of the unity of students--the same unity as that mentioned today by Prof J. Reykowski with respect to the present situation: this refers to the so-called student "ethos" accenting "pure" interests of students, the situation of students above the society, etc. In his letters on academic youth V. I. Lenin carried out analyses demonstrating that the political and ideological divisions existing among Russian students simply reflect the class divisions of the Russian society.

As part of attempts to modify the the course of the theoretical thinking of the classics of Marxims-Leninism on the intelligentsia, it is not infrequently argued that their analyses pertained to a society of another type, to another historical situation, and that they do not always fully apply to the present reality. This kind of reasoning was represented, e.g., by Prof S. Dziecielska and Prof J. Kadzielski at the WSNS conference on the intelligentsia. Championing the thesis that the intelligentsia is a social class, Prof S. Dziecielska argued that Marxist analyses considered the role of the intelligentsia exclusively in terms of the "service" role it fulfills in relation to other classes, on treating the intelligentsia itself was treated as neither a class nor a stratum, and so on. This model of the situation was in K. Marx to apply to a completely different society, and it is not applicable to our society. Likewise, Prof J. Kadzielski claimed that contextually similar analyses by V. I. Lenin pertain to the period of capitalism and are not too adequate to societies of the socialist type.

I regard such an approach as a misinterpretation of the thought of the classics of Marxism. After all, there are no such analyses at all in Marx's works. Marx considers the category of the intelligentsia at most only indirectly, i.e., when he discusses the "literary representatives" of discrete classes in his works. Similarly, Lenin's typically class-oriented analyses of the social status of the intelligentsia indicate that the intelligentsia is not a political force in the literal meaning of the term. Thus, at the 3rd Congress of the SDPRR [Social Democratic Worker Party of Russia], in his discussion with the Mensheviks, V. I. Lenin pointed out that the slogan of "accord with the intelligentsia" is meaningless, because an accord is to be achieved with political forces, whereas the intelligentsia is not a political force.

Thus, my opinion is that there is no justification for questioning the suitability of the Marxist method of class-historical analysis of the status of the intelligentsia and of the processes occurring therein under socialism, even though K. Marx did not employ the term "the intelligentsia" and instead relied on the formulas of "literary and political representatives of the classes." Similarly, Lenin's analyses of this question have not lost their methodological-cognitive worth. I believe that the fact is becoming clear that in Poland the political views and behavior of the intelligentsia continue to reflect the class system and the class struggle being waged in the course of building socialism. An analysis of the mechanism of this phenomenon is unusually pertinent, but the key to this mechanism is not to be found in

attempts to identify politically discrete or non-class [as published] interests of the intelligentsia.

I am also opposed to the view that the antisocialist attitude of a part of the intelligentsia (under the present Polish conditions) is contingent on so-called economic factors, that is, e.g., on its relative pauperization. Analyses of social processes should avoid any vulgarization of Marx's and Marxist thesis of their economic conditioning. The history of the socialist countries, inclusive of the 40 years of existence of People's Poland, demonstrates that the views and attitudes of the intelligentsia are not simply contingent on its material situation.

Also invalid is A. Schaff's view that, ever since the founding of the PRL, the intelligentsia has been hostile to socialism and anti-Soviet. If we consider the problem realistically, we will find that it was precisely a tremendous part of the intelligentsia that had been greatly committed to building the foundations of socialism and participated in implementing the PKWN [Polish Committee for National Liberation], the 6-Year Plan, etc. We can at most only dispute the extent of that participation. Similarly, another extreme view, namely, one denying the society's support for building socialism and totally negating the accomplishments of socialism, also does not withstand criticism, particularly if the causes of the crisis-period regressions of social awareness are to be perceived in changes in the wage level.

Doubts also are being expressed as to how is the intelligentsia to express its class interests considering that the process of building socialism is a process of the withering of classes (although some already have eliminated classes under real socialism) and that where classes still exist their mutual relations are of a clearly non-antagonistic nature. I thus believe that this problem cannot be confined to just one country or even to the group of socialist countries in general. I also believe that, so long as two mutually antagonistic systems of society exist in the world, the class struggle in the sphere of views and attitude will also continue within the socialist countries. The intelligentsia is not excluded from this struggle. Thus, fluctuations in the intelligentsia's attitudes are traceable not only to domestic factors but also to changes in the class alignment on the worldwide scale. Hence also the struggle for the nature of the intelligentsia's views cannot, in my opinion, end before the victory of communism on the worldwide scale.

Furthermore, just as the view that the intelligentsia was a "disappointment" or that from the beginning it was antisocialist and anti-Soviet, is a great oversimplification, so the uncritical glorification of the working class also is an oversimplification. Idealizing the working class in political analyses is just as dangerous as speaking of the intelligentsia as an enemy of socialism. The intelligentsia has no monolithic collective awareness, and this also applies to the working class. Ultimately, changes in the awareness of the intelligentsia as a group cannot be considered separately and in isolation from the processes occurring in the awareness of the peasantry and the working class.

It should be realized that the principle of introducing communist awareness among the working class by the revolutionary party is not confined solely to the era of capitalism. This principle continues to apply under socialism as well. This alone points to the fact that the awareness of the working class varies. This variation is due to manifold factors. And we have to consider this in the theory of the socialist society.

Another major problem is that sociological-psychological studies should not be confined to analyzing the awareness of discrete social groups, strata or classes, treated in isolation. We must instead explore instruments of dynamic analysis to determine how different so-called milieux or constituencies mirror the class process, both the one occurring in this country and the one occurring in the international scale, and how the process of changes in the awareness of one social class influences changes in the awareness of another social class or stratum as well as changes in the relations between the working class and the intelligentsia. Seen from precisely this class-historical and dynamic point of view, I have little faith in the so-called ethos of the intelligentsia which, as explicated so far, seems to me something static, supraclass and outside history. If we wish to shape rather than merely describe the ethos of the intelligentsia, if we wish to win over the intelligentsia to socialism, to the policy of the working class, a unified approach to the intelligentsia becomes necessary along with an overall viewing of the relationship between the intelligentsia and the working class; it becomes necessary to break out of the vicious circle of analyzing processes that occur only within the intelligentsia.

Only if we adopt such an approach we can in practice implement the formula outlining the direction of socialist renewal, the formula of struggle and [national] accord, construed not abstractly but as applying to every particular social constituency. The diagnosis of processes occurring on the general scale should be made specific by analyzing the situation on the microsocial scale. Generalized discussion with workers or the intelligentsia leads nowhere. On the other hand, a change in the party's tactics of action is needed: the formula of struggle and accord should be transferred from the level of a general political directive to particular workplaces, local communities, etc. These precisely are the places where party echelons should organize all prosocialist forces, mobilize allies and combat an enemy who is now no longer anonymous but specific. The activities of which I speak require, though, in the plane of both theory and practice, abandoning the primitive standardization of the assumptions of the theory of social development and returning to Marxist-Leninist class-historical analyses of phenomena, both within the working class and among the intelligentsia.

Phases of Development

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[Article by Jerzy J. Wiatr: "The Intelligentsia and the Socialist State"]

[Text] Any discussion of the role of the intelligentsia in the socialist state must consider the evident fact that the intelligentsia as a distinctive

[social] formation is highly and multiply differentiated. This differentiation of the intelligentsia can be traced in the plane of the social division of labor. In this plane we distinguish such component parts of the intelligentsia as, e.g., the technical, educational, medical and other intelligentsias. This differentiation can also be carried out in the plane of non-uniform division of material boons, social prestige or participation in the exercise of leadership functions, which will result in uncovering several non-overlapping--as revealed by sociological studies--hierarchies of stratification. The analysis of this differentiation may extend to the problem of the social genealogy of the Polish intelligentsia, following the discussion initiated by Jozef Chalasiński in his famous introductory lecture at Lodz University in 1946 /1/. In this last case, the significance of the division into the "old" intelligentsia deriving from prewar intelligentsia or even bourgeois families, and the "new" people's intelligentsia, educated in our system of society and owing its place within the intelligentsia precisely to the revolutionary changes in the system of society, seems to me a more important question than that of the gentry or non-gentry origin of the intelligentsia. Lastly, attention could be focused on political and ideological divisions within the intelligentsia and in this sense one could speak of the often intricately meshing co-existence of socialist and bourgeois intelligentsias in this country.

These are real divisions that deserve attention and investigation. Does their existence mean that discussing the intelligentsia as a discrete formation is pointless? I do not think so. The intelligentsia is not the only component part of our social structure to display far-reaching differentiation. The very fact of internal differentiation cannot be sufficient reason for questioning the validity of the category "the intelligentsia." Perhaps then this reason could be the blurred nature of the criteria for defining the intelligentsia, whose ambiguity is obvious. But in social sciences many important concepts suitable for analysis are nevertheless difficult to define. The concept of the intelligentsia resembles to some extent the concept of time, of which a philosopher has said: "I don't know how to define it, but I know that it exists." The existence of the intelligentsia is decided by educational background, mode of life (as explicitly shown in Polish studies of systems of values and patterns of consumption /2/) and, lastly, awareness--meaning here both the self-awareness of the intelligentsia and the awareness of the other social classes and strata, which regard the intelligentsia as a separate component part of the social structure.

The existence of the intelligentsia has not been questioned--although the issue of its internal differentiation has sometimes been raised--when raising the question of its political and ideological self-definition in terms of attitude toward the socialist state. In Poland, great discussions of the role of the intelligentsia have always arisen in connection with profound political changes, as their consequence.

Three such stages of Polish dispute over the political and ideological role of the intelligentsia in People's Poland can be distinguished. The first occurred in the initial years of People's Poland, when the intelligentsia--at the time still entirely formed under the capitalist system of society--had to answer

for itself the question of which road would it take and what did it want to become in relation to the new leading forces of the nation and state, particularly in relation to the working class. As Jozef Chalasinski wrote at the time, "At the present moment the Polish intelligentsia is menaced precisely by the danger that it could mint the gold of Polish culture into ducats that are valueless to the new social strata moving to the forefront of life in Poland."/3/ At the time, the best and most farsighted representatives of the Polish intelligentsia explored--and found--a road that could be followed by the Polish intelligentsia to avoid this danger.

The second stage of the dispute over the intelligentsia and its role in the socialist state was the period of the "October" 1956 changes and the subsequent search for a road. Then also members of the intelligentsia advanced serious criticism and admonitions addressed to itself./4/

And lastly the third stage began in the early 1980s. It continues to this very day. Once again voices of severe criticism resound. The recently published anthology "Gwalt i perswazja" [Force and Persuasion], edited by Prof Jerzy Adamski, reprints an article by Kazimierz Kozniewski from TRYBUNA LUDU of 9 January 1982. This article is titled "I Am Disappointed by the Intelligentsia's Attitude," and in it the author comments, among other things: "Yet it is precisely that group of the intelligentsia of which professors, writers, journalists, artists and philosophers consider themselves members, precisely this group of the creative intelligentsia, that is to a high degree responsible for the thinking of our society. It places itself in this role and others want to see it in it. In recent months it was precisely this group of the intelligentsia that defaulted, as it were, on its fundamental national duty, which consists in shaping social awareness in accordance with reason rather than emotion, in thinking sagaciously rather than falling prey to volatile enthusiasm, in the ethos of [national] accord and compromise rather than in blind fervor for any kind of clash, unresponsive to circumstances and blind to consequences."/5/

These are severe accusations, justified by the attitudes of a substantial part of the intelligentsia. But let us say it clearly--just of a part. Not the entire intelligentsia and not its majority took the position criticized by Kozniewski or evaded taking a position at all. With respect to the events of recent years the intelligentsia was--as formerly--divided. The nature of this division requires a calm and penetrating analysis. Such an analysis cannot be substituted with summary condemnation or equally summary justification. Neither will suffice some or other key of sociological reductionism that, for example, reduces the complex political and ideological reality to genealogical or professional-group divisions. Deep political divisions existed and exist in all professional milieux within the intelligentsia. They do not follow the sociological "key," because the old intelligentsia does not support in its entirety (or even in its overwhelming majority) the opposition, and neither has the new intelligentsia deriving from the working and peasant classes adhered in its entirety to the defense of our system of society, to which after all it should be grateful for its own social advancement. This also applies to the issue of "political genealogy." Those who had endured in their defense of the ideas of socialism even during the most difficult

moments, who had endured in the struggle against the forces of disintegration and antisocialist anarchy, also included individuals deriving from intelligentsia families that used to be linked to the capitalist system and bourgeois social movements; whereas the well-known individuals belonging in the camp opposed to People's Poland also include children of persons honored by the communist movement. Simple and oversimplified divisions simply do not account for the complex and intricate destinies of different factions of the Polish intelligentsia.

The present-day situation of the intelligentsia and its internal political divisions are better explained, in my opinion, by a thorough historical analysis treating the divisions among the intelligentsia not as autonomous phenomena but as an element of the political divisions within the entire nation. For in reality the intelligentsia has not taken any uniform political position in any period of existence of People's Poland, and neither have the divisions among the intelligentsia during any such period occurred of themselves in isolation from divisions within other social classes and strata. The divisions among the intelligentsia existed and exist not so much owing to some own, group or milieu interests of the intelligentsia itself as because its individual members choose different options in the great disputes dividing the nation. These disputes concern issues much more serious than the group interests of this or that milieu of the intelligentsia, although of course it would be difficult to deny that the better or worse evolution of the situation of different milieux of the intelligentsia affects somewhat the attitudes they choose. However, the choice they make is subordinated to broader issues transcending the milieu or group interests alone. The intelligentsia makes political choices--and thereby is subject to political division--overwhelmingly as a result of options of an intellectual and ideological nature. This is not unambiguously determined by the sociological features of individual milieux and the more so of individuals. The distinctive nature of their intellectual training and profession causes members of the intelligentsia to subordinate to a particularly great degree their political options to ideological rationales as well as to the particular mindsets they adopt. The outlook dominant at a particular moment in history and imposing itself with special force on the milieux of the intelligentsia hinges more on the overall alignment of the class forces than on the purely milieu-conditioned situation of the intelligentsia itself. The intelligentsia reflects the conflicts and contradictions among great social classes. Therein, I believe, consists the specific nature of the political attitudes of the intelligentsia.

As a result of this specific nature, the party's ideological work among the intelligentsia and the manner in which dialogue with it is conducted are of particularly great importance. In this dialogue a particularly great role is played by the communist intelligentsia, whose duty toward the party as a whole is to struggle for a proper shape of the party's policy toward the intelligentsia and at the same time to propagate the party's idea among the intelligentsia as a whole, to win over to the party vacillating or unconvinced individuals.

This is always accomplished in the course of struggle. It was through struggle that the first divisions and ideological options of the period of the formation and consolidation of the people's rule had arisen. Only a minority of the Polish intelligentsia--the minority linked to the communist movement and the socialist and people's left--greeted the birth of People's Poland without reservations, with enthusiasm and the feeling that the dream of generations was becoming fulfilled. The others approached People's Poland through various roads and with differing ideological motivations. To the greater part of the intelligentsia the road to People's Poland led through armed struggle with the Hitlerite invader, particularly serving in the ranks of the Polish Army reborn on Soviet soil. That was a great school of political thinking, in which more than one of the leading intellectuals of People's Poland obtained his ideological convictions. Others still approached by the road of sober political reflection which demonstrated to them that the policy of the London Camp [Polish emigre government], betting on some illusory "concern" of the West and persistently opposing Poland to its great Eastern neighbor which bears the brunt of the struggle and shapes the face of postwar Europe, is a policy of catastrophe to the nation and its statehood. Eloquent here is, for example, the road taken by Ksawery Pruszyński. Yet others, such as the former vice premier of the Sanacja [prewar Polish] government, Engineer Eugeniusz Kwiatkowski, were attracted by the greatness of the cause of the postwar reconstruction of the country--a cause in which they felt themselves and were needed. The side of People's Poland was taken in large numbers by scientists with progressive, though noncommunist, convictions, such as Ajdukiewicz, Chalasiński, Kotarbiński, the Ossowskis and many, many others.

They all chose, though from varied motives and in differing circumstances, the road which proved to be just and victorious. That part of the Polish intelligentsia which took the opposing road leading toward external or "internal" emigration, was frustrated in its illusory expectations of the collapse of the postwar European order and return to Poland in the train of a "man on horseback." Regardless of the personal professional successes achieved by individual representatives of that part of the Polish intelligentsia on foreign soil, as a political formation their choice was a failure. They deprived themselves of that greatest reward which is the feeling of having contributed one's own labor and efforts to the rebuilt mansion of the forefathers. Some of them grasped this later and joined in constructive activities in People's Poland. A worthy place was found for them.

That was the first choice. In this connection, it is worth considering a particular part of the contemporary socialist intelligentsia, varied as its origins are besides, which after having taken the position of fanatical bards of the new system of society in Poland, had turned away from it so violently and sharply at a time when, under conditions defined by the 20th CPSU Congress and the 8th Plenum of the PZPR Central Committee, tortuous roads began to be straightened out, glaring distortions eliminated and injustice rectified. After all, those contemporary apostles include eminent individuals, renowned writers, poets, artists and filmmakers. Can everything be simply attributed--as is being done by some of the press--to morally base motives, careerism, hypocrisy? Even if such explanations apply to some individuals, they do not account for everything, and neither do they permit plumbing the depth of the

problem. Yet this problem is important, because it is precisely the apostasy of former Stalinist fanatics that has decisively influenced the subsequent internal divisions and fatally weighed on the rising generation of the intelligentsia to which October [1956, the bread riots] already is mere history, more or less familiar from tales or fragmentary descriptions.

I believe that the roots of this new "trahison des clercs" are traceable to the manner in which the new political reality had fascinated a part--but, let this be borne in mind, only a part--of the intelligentsia. Fromm described the mechanism of what he terms "escape from freedom" with respect to fundamentally different conditions /6/, and he identified fascination with power as a component part of that mechanism. The then postulated ideal model of power was predicated on its nearly total nature, although reality greatly diverged from that model. The aura of the worship of might with its great power--typical of authoritarian personalities /7/--resulted in the fanaticism-imbued apologia of the subsequent "dissidents" for [having succumbed to] the cult of the individual. It is interesting that such a large proportion of the most extremist apostates, who not only abandoned the party and the socialist ideology but even shifted to the positions of anticommunism, consists of persons who had been particularly fanatical in their earlier dogmatic-Stalinist period. This deserves a psychological analysis, which in my opinion would confirm the hypothesis that individuals of this stripe display the specific authoritarian traits already described by science. It is precisely an analysis of the psychological type that can explain the seeming paradox that those individuals who had uncritically liked the political system that existed during the period of severe injustice and violations of the laws had felt an overwhelming need to abandon the party and socialism precisely after 1956 when the mistakes began to be eliminated and the injustices, insofar as possible, rectified. Much of the fanaticism of the subsequent extremist groupings of the early 1980s is traceable to this genesis of their spiritual fathers.

The year 1956 was to an overwhelming part of the Polish intelligentsia a time when some affirmed their previous choice of socialist commitment and their convictions of its fundamental justness became strengthened, while others--till then remaining neutral--committed themselves to a socialism that liberates from distortions. At the same time though, that year opened a new chapter in the history of doubts and divisions within the intelligentsia. Like 12 years earlier, the Polish intelligentsia again faced a roadfork: they had either to choose the road toward socialism and the Polish *raison d'etat*, for a renewal of public life on the basis of the ideological principles of socialism, or the road of spiritual escape to the West, of orientation toward bourgeois patterns of life and politics, toward anticommunism.

Attempts to bypass this choice were made. One such attempt was the once famous essay by Leszek Kolakowski, "The Priest and the Clown." /8/ It reduced to claiming that the intellectual can become either a "priest" of the official faith, an apologist for the ruling order, or a "clown" who utters the bitter truth, accepts responsibility for nothing and is independent of no one. This was an illusory proposal for standing aside from the basic conflict of the epoch. At the time, polemicizing with Kolakowski, I had written that his proposal is bound to be directed against the efforts and achievements of

progressive forces in history and that, under the guise of "revolutionary" criticism, it "objectively promotes the conservative forces."/9/ The subsequent political evolution of the author of "The Priest and the Clown" demonstrated that the antiprogressive choice that he had made soon led him toward militant anticommunism, once again proving the truism that one cannot take the position of a "neutral" critic in face of the great conflicts of the epoch, that, consciously or not, always one side or the other is chosen.

The disputes from a quarter-century ago that I am recalling here have not become outdated; on the contrary, they are even more topical now. Nowadays, the consequences of the choices then made are even more evident. Nowadays it is also more evident to us how far the present-day dissidents are duplicating the choice made even then by themselves or their predecessors. This choice means denying socialism rather than strengthening it through reforms, contrary to what the dissidents themselves sometimes proclaim.

This turned out to be so very explicitly when the Polish intelligentsia faced for the third time a fork in the road. During the nearly quarter-century separating October 1956 from August 1980 the overwhelming part of the intelligentsia had joined in constructive labor for the socialist fatherland, finding in this labor both the satisfaction of personal professional ambitions and the feeling of duty fulfilled toward the nation and state. During those years, conflicts spreading to more or less large parts of the milieu of the intelligentsia did happen. They occurred most sharply, and had the most serious consequences, in 1968 [the events in Czechoslovakia]. On considering that period as a whole, however, it can be said that it was definitely dominated by phenomena of constructive partnership and participation of milieu of the intelligentsia in the life and labor of the socialism-building country. This overall picture is not altered by the quantitative activities of small opposition groups, which at the time had not been sufficiently strong to dominate any significant milieu of the intelligentsia. The fact remains that a majority of the present-day dissidents, including many of the extremist stripe, had during the 1960s and 1970s lived in harmony with the authorities of the state, not infrequently accepting honors and awards, which at the time it still was not the custom to reject.

It is curious that many subsequent impassioned accusers of the pre-August period were not bothered at all by the fact that during that period they had enjoyed numerous privileges, received various manifestations of recognition from the authorities, and even sat in that Parliament which they nowadays do not spare the severest accusations. This phenomenon should not be reduced solely to opportunism, although its existence too should not be denied. What also counted was the conviction that in this way it was possible to achieve personal and group professional interests and accomplish something useful. This distinctive "positivism" of a part of the intelligentsia failed the test when the loud protest of the working class had shaken the traditional structure of the state. A choice had to be made. Again, as a quarter-century ago, a choice had to be made either in favor of a socialism liberating from distortions and reformatations [as published], in favor of the socialist renewal and the *raison d'etat* of the socialist Polish state, or in favor of the anti-socialist, anti-Soviet, pro-Western orientation whose objective sense had to

reduce to carrying out on Polish soil a political strategy determined by the interests of the imperialist West.

But this choice was obscured by a mythology in which the concept of "renewal" played a special role. From the outset, it was a myth to conceive that in Poland the fundamental and sole division exists between adherents and opponents of "renewal," and that that "renewal" does not require any more precise definition and elaboration. When the party spoke of the socialist renewal that combines in itself resolute criticism of distortions and mistakes with a no less resolute will to defend the accomplishments of socialism, the political opponents propagated a mystification, namely, the concept of a total "renewal" of everything that accounts for the real shape of socialism in Poland, that is, in practice, the rejection of all the accomplishments of the postwar years. It is precisely the intelligentsia that should have opposed this myth. This was done by a part of the intelligentsia, but was that part sufficiently substantial?

Let me return to the comments of Kazimierz Kozniewski cited earlier in this paper. His criticism is directed against that--considerable, after all--part of the intelligentsia which has the particular duty of thinking rationally, opposing myths and illusions, and shaping collective thinking in accord with the interests of the Polish nation and state, but which has not fulfilled this duty. What is more certain circles of the intelligentsia engaged in activities injurious to the state and strived to exacerbate the conflict at any price and bring about confrontations. This could be exemplified by the strike of higher schools in the fall of 1981, when the progress of the processes of polarization and the greatness of the resulting peril to Poland was already perfectly clear. Although the professors and rectors of institutions of higher education must have realized the gravity of the situation, they thought it possible and just to organize a national strike in order to force the minister [of higher education] to dismiss the rector of a small higher school who was elected against the will of Solidarity. Incidentally, that was a peculiar example of how the democracy and autonomy of institutions of higher education were construed, since the appeal made to the minister concerned precisely declaring as invalid the results of democratic elections that were lost by Solidarity!

The lack of responsibility as well as political blindness also dictated the continuation and even exacerbation of the political confrontation following the declaration of martial law. After all, the intellectuals could not perceive that from the very outset the policy of the government displayed far-reaching moderation and, as regards policies on culture and science, openness and a realistic approach consonant with the interests of national culture. It was during the martial law era that Andrzejewski's "Miazga" [Pulp] was published after it had been withheld from official publication for years. It was during that era that plays by Milosz and Mrozek were performed despite their aggressively hostile political comments directed against the societal system and authorities of People's Poland. Such instances could be multiplied. It could be thought--and let us say it clearly, it was thought--that such a cultural policy of the socialist state would affect positively the attitudes

of the intellectuals and creators of culture. This was a just and principled policy ensuing from the line of the 9th Congress. Its justness consists in that only such a policy promotes well the enrichment of Polish science and culture. Hence the fact that it did not meet with understanding from among a large part of the creative intelligentsia cannot serve as an argument against this policy. But it must serve as an argument against the political position of the political leaders of these milieux of the intelligentsia, who have again rejected accord and repulsed the hand extended to be shaken.

This does not mean the intelligentsia as a whole. The thesis that the entire Polish intelligentsia or its overwhelming part is opposed to socialism and supports the anticommunist opposition is false. It is tenaciously asserted by the propaganda centers in the West and various little conspiratorial publications. To make this false propaganda thesis sound true, a simple operation is performed. Whoever has come to the aid of the socialist state is ignored or shouted down by intellectual mediocrities whether or not his professional achievements are indisputable and recognized in this country and abroad. And conversely, it suffices to commit oneself in favor of the antisocialist opposition for [Radio] "Free Europe" to proclaim the artistic or scientific greatness of the oppositionist, again regardless of whether it can or cannot be objectively proved. Such are common rules of political struggle. But we ourselves do not wish to take this road too. We do not deny that some of the eminent artists and scientists have chosen in favor of the struggle against the societal system and authorities of People's Poland. We admit this clearly and explicitly. Our criticism of that choice reflects concern for the future of Polish culture and anxiety about the role of the intelligentsia in the state.

We must state clearly that the Polish intelligentsia, like all the classes and strata of our nation besides, is divided nowadays. A tremendous majority of the intelligentsia works constructively for the country and makes valuable material and spiritual contributions. This is also done by those who still remain unconvinced about our policy, who vacillate and doubt, but who have chosen the road of constructive labor instead of sterile "internal emigration." Toward them, the policy of the party and the authorities of the socialist state is based on patient dialogue, recovery of trust, building structures of accord. There is also that part of the intelligentsia which entrenched itself in the positions of anticommunism and anti-Sovietism, which neither wanting to understand nor being capable of understanding anything from history—including the history of recent years—rejects any accord and cooperation. We must and do wage a resolute struggle against this attitude which represents the implementation—whether conscious or not, history will not care—of the strategy of militantly anticommunist Western centers which wanted and still want to make of Poland a battlefield of no longer only ideological but also physical confrontation with the socialist camp. That part of the intelligentsia which adheres to the positions of anticommunism and anti-Sovietism is responsible for allying itself with forces directed against Poland's interests and, to promote its political aims, propagating a policy which has no chance to succeed but leads to perilous consequences. The antisocialist opposition lacks the strength to alter the political order of postwar Europe and upset the balance of powers in Europe, a balance of which

our frontiers and our place in the socialist community are a part. This opposition could at most, had not we nullified its plans by our own actions, cause Poland to find itself in an incomparably worse and weaker situation without changing the alignment of political forces in Europe. Such is the sense of oppositionist activity, harmful to the nation and state. This sense has to be patiently and resolutely explained to the intelligentsia, including that part of it which has lent its ear to the antisocialist opposition.

The present-day divisions are a continuation of earlier divisions, although the alignment of forces and the historical conditions differed during each of the great moments of choice. Consideration of the past leads to the obvious conclusion as to which of the roads chosen was just and which has led to a cul-de-sac. The road toward socialism, toward commitment to serve People's Poland, was and is the sole road on which the Polish intelligentsia can fulfill its historical mission toward the nation and translate into reality its own aspirations. The other road has led in the past and still leads now to a desert and disaster.

In choosing the road of socialist commitment the socialist intelligentsia links itself to the vanguard of the working class, to that part of it which bears the brunt of the political struggle for the future of socialism in Poland. It is not the myth of the unity of the intelligentsia, workers and peasants, propagated in various periods of our recent past, but the reality of the concerted communist struggle of the vanguard and its allies that constitutes the sense of the alliance of the social forces responsible for the socialist state. The ideological foundation of this struggle is the class interests of the proletariat, which are identical with the historical interests of all working people, that is, in Poland, with the interests of nearly the entire nation. These interests are not identical with the resultant of the views and feelings of individual workers. These interests are expressed by the vanguard of the working class, by that part of the class which actively assumes responsibility for the fate of socialism. The experiences of recent years have shown that, regardless of the divisions existing within the working class, the communist worker vanguard does exist and has become toughened. It is this vanguard above all that has outlined the direction of socialist renewal, imprinted an explicit character on the 9th Congress of the PZPR and assured the continuation of the Marxist-Leninist nature of the party and the continuity of the processes of socialist reforms. For the class interests of workers do not consist in maintaining decaying structures, and the more so in preserving distortions and deformations. These interests manifest themselves in the resolute will to purge socialism of alien influences and in the [no] less resolute will to defend socialism against its overt and covert enemies.

The adoption of these class interests as the lodestar for the activities of the socialist intelligentsia is a prerequisite for its playing an important and creative role in the socialist renewal of the economy and state, in building socialism. In this respect, a great responsibility is borne by the party intelligentsia, the communist intelligentsia, whose political and ideological commitment provides the premise for the practical building of bonds between the intelligentsia and the working class and thereby also for a worthy role to be played by the intelligentsia in creating the nation's future in the socialist Polish state.

FOOTNOTES

1. J. Chalasinski, "Social Genealogy of the Polish Intelligentsia," in: "Przeszlosc i przyszlosc inteligencji polskiej" [The Past and the Future of the Polish Intelligentsia], Warsaw 1958.
2. The findings of these studies were presented in the anthology, "Systemy wartosci a wzory konsumpcji spoleczenstwa polskiego" [Value Systems and Consumption Patterns of the Polish Society], Warsaw, Institute of Sociology, Warsaw University, limited edition, 1980.
3. Chalasinski, op. cit., p 116.
4. Such criticism was represented by, among others, the chapter on "The Intelligentsia and the Nation" in Chalasinski, q. v. It is based on two lectures given in December 1957 and January 1958.
5. "Gwalt i perswazja" [Force and Persuasion], an anthology of publicistics from the years 1981-1983, selected and provided with a preface by Jerzy Adamski, Warsaw, 1983, p 28.
6. According to Erich Fromm, "In the psychological sense the lust for power ensues from weakness rather than from strength. This is a desperate attempt to gain secondary power when authentic power is lacking. See E. Fromm, "Escape from Freedom" [translated into Polish], Warsaw 1970, p 161.
7. Th. W. Adorno, E. Frankel-Brunswik, D. J. Levinson, R. Nevitt Sandford, "The Authoritarian Personality," New York, 1969, p 228. The first edition of this already classical work was published in 1950.
8. L. Kolakowski, "The Priest and the Clown--Reflections on the Theological Legacy of Contemporary Thought," TWORCZOSC, No 10, 1959.
9. J. Wiatr, "The Sense of Philosophical Thought," POLITYKA, 12 December 1959.

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STAGES, BASIS FOR SOCIALISM STUDIED

Theoretical, Practical Background

Warsaw PROBLEMY MARKSIZMU-LENINIZMU in Polish No 2, Apr-Jun 84 pp 81-93

[Article by Augustyn Wajda: "Problems of the Theory and Practice of the Phases and Stages of the Communist Formation" under the rubric "Concerning the Socialism-Building Stage in Poland": this article represents a continuation of a debate concerning the nature of socialism published in JPRS East Europe Report EPS-84-087, 18 July 84 p 20, under the title "Nature of, Prospects for Socialism Debated"]

[Text] The communist formation is history's first system of society that does not arise in an elemental manner but evolves, functions and develops as a result of conscious and purposeful activities by people led by the revolutionary worker party. The development of discrete phases and stages of the socialist and communist society is occurring, for the first time in history, on the basis of the exploration and utilization of the objective laws of social development. This possibility was foreseen by Marx, who wrote that: "...mankind poses itself only the tasks that it can accomplish." /1/ This comment by the author of "Capital" was and remains to Marxists a basic guidepost according to which good familiarity with the principles of scientific socialism, the premises of its theory and practical experiences is of far-reaching importance to elaborating the strategy and tactics of the working class in every period of development of the socialist and communist society.

As viewed by the classics of Marxism, socialism and communism are not two separate socioeconomic formations but two phases of the same formation. The first phase (socialism) is incomplete communism that is "underdeveloped on its own foundation" and bears "...in every respect the earmarks of the former society." In this phase the mandatory principle is: "From each according to ability, to each according to his labor." /2/ In this phase of building communism the victorious proletariat under the leadership of its party must, V. I. Lenin believes, organize and inspire with the revolutionary spirit of building a new system of society the whole of the working people, "...lead the whole of the laboring masses... to the road of new economic construction, to the road of creating a new social bond, a new discipline of labor, a new

organization of labor combining the last word of capitalist science and technology with the mass consolidation of the awareness of workers erecting the edifice of great socialist production."/3/

Socialism as the first phase of communism still bears the imprint of the capitalist system, the founder of the Soviet state wrote. In this form of development, justice and equality cannot be completely achieved, because differences in the level of material social welfare, which also determine the scale of the existing problems, still persist. However, owing to the socialization of the basic means of production and the elimination of the exploiting classes, the exploitation of man by man then is no longer possible. Characterizing the alignment of property relations in the first phase of building communism, V. I. Lenin wrote: "'Bourgeois law' becomes abolished /not/ [emphasized] completely but only partially, only commensurately to the already attained economic change, i.e., only in relation to means of production. 'Bourgeois law' considers them as the private property of individuals. Socialism makes them /common/ [emphasized] property. To this extent--and only to this extent--'bourgeois law' is dispensed with."/4/ A special role during this period is attached by V. I. Lenin to the organization of labor. He was convinced that, in the process of building socialism, the working class must avail itself of the science and technology developed under capitalism and utilize the experience and skills of bourgeois experts. He did not conceive a total victory of socialism without capitalist technology, without a planned organization of state. Above all, though, he stressed that socialism is inconceivable without the leading role of the proletariat and its party.

Thus, the main tasks of the first phase of building communism become:

--the formation of a developed material-technical base of industry, the consolidation and refinement of socialist production relations and the socialist principle of distribution according to the labor contributed;

--the formation and consolidation of the socialist structure of society, which is based on the alliance between the working class with the nonproletarian classes and strata, particularly with the peasant class and the stratum of the intelligentsia, as well as the perpetuation of social relations of a new type based on the principle of collective mutual cooperation and assistance;

--the strengthening of the leading role of the working class and the directing role of the party in the state and its leading role in the society, as well as the strengthening of the socialist political system based on the development of socialist democracy;

--the implementation of the cultural and educational revolution, the propagation among the society of Marxist-Leninist ideology and socialist patriotism and internationalism, and the formation of the personality of the socialist man.

The higher phase--mature communism--denotes in the perspective of Marxist thought a society in which, owing to the tremendous development of science,

technology, culture and education, the contrasts between physical and mental labor as well as between town and country will disappear and labor will become not only a way of making a living but also the most important vital need; a society in which broad development of the individual as well as of creative forces will occur, and one in which, in the presence of an abundance of "massed wealth," the mandatory principle will be: "Each according to his ability, to each according to need."/5/

When considering the phases and stages of social development it is important to determine the interrelationship of the concepts "socioeconomic formation" and "historical era," because this provides the key to solving a number of problems linked to the periodization and typology of development processes. These considerations are particularly important in view of the fact that many bourgeois authors employ the concept of the era with the object of downgrading the importance of the concept of the socioeconomic formation or completely ignoring it as a concept that supposedly belongs solely in Marxist terminology instead of being a category that objectively functions in science. The formation, as distinct from the era, is not confined by any exact historical boundaries acknowledged universally by every country. It can commence and come to an end in different countries and periods depending on the socio-economic situation and the degree of development of a given country, in consonance with the general laws of social development./6/

By contrast, as V. I. Lenin pointed out, a historical era is a particular historical concept associated with a specific interval of time, with specific dates and events (e.g., the era of the transition from capitalism to socialism, etc.). He also emphasized that the nature of the class occupying the center stage in an era and determining the direction of historical development is important to the analysis of the era./7/ P. Fedoseyev considers the era an important rung in the ladder of historical development and a category needed to determine the scientific periodization of historical processes./8/ In the opinion of J. Topolski, the socioeconomic formation is "a social macrosystem considered from the standpoint of development"/9/ and represents the basic criterion for periodizing the development of mankind as a society. The interpretations cited above point to the validity of K. Marx' comment that a socioeconomic formation is primarily distinguished by a particular level of the development of productive forces and production relations. The manner of the production of material boons represents the unity of productive forces and production relations and is the decisive criterion for determining the formation. In his "The Poverty of Philosophy" K. Marx described this picturesquely: "Grinding stones are provided to us by a society dominated by the feudal master and the steam mill by a society in which the industrial capitalist comes to the fore."/10/

In the course of its development the formation passes through specific phases and is a concept serving to isolate qualitatively definite periods in the evolution of a given system of society. The concept "phase" appeared for the first time in "Critique of Gotha Programme" and served to define the basic qualitative changes occurring within the framework of the communist formation. Discrete phases as successive rungs in the development of a given formation display common basic features but also are characterized by specific

differences. Hence also gradation into "lower," "higher" and "highest" phases is possible. In turn, each phase is divided into stages. The stage is a widely employed category of the theory of social development, denoting a qualitatively definite degree (or rung) of that development. This concept also applies to other spheres of the development of reality, but is particularly suitable to the periodization of social development. The division into phases, as introduced in Marxist-Leninist analysis of historical development, serves to employ a relatively uniform tripartite gradation: formation-phase-stage. These are the rungs of historical development, with the phases being the degrees of development of a formation and the stages being the degrees of development of a given phase. The theory of social development also employs the term "stadium," which has become perpetuated in Marxist tradition in connection with the analysis of the last phase of the development of capitalism, and which is treated on par with classical stadia, i.e., the manufacturing and machine stadia of the development of capitalism. This term is sometimes used interchangeably with the aforementioned terms, as well as in interpreting the development of the other socioeconomic formations, conferring on them a more universal meaning./11/

In the early period of the formation and development of scientific socialism, according to the expectations of K. Marx in his "Economic-Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844," the future society would pass through two phases of its development. He termed the first phase communism and the second socialism. Socialism was to be a higher phase of communism, tantamount to communism as it is construed nowadays. However, in his subsequent works, and particularly in "Critique of Gotha Programme," which crowns the 30 years long period of the evolution of views on the society of the future by the author of "Capital," K. Marx employs more precise terminology. It is in that work precisely that he first mentions the first, "lower," phase and the second, "higher," phase of the communist society./12/

Until the Great Socialist October Revolution the term "communism" was used interchangeably with the concept "socialism." It should be added that in that period the meaning of the concept "socialism" had not been confined to the first and "lower" phase of communism but was construed much more broadly: it simply referred to the future society that was to arise following the socialist revolution. Thus, e.g., in his speech at the 7th Congress of the RKP(b) [Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks)], V. I. Lenin defined the higher phase of communism as the phase of "the socialist society in its developed form," i.e., of communism construed as "socialism in its ultimate form," as "complete communism."/13/

In the prerevolutionary years V. I. Lenin often employed the term "communism" to denote the future postrevolutionary society. By this term he meant two phases of the new formation and at the same time during that period he resorted less often to the term "socialism," because of the fact that the concept of socialism and its features then became increasingly distorted in social-democratic literature.

We meet with a definite differentiation and explicit division of the communist formation into two phases or rungs, socialist and communist, only in V. I.

Lenin's work "The Great Initiative," published in 1919, when the founder of the Soviet state wrote: "The only difference between socialism and communism is that the former term refers to the first rung [in the development] of the new society growing from capitalism while the latter term refers to another and higher rung in that development."/14/ This explicit isolation of two phases or rungs in the process of communist construction--socialism and communism--as well as the more precise determination of differences between them, can be regarded as a continuation of the position expressed by V. I. Lenin in his earlier works, e.g., in "The State and the Revolution," in which he states: "The scientific difference between socialism and communism is clear. What is usually called socialism was termed by Marx the 'first' or lower phase of the communist society. Considering that means of production become /common/ [emphasized] property, the term 'communism' can be applied here on bearing in mind that this is /not/ [emphasized] complete communism. The great importance of Marx's clarification consists in that here, too, he consistently applies materialist dialectics, the science of development, and considers communism as something that develops out of capitalism. Instead of 'speculative' scholastic definitions and barren disputes over meaning (of socialism and of communism), Marx provides an analysis of what could be termed the degree of the economic maturity of communism."/15/ Another work by Lenin that returns to this issue is "The Tasks of the Proletariat in Our Revolution" (1915), in which he stated: "There can be no direct transition of mankind from capitalism to socialism alone... socialism must inevitably gradually evolve into communism."/16/ The concepts "socialism" and "communism" here have the same meanings as those ascribed by K. Marx to the "lower" and "higher" phases of the communist society.

Thus, the founders of scientific socialism distinguished between two /separate/ [emphasized] phases or rungs or stadia of development in the process of the rise of the communist formation: incomplete communism, that is, socialism, and complete communism. Here it should be added that, when discussing the phases or rungs in the development of communism, these founders also clearly isolated the period of transition from capitalism to socialism, regarding it as the first stage of the socialist phase, during which a series of reforms of a socialist nature is introduced and the implementation of tasks proper to the stage of laying the foundations or erecting the walls of socialism is commenced. Hence also the typology outlined by K. Marx and subsequently elaborated by V. I. Lenin--a typology that reduces to the formula: transition period--first phase of communism--second phase of communism--has become fully corroborated by the social reality, particularly in the Soviet Union following the victory of the Great Socialist October Revolution, and in a later period also in the process of building socialism in all the countries of the socialist community.

Undoubtedly, the best foundation for reflections on the theory of these questions is provided by the experiences of the Great October and the first few years of Soviet rule, assessed in the works of V. I. Lenin. Referring to the thoughts expressed by K. Marx in, among others, "Critique of Gotha Programme," V. I. Lenin focuses attention on the degrees of the economic maturity of discrete phases in building communism, on developing in this connection a theory of the transition period which, in his opinion, commences

with the moment that political power is won by the popular masses led by the worker party and the basic means of production become socialized. He stressed that the socialist phase of the communist formation is a prolonged process of historical transformations, consisting of a number of stages and transitions, and the entire difficulty of the task, the entire difficulty of politics and the entire art of politics, consists in making allowance for the particular tasks of each such transition. He pointed out that the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat must be the political counterpart of the period of the restructuring of production relations in the course of the class struggle and the process of the propagation and consolidation of socialist forms of economic management and of the corresponding social-class structure.

On considering the process of building communism from the standpoint of the universal laws of social development, the classics of Marxism distinguish both general and specific features in each [phase of the] communist formation. The features they consider common to both phases are primarily: public ownership of means of production, these being decisive to the development dynamics of productive forces and the elimination of antagonistic class relations; the formation of new production relations developing in a planned manner; and the propagation of socialist awareness. The inspiring and organizing role in these transformations belongs to the Marxist-Leninist party of the working class. The paramount specific feature of both phases is the fact that socialism and communism develop on different principles. Socialism arises on the soil of capitalism, representing the negation of its socio-political and ideological structure, and it forms a qualitatively new model of a societal system, different from all the previous antagonistic systems of society. Communism, on the other hand, arises on the basis of developed socialism, i.e., it arises once the conditions for the qualitative refinement of socio-economic, political and ideological relations mature after the phase of socialism is reached.

The differing genesis of socialism and communism does not, however, completely account for the differences between them. Socialism arises as a result of revolutionary transformations, in the process of class, political and ideological struggle. All revolutionary transformations occur contrary to the will of the traditional ruling classes and demolish the old class, system-of-society and state structures. In this sense, the weapon of force is the factor decisive to seizing and maintaining political power by the working class. By contrast, the evolution of socialism into communism is no longer accompanied by violent and radical transformations. The transition from socialism to communism does not occur in the presence of antagonistic class struggle and the need to break the resistance of property-owning classes. It is accomplished through the growth of the material base and refinement of the socio-economic, political and ideological structures formed under socialism. Thus, the task of socialism is to prepare qualitative changes in the sphere of both production relations and social relations.

In view of such a many-sided interrelationship of both phases of building communism, the concept of the "transition period" cannot be applied solely to the process of the evolution of the socialist society into a communist one, because these societies represent two phases of one and the same formation.

The well-known thought of Lenin regarding the "middle phase" of the communist society apparently should in this connection be regarded as a confirmation and more precise definition of the Marxist-Leninist thesis that the higher phase of communism does not arise and develop following the completion of the formation of its first phase but gradually evolves in the bosom of the socialist society. These two societies are not, as has been pointed out above, two different formations but two phases of the same formation; they represent not two separate methods of production but two different rungs in the development of the same method of production based on the public ownership of means of production.

In different countries, depending on their particular conditions, the number of stages of development may be greater or smaller, the sequence of transformation of various aspects of societal life may differ, and the boundaries between discrete stages of development may be blurred; a superposition of tasks of the different periods also is possible. The sequence of changes hinges on, among other things, the degree of industrialization and urbanization, the status of agriculture, the cultural level and the historical traditions of a given country. For example, in the Soviet Union the period of transition from capitalism to socialism lasted roughly until the mid-1930s. During that period the question of "who's the winner" in the economic sphere was resolved in favor of socialism. The socialized sector became the dominant sector of the economy. This means that the foundations of socialism were laid./17/

The teachings of V. I. Lenin and the experience of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries serve to isolate the following stages of development within the framework of the first phase of the communist formation (socialism): first, there is the transition period, which to a large extent overlaps with the stage of laying the foundations of socialism, this also is how it is treated in the native literature of the other socialist countries; the second stage is that of the formation (building) of the developed socialist society /18/, which in the USSR had lasted roughly until the mid-1960s (most of the European socialist countries exist in this stage at present); and the third stage is that of the developed socialist society itself, in which the Soviet Union exists at present (at the June 1983 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee the current state of the development of socialism in the USSR was defined as the period of the refinement of mature socialism). This period is characterized by the domination of socialist social relations not only in the economy but also in other domains of social life. Developed socialism is a stage in the development of the socialist formation, during which the socialist society becomes transformed into an integrated social organism, an integrated whole, on subordinating various domains of societal life to its principles and norms./19/

Laying the foundations of socialism and undertaking tasks of building the developed socialist society signifies that socialist relations have become widespread in every domain of social and economic life in a given country, that is:

--a high level of development of productive forces has been attained along with the application of achievements of the scientific and technical revolution in a manner assuring a complete and rational utilization of the creative potential of the nation and the assurance of the development of omnilateral international cooperation;

--a qualitatively new stage in the process of strengthening the unity of the nation and rallying it around the working class and its party has been achieved, and in addition the ideals of socialism have been consolidated in the awareness of the society;

--a consistent implementation of socialist principles of social justice and acceleration of the process of the equalization of living standards has been assured, along with a gradual obliteration of differences between town and country and between physical and mental work;

--access to the development of socialist democracy has been opened and a constant refinement of the activities of the state and its institutions and agencies serving to promote in an increasingly better manner the socialist development of the country and the satisfaction of the needs of its citizens has been assured.

The implementation of the thus formulated tasks means a gradual transition from the stage of laying the foundations of socialism to the stage defined by V. I. Lenin as the stage of "...the developed socialist society."/20/

It is on the basis of precisely this Leninist analysis of the socioeconomic situation, providing an overall view of all aspects of social, economic, political and cultural life, that communist and worker parties assess the state of advancement of the development of socialism in a given country and formulate programs for further development.

The basis for outlining current and longrange programs for building socialism in a given country is thus the analysis and evaluation of the degree of the spread of socialist production relations in town and country as well as a degree of development of productive forces that assures a high productivity of social labor and at the same time makes it possible to resolve fundamental social problems. Such an analysis also makes allowances for the comprehensive and proportional development of the economy as subordinated to the tasks of meeting the growing material and spiritual needs of working people, as well as for an organic combination of the achievements of the scientific and technical revolution with the social values of socialism, and primarily for a close coordination of science, technology and production, i.e., for the spread of science and technology to the processes of the governing and management of society. The programs prepared on the basis of such analyses provide for further progress and, as a consequence, for the elimination of social inequalities through an extensive implementation of the principles of social justice, particularly in the field of social and wage policies. Also assumed is the equalization of the living and working conditions of individual social classes and groups, of the rural and urban population, i.e., the creation of

conditions for the gradual transition from the nonantagonistic class structure under socialism to the classless society under communism.

The next assumption pertains to the development and refinement of the organizational-economic, social and cultural-educational functions of the socialist state and its institutions and bodies. Thus, in this domain a gradual departure from directive-administrative functions toward the further development of various forms of socialist democracy under the leadership of the working class and its party is assumed.

Another unusually important aspect of the program assumptions for building mature socialism is the degree of the acceptance and observance of the principles, values and ideals of socialism, the consolidation of the socialist ideology in the awareness of society. All this means providing the conditions conducive to a broad development of the individual--of his personality, his system of values and his ideals in life, along with conditions conducive to an increasingly greater safeguards of social rights and civil liberties, the deepening of rights and duties, the self-manifestation of all values associated with energetic and creative activism, and the utilization of the talents and implementation of the desires and aspirations of all working people.

Such are the fundamental determinants of the degree of development of the building of socialism which, existing in a mutual dialectical relationship, together compose the model of an analysis performed from the standpoint of the qualitative factors in the development of socialism, and which represent to the party the basis for determining the degree of advancement of the process of building the socialist society and defining more precisely the short- and long-term tasks ensuing from this analysis. This is a corollary of the fact that, in their theoretical and practical activities, the communist parties must guide themselves by the laws of historical materialism, according to which social development is an objective process subject to the operation of these laws.

These general laws of the socialist revolution and of building socialism on the international scale include:

- the laboring masses are led by the working class, whose guiding force is the Marxist-Leninist party, both when accomplishing the proletarian revolution and when establishing the dictatorship of the proletariat;
- the alliance of the working class with the basic mass of the peasantry and other strata of working people;
- the abolition of capitalist ownership and the establishment of public ownership of means of production;
- gradual socialist transformation of agriculture;
- planned development of the national economy, intended to build socialism and communism and raise the living standards of the laboring masses;

--the accomplishment of the socialist revolution in the field of ideology and culture and the formation of masses of the intelligentsia devoted to the working class, to the laboring masses and to the cause of socialism;

--the abolition of nationalist oppression and the establishment of equal rights for nations;

--the defense of the achievements of socialism against encroachments by internal and external enemies;

--the solidarity of the working class of a given country with the working class of other countries, that is, proletarian internationalism./21/

Thus, new tasks cannot be formulated arbitrarily but must allow for the general laws of social development and reflect various objective needs, tendencies and possibilities ensuing from a given stage of social progress. As K. Marx has pointed out, a new and genuinely historic "task arises only when the material conditions for accomplishing it already exist or at least are in the process of becoming."/22/

The task of the subjective factor, i.e., of the communist party, consists precisely in expressing the objective needs of social development in a conscious form based on the general laws of social development and the formulated historical aims and tasks, and in identifying and scientifically substantiating the ways and means of translating them into reality. Of course, the more closely and adequately these aims and tasks reflect the objective needs, tendencies and possibilities of a particular stage of social development, the more effective the implementation of these aims and tasks by all elements of the socialist developmental process becomes and the faster the pace of social progress becomes. The basis for the related activities continues to remain V. I. Lenin's tenet that "the point of departure for the program of the Marxist party should be facts that are determined with absolute exactitude."/23/

The particular conditions existing in different countries require the application by their parties of varied methods for accomplishing the tasks relating to the implementation of discrete stages in socialist construction. Each party resolves on its own the principal political and socioeconomic problems, bearing responsibility for its decisions to the working class and laboring masses of its own country, and hence also to the entire international communist movement. "Communist and worker parties operate under extremely varied and specific conditions requiring an appropriate approach to the implementation of particular tasks. Guiding itself by the principles Marxism-Leninism and at the same time allowing for particular national conditions, each party acts entirely on its own in shaping its policies, determining the directions, forms and methods of its struggle and choosing--depending on the situation--the peaceful or nonpeaceful road of transition to socialism as well as the forms and methods of building socialism in its country." /24/

The communist parties of the countries of the socialist community, evaluating at their congresses, on the basis of precisely such an analysis, the degree of development of the processes of building socialism in their countries, have formulated the task of building mature socialism. As a consequence, they have prepared programs for the further socialist development of their countries and outlined extensive and complex tasks: meshing the values of the socialist system of society with the achievements of the scientific and technical revolution; a balanced development of the entire national economy; expansion of activities in behalf of further deepening the socialist social awareness; and expansion of cooperation among fraternal parties and socialist states.

In undertaking the cause of building a mature socialist society in their countries, the communist and worker parties of the socialist community acknowledged that the socioeconomic, cultural and political transformations accomplished in the earlier periods have in principle resulted in eliminating the relics of capitalist relations and assured laying the foundations for socialist relations. For building a developed socialist society can be accomplished only on the basis of economic-social and political relations of the socialist type and, as before, it proceeds on the political, economic, social, ideological and international planes.

In practice this means consolidation of the system of dictatorship of the proletariat, assuring to the laboring masses broad participation in managing the national economy and governing the state, development of socialist democracy, gradual liquidation of class antagonisms, strengthening the political alliance of all working people, fortifying the guiding position of the working class, and assuring the leading role of the communist party in the political organization of the society. During this period the following occur: socialization of basic means of production, organization of a planned national economy, socialist industrialization of the country, consolidation and development of the socialist sector in the national economy and socialization of production relations in agriculture.

Thus, establishing as a fact that the foundations of socialism have been laid and determining [that it is time for] the transition to the stage of building the developed socialist society is an act of portentous political significance. Hence also all the related resolutions are adopted by the highest party forum, namely, by party congresses./25/ Such a program represents the constancy of the transformations of a socialist nature accomplished in all spheres of the country's life: political, economic-social and ideological, while implementing the first stage of socialist construction, during the period of laying the foundations of socialism.

It ensues clearly from the assumptions of theory discussed above, as well as from practical experience in building socialism, particularly in the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community, that the decision of the 7th Congress of our party that Poland has commenced to build a developed socialist society was a premature decision. Above all, the degree of advancement of the development of socialism in our country was evaluated too optimistically, and it was arbitrarily decided that the stage of laying the foundations of socialism was completed or reaching its end at least in the

principal domains of social, economic and political life. Thereby also, the situation in the political, economic, social, ideological and international planes in Poland was declared to be ripe for the transition to the next stage, that is, it was judged that conditions already exist for commencing to build developed socialism. Actually, however, these conditions were, as demonstrated with such clarity by the period following the adoption of this decision by the 7th PZPR Congress, and particularly by recent years, far from ripe for making such a decision, at least in certain fields such as agriculture, the level of services in town and country, and especially artisan and trade services, etc.

It should be clearly stated, however, contrary to what the opponents of socialism as well as certain authors who declare themselves "Marxists" are trying to prove, in their attempts to question the reality of developed socialism in general, the reason for the mistake was not because the party placed this complex problem on its agenda and undertook theoretical and practical work on this problem, but because, with respect to the then existing socio-political and economic situation in our country, the party decided that nearly all the conditions for the transition to the next stage were met. In this case we are dealing with an evident deviation from Leninist principle, failure to heed the teachings of V. I. Lenin, who in his works repeatedly returned to these questions and warned against any voluntarist formulation of new tasks and programs during the period of socialist construction. He constantly stressed that they must be adopted upon making allowances for the general laws of social development and determined with absolute accuracy.

The 13th Plenum of the PZPR Central Committee, on analyzing the current socio-political and ideological situation in our country, also considered the problems of the development stage of socialism in Poland. The Politburo report states: "A simple formula cannot provide an exhaustive assessment of the complex reality of our country, but one thing is certain: in Poland we have accomplished most of the tasks of the period of transition from capitalism to socialism. This means the existence of a permanent socialist system in economic and sociopolitical life. In many fields, social solutions and social services that could be considered part of the phase of highly developed socialism have been introduced."/26/

It appears that the plenum's assessment of the degree of advancement of socialist construction in our country is both realistic and responsible as well as closely linked to the Marxist-Leninist interpretation of this difficult yet extremely important question of theory and practice.

FOOTNOTES

1. K. Marx, "A Contribution to Critique of Political Economy. Preface," in: K. Marx and F. Engels, "Works," Warsaw 1968, Vol 13 p 10.
2. K. Marx, "Critique of Gotha Programme," in: K. Marx and F. Engels, "Works," Warsaw 1972, Vol 19 p 23.

3. V. I. Lenin, "Works," Warsaw 1956, Vol 29, pp 417-418.
4. Lenin, Ibid., Warsaw 1951, Vol 25 p 503.
5. K. Marx, "Critique of Gotha Programme," op. cit., p 24.
6. Socioeconomic development has not been proceeding in a model manner, i.e., from one formation to another, in every country. In the historical development of some countries (e.g., Mongolia) transition to higher stages of development, bypassing certain formations, has taken place.
7. Cf. Lenin, op. cit., Vol 23 p 28.
8. Cf. P. Fedoseyev, "Dialectics of the Present Era" [translated from the Russian], Warsaw 1969, p 624.
9. J. Topolski, "Metodologia historii" [Methodology of History], Warsaw 1973, p 267.
10. Marx and Engels, op. cit., Warsaw 1953, Vol 4 p 141.
11. Terminological reflections on the concepts of "phase," "stadium" and "stage" can be found in the work by S. Widerszpil, "Refleksje nad rozwojem wspolczesnego spoleczenstwa polskiego" [Reflections on the Development of Contemporary Polish Society], Warsaw 1979, pp 37-38.
12. Cf. Marx and Engels, op. cit., Warsaw 1972, Vol 19 p 24.
13. Lenin, op. cit., Warsaw 1954, Vol 27 pp 143-144.
14. Ibid., Warsaw 1956, Vol 29 p 415.
15. Ibid., Warsaw 1951, Vol 25 p 507.
16. Ibid., Warsaw 1952, Vol 24 p 69.
17. Cf. "Klasy i warstwy w spoleczenstwie radzieckim" [Classes and strata in the Soviet Society], an anthology. Selections made by W. Wesolowski and W. Stelmach, Warsaw 1977; cf. also M. Michalik and J. Muszynski, "The Marxist-Leninist Theory of the Period of Transition from Capitalism to Socialism" in: M. Michalik (ed.), "Budownictwo rozwiniętego spoleczenstwa socjalistycznego" [Building the Developed Socialist Society], Warsaw 1976 pp 9-58.
18. Contemporary studies of the degrees of maturity of the communist formation employ a number of concepts and terms such as era, stage, phase, period, rung, etc. In economic, sociological and historical literature these concepts are often used interchangeably. Thus for example V. I. Lenin in his "The State and the Revolution" employs the terms "rung" and "stage" interchangeably with the term "phase."

19. Cf. A. P. Butenko, "Sotsializm kak obshchestvennyy stroy" [Socialism as a System of Society], Moscow 1974.
20. Lenin, op. cit., Warsaw 1957, Vol 30 p 333.
21. Cf. "The Declaration of the Conference of Representatives of the Communist and Worker Parties of the Socialist Countries," NOWE DROGI, No 12, 1957, p 28.
22. Marx, "A Contribution to Critique of Political Economy," in: Marx and Engels, op. cit., Vol 13 p 10.
23. Lenin, op. cit., Warsaw 1954, Vol 27 p 125.
24. "Dokumenty narady moskiewskiej, 5-7 VI 1969" [Documents of the Moscow Conference of 5-7 June 1969], Warsaw 1969, p 114.
25. These decisions also were adopted by the party congresses in various socialist countries (outside the Soviet Union): in Czechoslovakia, by the 8th Congress of the Czechoslovak CP, 18-21 June 1958; in Hungary, by the 8th Congress of the Hungarian Socialist Worker Party, 20-24 November 1962; in the GDR, by the 6th Congress of the SED, 15-21 January 1965; in Romania, by the 9th Congress of the Romanian Communist Party, 19-24 July 1965; in Mongolia, by the 16th Congress of the Mongolian People's Worker Party, 7-11 June 1971; in the Korean People's Democratic Republic, by the 5th Congress of the PPK [expansion unknown], 2-13 November 1970; in Bulgaria, by the 10th Congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party, 20-25 June 1971; in Poland, by the 7th Congress of the PZPR, 8-12 December 1975.
26. "Ideological Tasks of the Party in Implementing the Line of the 9th Extraordinary Congress," Politburo Report presented by Jozef Czyrek, Politburo member and secretary of the Central Committee, NOWE DROGI, Special Issue, 1983, p 14.

Views Defended

Warsaw PROBLEMY MARKSIZMU-LENINIZMU in Polish No 2, Apr-Jun 84 pp 94-103

[Article by Jerzy Muszynski: "On the Foundations of Socialism in Poland" under the rubric "Polemics"; this is a continuation of a debate concerning the nature of socialism published in JPRS East European Report EPS-84-087, 18 July 84 p 20 under the title "Nature of, Prospects for Socialism Debated"]

[Text] The polemical article below by Prof Jerzy Muszynski is the last in the exchange of views on the stage of the advancement of socialism-building in our country. In the near future we shall revert to this topic.

The Editors.

1. I found it interesting to familiarize myself with the polemical positions taken toward my article, "Have the Foundations of Socialism Been Achieved in the PRL?" The fact that it has elicited such a lively response points also to the importance of the issue it raises. Have the foundations of socialism been laid or not in Poland after 40 years? An answer to the question thus posed cannot--unfortunately--be found in the assumptions of the theory of the transition from capitalism to communism, which is an integral part of the political theory of Marxism-Leninism. For the theory of scientific communism formulates general and universal laws of the supplanting of capitalism by relations of the socialist type, while at the same time recommending that allowances be made for the real conditions and possibilities in every individual country. It can also be added that this theory places emphasis on the need to harmonize these general laws with the economic, political, social and cultural realities of the countries that accomplish revolutionary transformations on the road to socialism. But as for harmonizing, that already is not theory but practice; it is an art that has to be mastered by every communist party that directs revolutionary processes. In this art, what matters most is neither to overestimate the general nor to underestimate the particular, national features, and vice versa.

Such perceptions, in the form of a far-reaching synthesis, can be deduced from the assumptions of the theory of the transition from capitalism to communism when assessing the degree of the advancement of the processes of forming socialism in individual countries. Hence ensues the fundamental conclusion that a comprehensive assessment that objectively reflects the reality is to be based on the particular relations existing in a given country, on what has already been accomplished and what still could not be accomplished when creating the new formation, as well as on what has become distorted and undermined and what requires reparation and renewal. Allowance should also be made for diverse domestic and external factors that actually or potentially influence all the processes and results of the developing revolution.

It is methodological assumptions of this kind that represented the basis for my article. In defining them more precisely my object is to remind all those who engaged in polemics with me that in that article I confronted, so to speak, the practice of the formation of foundations of socialism in Poland with the assumptions of the theory of Marxism-Leninism which are supposed to be the basis for official party and state documents outlining the tasks to be translated into reality. Such assumptions were, besides, justified by the title of my article, which ends with a question mark. It was the results of this "confrontation," too, that justified a negative answer to the question posed in its title. Hence, in my conclusions in that article I formulated the view that so far the foundations of socialism have not yet been laid in the PRL, that the attendant processes still continue, and I based this view on specific facts presented in my article. I had also realized that facts in themselves imply neither a positive nor a negative answer to the question posed, and that only the interpretation and assessment of these facts can justify taking a particular position on them. In my case, the interpretation and assessment of the presented facts led to a negative answer, and I personally am convinced that such an answer is consonant with the reality

existing in Poland. Hence also in my article I "did not lean" on any official declarations on the matter, except that I quoted--upon the recommendation of the periodical's editors--an excerpt from the Politburo report presented to the 13th Plenum of the PZPR Central Committee, referring to an assessment of the accomplishments of our society on the road of transition from capitalism to socialism (my article was transmitted to the editors in July 1983). My concern was to present in that article my personal view on the degree of the advancement of socialism in our country. That plenum corroborated my thesis besides, by stating that only /a majority/ [emphasized] of the tasks of the period of transition from capitalism to socialism was accomplished in Poland. Thus, if it is only a majority, this means not all. And hence it cannot be credibly claimed that we did lay the foundations of socialism.

2. The writers commenting on the problem presented in my article did not all take the same position, with some opposing my assessment (Artur Bodnar) and others regarding it as valid (Jerzy Wiatr). Clearly, those who accepted my assessment did not agree with all of my views. This I consider quite natural, especially because I myself assumed that differing appraisals of the same facts are possible. Hence I am not surprised by A. Bodnar's adversary stance, and if I engage in a polemic with him, it is not because of his assessment of the advancement of socialism in Poland but because of the manner in which he formulates his arguments and conclusions.

Although A. Bodnar utilized my article as a pretext for formulating his own "theory" of it, and presented his own "methodology" in assessing it, this is not the principal issue in the polemic. What I reproach A. Bodnar with concerns issues on their own merit rather than issues of methodology. For I believe that, in formulating his thesis of the laying of foundations of socialism in Poland, A. Bodnar did not substantiate it in a credible and convincing manner, because many of the arguments he presented are not corroborated by the country's economic, political, social and ideological realities. For now I wish only to explain that the historical method imputed to me by A. Bodnar did not come into play at all, and not because I am a political scientist rather than a historian at that but because reliance on the facts that currently constitute the history of our country (in particular, this concerns the years 1948-1980) was required by the "confrontational method," i.e., by the comparison of practice with theory. My article dealt with historical facts serving to corroborate one of the most important theses on this issue, namely, the fact that not only the assumptions of the Marxist-Leninist theory regarding the transition from capitalism to communism were not honored in practice but also the party's own decisions, adopted at congresses or plenary sessions of its Central Committee, likewise were not honored in practice. This laxity was a major source of our failures and breakdowns impeding the laying of the foundations of socialism.

Had A. Bodnar perused more attentively my article, and particularly its first part, which justifies the conception of the problem formulated in the title, all his "methodological" conclusions would have been completely needless and would not have elicited my critical comments on this entire "methodological" stratum. Hence I believe that A. Bodnar's attempt to "recreate" my manner of reasoning and offer various critical comments on that manner (e.g., "employment

of several different levels of substantiality of the vision of the historical process," pp 63-64; the manner of interpreting the "ideological vision of the society" p 65; accusing me of superficiality of treatment, p 66; "by the authorities the author sometimes means the party leadership, sometimes the party as a whole and sometimes the government"; imputing to me the identification of awareness with ideology, p 67) is distant from reality and from my intentions and appraisals. Instead of demolishing with specific arguments my assessment that the foundations of socialism have not been laid in Poland, A. Bodnar engages in "methodological" reflections that do not enhance the value of his polemical article intended to prove a thesis contrary to mine.

However, I have no pretensions toward him for this reason, and in reverting to the issue I raised in my earlier article I wish to stress that I do not regard his imputations as merit-based arguments against my answer to the questions I had asked in my first article.

3. What proves, according to A. Bodnar, that the foundations of socialism have indeed already been laid in Poland? Unfortunately, the writer does not adduce any specific arguments to prove his assessment, and instead reiterates--using the convention of citing the official language of party documents of the 1970s--generally known opinions that often do not correspond to reality and are couched in distinctively obscure formulations of theory. His main argument is the extremely weak construct of "levels of reality," which, according to him, provide the guideposts for interpreting and assessing the principles and effects of socialist construction. This construct is substructured on two assumptions: the unificative concept and the antideterminist concept. Referring to his work, "Spoleczne uwarunkowania polityki" [Social Factors That Condition Politics] (Warsaw, 1980), A. Bodnar distinguishes among three levels of reality: "constructive," "historical substratum" and "concretely situational."

He uses this "theoretical construct," which in my opinion is of no practical importance to answering the specific question of whether we already have or have not laid the foundations of socialism in Poland, to formulate postulates concerning the need to stabilize our system of society, while at the same time completely overlooking other aspects of the argument. In his postulates, besides, A. Bodnar restates tasks and intentions ensuing from various official documents. But the creation of any theoretical constructs of this type does not appear requisite for formulating the thesis that stabilization of the economic-social and political system of the PRL is needed. Unless the system of society is stabilized, nothing can be accomplished, that is, neither socialism as the lower phase of the communist formation nor even laying the foundations of socialism can be accomplished. But as I had attempted to show in my article, the reason why we have not yet accomplished laying the foundations of socialism is precisely because it has not always been possible to assure the necessary stabilization in certain domains of life in Poland.

A. Bodnar states: "In our opinion, analysis of the social reality in Poland warrants stating that we did lay the foundations of socialism in our country. However, stabilization of the socialist system and its consistent development

adapted to Poland's socio-historical possibilities are needed. The stabilization of the system and its development on the Polish road is promoted by the extensive economic and political reforms initiated by the 9th Party Congress" (p 70), and so on. A. Bodnar identifies the objectives of the stabilization by resorting--unfortunately as before--to generalities ("strive to surmount the occurrences and processes that are by their very nature not inherent in the socialist system of society"). But this is obvious to any Marxist. It is to be regretted that A. Bodnar was not capable of formulating proposals for surmounting these occurrences. Socialism cannot be translated into reality unless the relics of the capitalist system are surmounted and new values created in every domain of life. Referring to the 9th Extraordinary Congress of the PZPR, A. Bodnar entirely overlooked, when discussing the stabilization of the system, the assessments made by that congress regarding the "devastation" of the socialism created in Poland owing to the deformations perpetrated, as well as owing to the anarchy-promoting activities of the extremist antisocialist forces. To eliminate the consequences of these deformations, and extirpate their sources and causative factors, the congress formulated the line of socialist renewal, which essentially meant "restoring the fundamental values of socialism to the country's life and the ideological-political principles of Leninism to party life, along with orientation toward deep economic reforms, development of socialist democracy, respect for the law and strengthening of social discipline.... We thus explore solutions based on socialism, because it was not socialism that was a mistake but the violation of its principles."/1/

When speaking of the need to stabilize the system of society, all the negative consequences of the deformations perpetrated while directing the processes of the creation of socialism in our country should not be overlooked, however. Therefore, even if the claim of the 7th PZPR Congress that the foundations of socialism have been laid in Poland is accepted as consonant with reality--and this I personally cannot accept, because in my opinion such assessments diverge from reality--the consequences of these deformations had largely vitiated the accomplishments made, particularly in the sphere of the economy and social awareness. For what had happened was, as declared in the resolution of the 9th Extraordinary Congress, "curtailment of democracy, gradual elimination of self-government systems and institutional autonomy or their reduction to make-believe functions, and the assumption of power by the executive apparatus of the party, state and economic administration.... Paralyzed by its leadership, the party forfeited the trust of the society.... This great potential (here the new rising generation of the working class is meant--J. M.) was largely wasted by the poor system of management and poor organization of labor.... The institutions of the political system not only failed to inspire citizens to participate in public life but even impeded their participation."/2/

Did not these negative and harmful consequences of the deformations perpetrated constitute the devastation of the foundations being laid for socialism? Did not the subsequent activities of forces hostile to socialism worsen the country's economic and political situation? Does not the country still find itself in a precarious situation in various domains of life? Are stabilization processes being carried out without difficulty?

When assessing the degree of the advancement of the transition from capitalism to communism in Poland, all these negative phenomena can in no way be ignored unless we want to commit mistakes ensuing from excessively optimistic assessments of all the Polish crises and socio-political conflicts.

A. Bodnar's "Q.E.D." of his thesis that the foundations of socialism in Poland have already been is based on the generalized assessment that "our society is a society based on the industrial type of productive forces" (p 71) and on the state of the relations in the economic, social and political sphere as well as on the state of social awareness.

In the economic sphere A. Bodnar's "Q.E.D." is confined to generalizations about the indivisible dominance of state and public ownership of means of production and exchange. He also offers the reminder that triple-sector [state farms, cooperatives and private farms] property relations exist in agriculture and states that "the need to feed the nation and restore Poland's position as an exporter of agricultural commodities requires bringing a permanent order into land management and the instruments of influencing all sectors of agriculture inclusive of private peasant farms" (p 71). Are these to be arguments in favor of the thesis that the foundations of socialism in Poland have been laid in the economic sphere? It is a pity that A. Bodnar did not evaluate the effectiveness of economic relations in recent years in both industry and allied domains and agriculture. Had he done so, he might not have conceived the idea of concluding that the foundations of socialism have been laid in Poland.

A similar method was used by A. Bodnar in evaluating the sphere of social relations. He stated: "In the social sphere, owing to Poland's industrial progress and the systemic principles implemented, many fundamental transformations radically altering the social situation of the country have occurred" (p 72). A. Bodnar's further arguments refer to: the leveling of many basic class and stratum differences, the high indicator of supraelementary education, the fact that 98 percent of urban inhabitants derive their living from employment in the state and cooperative sector, the extensive equalization of the opportunities of young people for getting a start in life and the considerable leveling of living standards. All this is true, but unfortunately it is true only of assumptions and postulates, not of life itself. Had things been as good as is claimed by A. Bodnar, I believe that socio-political conflicts in this country would not have been so extensive and acute. The justified protest of the working class against distortions of the system and against deviations from the universal principles of socialism was, as declared in the resolution of the 9th Extraordinary PZPR Congress, largely due to the failure to honor in practice the assumptions mentioned by A. Bodnar. This was also a protest against the violations of the principles of social justice, because these violations led directly to the deterioration of the material and social conditions of huge masses of laboring people. Instead of living better and better in measure with the advances on the road to socialism, people began to be less well off and, what is more, specific and realistic prospects for a better life were absent. Suffice it to recall the

situation in this respect that existed in the period between the 7th and 8th party congresses. It is a pity that A. Bodnar forgot this in his article.

It is a misunderstanding to claim that Poland is past the phase of dictatorship of the proletariat, "construed as not only the reign of the working class but also a political regime." Nota bene, "dividing" the dictatorship of the proletariat into the system of reign of the working class and a political regime is artificial, because dictatorship of the proletariat as a system of reign of the working class always is present in a particular form of government, whereas a political regime is a form of the exercise of power or, more exactly, of governing. However, this is not the point here. I cannot agree to the thesis that the system of dictatorship of the proletariat is withering away in this country ("the phase of dictatorship of the proletariat is behind us"). It conflicts with the actual situation. To be sure, the 7th PZPR Congress declared that, in the course of the implementation of the developed socialist society, the dictatorship of the proletariat will gradually transform itself into a general-national state, but following the events in Poland since 1980 the position of that congress has not been justified by the specific political relations in existence. We are not yet on the road toward a general-national state, and the class nature of the present authorities is obvious. The PRL remains a state of dictatorship of the proletariat, as has been mentioned at the 13th Plenum of the PZPR Central Committee. The universal attributes and principles of the building of socialism in Poland as mentioned at that plenum include a state exercising the functions of dictatorship of the proletariat. This circumstance is not nullified by the fact of the formation and operation of an extensive front of patriotic forces supporting the socialist system of society (PRON [Patriotic Movement for National Rebirth]). The reforms of the political system discussed at the 9th Extraordinary PZPR Congress, the 13th and 15th plenums of the Central Committee and the National Conference of Delegates, are intended not to replace the dictatorship of the proletariat but to strengthen it by, among other things, providing real conditions for the democratization of political life.

A. Bodnar's thesis that the socialist system of values is a common element of social awareness (p 74) is an unprovable thesis. The moral-political unity of our nation has already been repeatedly mentioned at, among others, the 7th PZPR Congress in 1975. Reality has not confirmed this assessment. This was voiced at the 13th PZPR Central Committee Plenum, where emphasis was placed on the adversary's devastation of the awareness of a substantial segment of our society owing to, among other things, his exploitation of the deformations, failures and mistakes committed in the 1970s, as well as owing to the hostile activity of counterrevolutionary forces. A. Bodnar did not offer a single credible argument in favor of his thesis. In this case, too, his "Q.E.D." that the foundations of socialism have been laid in Poland does not pass the test of confrontation with reality. One has to be completely uncritical or disoriented in order to formulate the assessments of the social awareness of Poles offered by A. Bodnar.

The shaping of the socialist awareness of society is one of the most difficult tasks of the socialist revolution in the entire historical period of

transition from capitalism to socialism. As the foundations of socialism are laid, this task is, as demonstrated by the experiences of all the countries implementing the lower phase of the communist formation, accomplished only to a limited degree. Awareness, being part of the human psyche, is not readily amenable to any operations modeling and molding the processes of human thought, perception and sensation. The mentality inherited from the previous social formation still long remains a wellspring of human behavior and motivation. The old morality and mentality, the old world outlook and the old customs and mores still continue for a long time, following the seizure of power and socialization of basic means of production in the interest of the laboring masses, to influence interpersonal relations, including the attitudes toward the economic-social and political system of society being created. Thus, the tasks of the socialist revolution in this field are particularly complex, and their implementation requires not only a great deal of time but also persistence, patience and understanding. It is thus no accident that the eight most important tasks of the party formulated in the report of the Politburo of the PZPR Central Committee to the National Conference of Delegates include the task of shaping social awareness ("go over to an ideological offensive on the entire front, conquer new domains of social awareness, particularly among the rising generation")./3/

Hence, given the present situation in our country, assessments that transcend reality should not be made, because, as noted by Wojciech Jaruzelski, first secretary of the Central Committee, in his speech at the 15th PZPR Central Committee Plenum, "we could be menaced by harmful arrogance, complacency, relaxation of requirements and an undemanding attitude."/4/

Regarding the state of the social awareness of the Polish nation, the party has repeatedly made mistaken assessments diverging from reality. This alone should be sufficient warning against formulating theses or generalizations that are unsupported by reality or that mistake wishful thinking or subjective feelings for reality.

It does not appear that A. Bodnar has argued credibly his thesis that the foundations of socialism have been laid in Poland. If this is his personal conviction, it ensues, in my opinion, from excessive and unproved optimism. I personally am disposed more skeptically toward his assessment, as I tried to demonstrate in my first article. Without denying the obvious and incontrovertible accomplishments of our country on the road to socialism, I find more suitable the position represented in the final words addressed by Wojciech Jaruzelski to the National Conference of Delegates: "The processes currently occurring in Poland can be compared only to the postwar ones at a time when we had first entered upon the revolutionary road of building a new system of society."/5/ This assessment does not at all mean that we are beginning our revolution anew. Our previous accomplishments that remain inviolable represent our positive balance sheet. However, the situation in many domains of life in this country does indeed resemble in many respects the first years of the socialist revolution in Poland. In those years we had commenced laying the foundations of socialism in Poland, whereas now, on emerging from a deep economic, political and moral crisis, we are continuing, on the basis of permanent accomplishments, the processes intended to lay

genuine foundations of socialism in our country. It can be assumed that this goal will be achieved following complete emergence from the crisis and the achievement of complete stabilization in all domains of life.

4. In conclusion, a few minor reflections on A. Bodnar's article.

A. Bodnar's interpretation of Lenin's concept of the transition from capitalism to communism is of no major significance to the problem considered in my article. In mentioning the "middle" phase of the transition to communism (a mention which he makes only once besides), V.I. Lenin refers to the achievement of socialism as the lower phase of communism, that is, before it transforms itself into complete communism. From the standpoint of the topic of my article, periodization of the transition from socialism to communism was not an issue, and hence I did not consider this topic in greater depth, for which A. Bodnar reproaches me. The purpose of my article was to answer the question of whether /the foundations/ [emphasized] of socialism have been laid in Poland, and not whether /socialism/ [emphasized] as the lower phase of the communist formation, in both Marxist and Leninist understanding of the term, has been accomplished in Poland.

Equally invalid is A. Bodnar's accusation concerning my assessment of the position of the 17th and 18th VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)] on the question of the next--after the foundations of socialism are laid in the USSR--stage of accomplishing the lower phase of the communist formation. It is true that at these congresses the term "developed socialist society" was not employed, but in the assessments of the 22nd CPSU Congress and subsequent congresses that period (from the mid-1930s till the late 1950s) was considered as the building of a developed socialist society in the Land of the Soviets. Thus, I was concerned not with the formulation but with the point of the matter, as ensues unambiguously from my article.

A. Bodnar believes that my ideological vision of the socialist society presupposes a completely harmonious and balanced development of that society and states that I operate with a "closed model." Had A. Bodnar delved into the purpose of my article and the course of my reflections, he would not have made such accusations. Let me once again offer a reminder: the purpose of my article was to confront the practice of the laying of the foundations of socialism in Poland with the assumptions of the theory of Marxism-Leninism and the program documents of the PZPR on the subject. This confrontation demonstrates that the processes of laying the foundations of socialism did not occur in a stereotyped manner, and hence I could not evaluate them in accordance with some "closed model." After all, the party has reassessed the past critically several times and formulated new assumptions for the implementation of socialism, and all this was considered in my article. Hence, there can be no question of any "closed model," unless A. Bodnar needed this "model" to prove that I am mistaken.

I cannot agree with A. Bodnar's position that an "analysis of the historical processes occurring in times of great social changes (such as the 40th anniversary of the PRL), when conducted in moral categories, leads to perceiving these processes as a succession of incessant regressions, because

psychosocial phenomena alone become the basis for evaluating them" (p 66). I have a growing impression that A. Bodnar either did not read my article thoroughly or failed to grasp its meaning. My reflections in no way lead to the conclusion that the 40th anniversary of the PRL is "a succession of incessant regressions." They illuminate--and they do so in the light of party documents and assessments besides--negative aspects of the process of laying the foundations of socialism, but they do not overlook the accomplishments, which after all are substantial but, when taken together, still do not warrant the assumption that the foundations of socialism have already been laid in Poland. In pointing to the negative phenomena I explored both their sources and conditions and the arguments for justifying the thesis that we have not been capable of laying the foundations of socialism--primarily owing to these regressions, collapses and failures.

I am not retracting, despite A. Bodnar's accusations, my critical assessment of the situation within the party in the period between the 7th and 8th congresses and directly after the 8th Congress. Referring to the party's situation in the period of the preparatory campaign for the 9th Extraordinary PZPR Congress (p 66), that is, to the party's tremendous activism in various constituencies, does not alter the heart of the matter. A. Bodnar appears to have forgotten that after August 1980 nearly a million members withdrew from the party's ranks and that the present situation in the PZPR is far from ideal.

I could question other theses and appraisals of A. Bodnar regarding my article. I relinquish doing so, because the purpose of my rebuttal of his accusations is basically to demonstrate that the arguments he offers to prove the thesis that the foundations of socialism have already been laid in Poland did not convince me and did not influence me in the direction of changing my previous assessment. For these arguments were not credible, not supported by the reality in our country. As a matter of fact, this reality, as it exists in various domains of life, is not amenable to any subjective perception or assessment. Unjustified optimism, complacency and the identification of one's personal feelings with reality lead nowhere. The objective reality decides whether the foundations of socialism have or have not yet been laid in Poland. A. Bodnar's appraisal does not provide convincing proof in favor of the thesis that the foundations of socialism have already been laid in Poland.

FOOTNOTES

1. "IX Nadzwyczajny Zjazd PZPR. Podstawowe dokumenty i materialy" [Ninth Extraordinary Congress of the PZPR: Basic Documents and Materials], Warsaw 1981, p 25.
2. Ibid., pp 103-104.
3. "Referat Biura Politycznego KC PZPR wygloszony na Krajowej Konferencji Delegatow PZPR przez I sekretarza KC PZPR Wojciecha Jaruzelskiego" [Report of the Politburo of the PZPR Central Committee, Presented at the National Conference of PZPR Delegates by First Secretary of the PZPR Central Committee Wojciech Jaruzelski], Warsaw 1984, p 43.

4. W. Jaruzelski, "Concluding Address of First Secretary of the PZPR Central Committee at the 15th Plenum of the PZPR Central Committee on 18 February 1984," NOWE DROGI (Supplement), No 1, 1984, p 65.
5. "The Most Dramatic Is Behind Us; the Most Difficult in Front of Us: Final Address by Wojciech Jaruzelski, Concluding the Deliberations of the National Conference of Delegates," ZAGADNIENIA I MATERIALY, No 11-12, 1984, p 30.

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CULTURAL DEVELOPMENT UNDER SOCIALISM TRACED

Warsaw ZYCIE PARTII in Polish No 14, 4 Jul 84 pp 3,4

[Article by Bronislaw Golebiowski]

[Text] Cultural transformations of a given country, people, class or medium cannot be understood without a broad historical perspective. Nor can they be understood by separating cultural phenomena from phenomena occurring in the social structure and in the sociopolitical system. Unlike political institutions or arrangements of social relations, culture requires a developmental continuity, which is its sine-qua-non.

Cultural transformations of a given country, people, class or medium cannot be understood without a broad historical perspective. Nor can they be understood by separating cultural phenomena from phenomena occurring in the social structure and in the sociopolitical system.

Culture, unlike political institutions or arrangements of social relations, requires a developmental continuity, which is its sine-qua-non. Those are complex processes that do not always follow the course mapped out for them by cultural policies or envisioned by theoretical programs. Sometimes cultural tensions and conflicts are preliminary phases of the real progress in a given culture, and vice-versa, and an ostensibly harmonious development is only the surface of a growing crisis and confrontation of values. This syndrome has been fathomed in depth by renowned Polish investigators of Polish culture, such as L. Krzywicki, S. Czarnowski and others who were close to the idea of socialism, or F. Znaniecki, J. Chalasinski, J. Bystron and others who were adherents of the national democratic idea. Jozef Chalasinski, for one, an uncommonly inquisitive investigator of permutations in Polish culture, presented the following brief characterization of cultural permutation during the first 20 years of the Polish People's Republic (1944-1964) at the 1966 Congress of Polish Culture in Warsaw:

"The basic change brought about by the 20 years of the Polish People's Republic is the nationalization of popular masses, hence the integration of the people. Staszic had written about the need to overcome the exclusivity of the nobility nation, because at that time the Polish nation was a nation of nobles. Then during the period of bondage the intelligentsia class moved to

the top; the years between the wars brought a discordant hegemony of three elements: landowners, upper middle class, and intelligentsia. The 20 years of the Polish People's Republic opened the way for the popular masses to play an instrumental part. Many upheavals of our humanistic idea, including the exaggerated problem of alienation, are the outcome of this basic change, which is due to the fact that along with the nationalization of the popular masses history deprived our intelligentsia of the national exclusivity and its former mission: to be a national patron of the popular classes."

The three issues raised above are essential for the purpose of further contemplations:

--Cultural shifts are not mainly the function of some cultural policy of remedies centered around intellectual or creative media, but rather the logical consequence and expression of permutations in the social structure and relations of a given nation (country-government, et al.).

--The main social function performed in a given nation or group of nations, i.e., the function of integration, bond-forming, feeling of dignity and identity, socioethical function, has always been appropriated in the past by the governing class to suit its own interests under the slogan of "cultural community."

There are no simple and unencumbered ways to pursue the liberation of popular masses (referring in this case also to Gramsci's categories) from that selfish appropriation of the function of national culture for selfish class purposes in order to shape them into a "people-nation," because the main assistants in this process, the intellectuals, are for the most part stigmatized, too, by this "lust for exclusive domination of culture," even after the exploiting classes have been swept away by the socialist revolution. For this reason, in these processes a "collective intellectual" is indispensable, and, according to Gramsci, this is the Marxist-Leninist party of the workers' class.

Was the cultural policy of the Polish People's Republic going in the wrong direction?

Insofar as basic theoretical and ideological premises are concerned, of course not. Those premises were worked out in the period between the wars, particularly during the occupation, by communists, radical socialists, and members of the Peasant Party, whose roots were in the intelligentsia concentrated around the Polish Workers Party.

The Manifesto of the Polish Committee of National Liberation during the first development phase after the workers and peasants had seized power gave it a positively national democratic profile in accordance with the principles of the Leninist concept of a cultural revolution. Following the unification of the Polish labor movement, that concept was highly dogmatized, although, in my opinion, it remained qualitatively identical, even if highly and unfortunately voluntaristic, insofar as the hasty establishment of a nonsocialist Polish system of cultural values as a whole is concerned.

The fact that the developmental specifics of this culture were not adequately considered in the 19th century, and furthermore the involvement of the Catholic Church under the conditions of national bondage, had their negative effects during the next three decades regarding the prosocialist ideological and educational possibilities that have been made feasible by a socialism of a socialized culture rendered democratically accessible.

After 1956 the chance was provided to correct this error under the conditions of a decisive breakdown of effects, of both revisionism and dogmatism, occurring in the party, culture and education. A uniform consistency and a principal severity were called for, which was the key for the proper regulation of the cultural role and education of the Catholic Church and lay Catholics, who took great advantage of the internal "tug-of-war" within the party and the successive crises, boosting their own influence up to the latest crisis.

The ideological and theoretical weakness of the Marxist-Leninist party was in this case of decisive importance for governmental voluntarism and lack of cohesion in cultural policies with regard to two dimensions:

--an inconsistency and vacillation in the internal line of the ideological struggle in the party itself, insofar as its relation to the intellectual media is concerned, which is in relation to opportunism and chicanery;

--the lack of a decisive and realistic policy line in relation to the church's role and cooperation of both the church and church laity in the joint formative effort with the state in the aggregated cultural phenomenology of the Polish People's Republic, as a socialist state, in certain domains, particularly in fundamental social milieus with strong emotional attachments to the Catholic tradition of Polish culture (referring to peasants and new workers).

Yet, against the background of such a policy program, the execution, particularly in some periods, was impressive and utterly effective. What caused such a paradox? Its origin should be traced back to the endeavors and expectations of the masses, especially peasants, considering that in 1944 we were a country with a rural population of about 54 percent, while today the rural population is only 24 percent. The reason? The terrible war and the fact that we stood on the threshold of great opportunities for social advancement beyond the village into other media.

The social element was not adequately cultivated by government activities to promote science and culture through organizational and real planning, because of constant bureaucratic reverses and a schematization of cultural institutions along with a constant suppression of the sociocultural movement, cultural societies and such.

The previously quoted J. Chalasinski referred to this phenomenon as "the integration process of the popular class into the aggregate of national culture," and also as the searching process of advancing popular masses (primarily peasants) for a confirmation of their personal freedom in enlightenment and culture, to lift themselves from the former feeling of humiliation and inferiority to the right to participate in the wholeness of national culture and through it in worldwide culture.

Chalasinski's thesis that the 20 years (1944-1964) brought national integration in the form of a fundamental sociocultural transformation on a hitherto unknown scale is a cogent thesis, although someone might say that it was not strong enough if it brought with it a division within less than 20 years, which means the disintegration of the same nation during the critical years 1980-1981, something with which we are still grappling today.

In the first place, it should be borne in mind that the scholar quoted in the 1966 abstract expressly emphasized that the integration process in question was not completed. Moreover, he felt that its continued progress aroused among the intelligentsia some anxiety about its own role that had some bearing on the promotional monopoly in culture, in addition to giving rise to various theories of alienation and national nihilism, etc., which came out during the crisis years of 1968-1970.

In the second place, in the quoted abstract the author discerned and expostulated that those processes were primarily the cause of new phenomena in the worker and peasant classes on the perceived scale, namely "the awareness of a historical national communion and the cognizance of responsibility of the popular classes for its future success or failure." This is the starting point of our further analysis.

Do culture-forming processes have their negative results, too?

Great social processes always arouse a gamut of results that lend themselves to various appraisals from various points of view. Those processes are made up of entire series of phenomena contingent on factors of multifarious characters: economic, political, demographic, psychological and moral. Those are conflicting and colliding processes in the course of which some cultural elements are supplanted by others, and otherwise hierarchically arranged in relation to each other, interlinked into different patterns, etc.

One of these strong factors of cultural change in the post-war period deals with the demographic factor, i.e., the generation shift that has been going on since the end of the 1960's in connection with the rapid rate of change in the social structure (quantitative growth and change in the qualitative structure of the working class and intelligentsia, the advancing cost of a major and mostly young portion of the peasant class).

The youth demographic explosion, with over 10 million young people entering the sociocultural and economic-political life mainly in the period from 1968 to 1978, with the number of those reaching their 18th year of age hitting annual figures of 700,000 to 850,000 people, brought different experiences and aspirations from those of the previous generation. This huge and rather inexperienced human potential entered social life with higher than elementary education, having been raised from childhood in the Polish People's Republic and accepting as a self-evident matter the right of co-governing the country, the right of civic equality, and the right of participating in culture and so on. The fact that for the most part those were young workers also served to reinforce their conviction, supported by widely promulgated premises of a political structure, that they constituted a major political and social force in society and government.

There were other factors, too, namely the revolution in the form of government, enlightenment, and culture, the socialist industrialization, settling of western territories with a rural-to-urban migration, sociocultural advancement and the rise of a broad class of people with secondary and higher education (considering over 5 million people with secondary education and more than 1 million with higher education), the institutionalization phenomenon of social and cultural life, the international ideological and political struggle in the cultural field between capitalism and socialism, and so on. In fact, the major processes enumerated above surely do not exhaust the factors conditioning the cultural shifts.

A renowned cultural sociologist of the Jagiellonian University, Kazimierz Dobrowolski, while investigating in 1966 the formation syndrome of the new culture in the Polish People's Republic, wrote that it involved a process of collision full of various contradictions and elementary phenomena leading "from harmony to a new style of harmony through discordant processes." It is advisable to adduce at this point the makeup of the factors which, in Prof Dobrowolski's opinion, condition those colliding cultural shifts.

They are: "...a shrinking economic distance between particular social classes and occupational categories; an improvement in rural economic conditions as expressed by the overpopulation discharge (parceling out some of the landed estates, shifting peasant masses to the western territories, attracting to the cities and industrial centers the excess of the rural population and providing it with work and housing in the new trade, enabling rural populations still living in villages to find jobs in cities and industrial centers by providing transportation and establishing some industrial plants in rural areas), plus a considerable rise of the level of agrotechnical culture; cities and villages uniformly provided with basic industrial goods; a thorough overhaul of living conditions in the village as a result of electrification, road improvements, and better transportation means; the introduction of health centers in villages, mass library networks and recreation centers, movies, establishing the conditions for enjoying radio and television programs, liquidating illiteracy and erecting thousands of modernized buildings for seven-grade elementary schools; a constant and systematic uplift of professional qualifications that gradually effaces the distance between physical labor and intellectual work; preferential treatment of children of workers and peasants in admittance to secondary and higher schools of learning and colleges; and finally, a systematic buildup of a uniform culture by fusing and tempering choice national Polish traditions with the most creative elements of the people and new government programs."

How many factors from different domains does this renowned scholar take into consideration in order to come up with the contingency factor of cultural shifts and the mechanism of those shifts? What was the course of action? Is it possible to reconstruct in general terms the phases of those shifts on the basis of many other investigations? Why has there been so much tension and conflict in those shifts, or even crises, just to mention the last and sharpest crisis of them all?

Those are questions which scientists might be able to answer after long and painstaking investigations. In the past the accepted procedure was to single out definite cultural developmental stages, primarily in accordance with criteria of political events. Thus, first, from 1944 to 1948 there was the cultural reconstruction; second, from 1949 to 1956--attempts to politicize culture; third, from 1957 to 1970--making culture a mass venture; fourth, from 1971 to 1980--domination of culture by the media, and fifth, from 1981 to the present, polarization of the value of culture. This is a rather schematic division which gives rise to some doubts. Because political events or social tensions are nothing more than symptoms of deeper cultural processes, although by themselves they may either promote or hinder, by themselves their courses crystallize cultural syntheses or retard them.

One of the possible efforts to link such sociopolitical elements, making cultural changes on the 40th anniversary of the Polish People's Republic contingent on sociocultural prerequisites, stipulates that mutational processes in the socio-occupational and demographic-environmental structure are the most essential factors for cultural change. Of course, this possibility does not include the economic factors that constitute the underlying foundation of such shifts, in addition to political and governmental changes, because I assume the socialist government principle to be irrelevant here and not subject to any discussion, whereas the realization of this premise is relevant. If this assumption is admitted, we may distinguish the following phases of the culture-forming process in the Polish People's Republic during the 1944-1948 period.

I. From 1944 to 1956, when we dealt with a frontal clash of cultures. This clash occurred as a result of the Nazi occupation, the war, and the resistance movement, which made it possible to shift the turning point of that period to 1939. It was the outcome of the fight for the country's liberation and the accomplishment of the popular-socialist revolution during the period from 1944 to 1947, the westward territorial translocation of the country's borders, repatriation, and return of the people to their homeland.

That was a cultural clash, so violent and multifaceted that it would be hard to list all its possible aspects, such as the rural and urban cultures, cultures of the East and West, cultures of Catholicism and socialism, the cultural elements of nobility, high and low middle classes, the peasant and proletarian culture, regional cultures, and for the first time, a democratic universal all-national culture, a Soviet culture, often schematic in its issue because of the personality cult period, but constituting a Polish culture with elements of traumas and an "anticommunist culture" that had been grated onto it during the periods between the wars, a political culture of the popular movements in various manifestations, a socialist movement, a communist, rightist national democratic, and liberal-democratic movement, etc., etc. All this brewed and boiled in the postwar crucible as the masses strove to advance, obtain better housing, etc.

Needless to say, that period can be divided into two rather clearly delineated stages from the point of view of those very conditions and political events, or perhaps three stages, if we care to include the occupation time.

The two post-war periods are obvious: 1941-1948, which under the influence of the national liberation and sociopopular revolution witnessed a cultural offensive with a strong popular and democratic context, primarily pursued by all patriotic and class groups except for those swept away by the revolution. Then comes the period from 1949 to 1956 when, under the influence of the political permutation factor, we witness a sectarian delimitation of the universal pluralism in culture, plus an institutionally cultivated national cultural tradition to fit a selected text and form, such as in schools. That, from the points of view of both strategy and also cultural revolution tactics, was an unforgivable blunder, although that period had brought Poland many mass successes in propagating culture on a rural and urban basis.

II. From 1957 to 1970, when we dealt with an unparalleled intermixture and fusion of rural and urban cultures. This homogenization has had, of course, its negative aspects. It is the cause of the eclecticism in morals, culture everyday life, outlooks on life, lifestyles, and even aspirations, drives and attitudes.

This period is conditioned primarily by further industrialization and urbanization of the country, further intensive migrations from villages to cities, mass transit systems that have now become quite universal, and new aspirations of rural "privileged" youth that refuses to be worse off culturally than other groups (hence, the great success of cultural clubs, rural coffee clubs, etc.).

This is the period of confusing values and searching for a model of a socialist culture and would meet the cultural traditions of Poland in accordance with the Leninist prototype. In this regard, the cultural policy of the party and the state, particularly in the second half of the 1960's, lacked consistency and a clear-cut program. This refers in particular to attitudes toward cultural development in the medium of the young workers' class, and the refusal of antisocialist and revisionist groups to allow the former to join learning centers and young intelligentsia groups, while the latter tried to fight off sectarianism.

However, on the whole, it was the basic integration period of the popular classes into national culture, the acquisition period of its major values, which helped the youth of our society in its unceasing dynamics of drives for enlightenment and culture. There was the conviction that this was the permanent road to social advancement in the future, too. And that was only a half-truth....

III. From 1971 to 1984 (this process is still going on as 1984 does not close this phase), witnessing processes of a gradual, but ever sharpening and multifaceted labor cultural polarization. This polarization is due to a strong feeling among the workers, particularly the younger generation, that they are entitled to subjectivity in every realm of social life, including culture.

In the meantime, the overwhelming mass of new white-collar workers (more than 6 million with secondary and higher education) showed little eagerness to share its cultural achievements with laborers. At the same time, while young

laborers saw their consumption aspirations knocked down, the trends toward a lower middle class style of life and social ethos had been growing in every social field. These trends were aimed in particular against the interests of hardworking laborers.

Workers tried to resist this situation a number of times, including during the 1976 discussions before the Seventh Congress and particularly the Eighth Congress of the Polish United Workers' Party. However, the majority of the party's leadership failed to take those feelings into account, which was one of the main causes for the workers' protest in 1980, raising postulates in matters of a broadly understood culture.

This opportunistic attitude on the part of the leading party structures, which were more intent on heeding the interests and opinions of a hefty portion of the technocratic and bureaucratic intelligentsia than the interests and opinions of the workers' class, was exploited in an organized fashion by the antisocialist opposition (KOR, KPN, underground publications), which had a major effect on the deformation of the labor movement in August 1980 in the direction of anarchistic syndicalism and antisocialist nationalism. This status could only end in a confrontation "on the streets" or the only alternative, a "state of martial law" in Poland, which was in fact declared.

The cultural labor polarization continues, although it has become more complex due to the 1981 events of an antisocialist context, presented as "labor demands" under the mantle of Solidarity; it will have to drag on. This is the fatal result of errors of the cultural policy dating back to 1956 which, in various periods and to various degrees, was not oriented to the cultural needs and aspirations of the basic socialist class, the workers, but traditionally attached the greatest importance to whatever was culturally happening among the intelligentsia, particularly intellectuals and shapers of culture.

Without minimizing their importance in generating creative facts, works, events, etc., it must be said that in the social promotion of culture, in creating its ethos, its social modus operandi, the intelligentsia can only be, and in practice it is, superseded by basic social classes who have been integrated into national culture to the extent that they can perform their part independently, although they are still learning from clashes and conflicts.

In this learning process the intelligentsia's help and cooperation, as it assumes the labor ethos, i.e., a socialist ethos, as its own, is, of course, indispensable and irreplaceable. However, nowadays we can speak no more about the intelligentsia's "patronage" of workers in the cultural field, because if this were the case, such patronage would always aim at targets conflicting with the interests of the labor ethos.

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HISTORIAN EMPHASIZES PERSONAL INTEGRITY, TRUTH

Warsaw PRZEGLAD KATOLICKI in Polish No 3, 8 Jul 84 p 5

[Interview by Jan Skorzynski with Professor Zbigniew Wojcik, historian: "The Ethics of My Profession: No One Has Forced Us To Write Untruth"; date and place not specified]

[Text] [Question] What good does history do, professor?

[Answer] History helps primarily, though not exclusively, to understand the present, to understand the genesis of events and processes we are going through. It is an absolutely necessary component of national consciousness. A nation deprived of history--through falsification, for instance--can easily be annihilated.

The role of history in the life of major, powerful nations, or of those who have lived in the past, generally speaking, in prosperity and peace, differs greatly from the role history plays in the life of smaller, weaker nations, scourged by fate, or for protracted periods of time deprived of their independent status. National consciousness has--and probably will have for a long time to come--one sense for Englishmen and French, another for Poles or Ukrainians. Hence, in the latter group, many historical obsessions, oversensitivity concerning "desecration of holy values," and--what is even worse--symptoms of hostility towards foreigners. Obsessions and oversensitivity can be condemned, but should be understood. On the other hand, whatever promotes hatred of other nations should be patiently, but determinedly and consistently, fought against.

[Question] The therapeutic function of history is frequently emphasized. From our past triumphs we draw consolation and hope. On the other hand, it has been unambiguously claimed that the object of historical writing is to explain the truth about the past, regardless of how this past looked. If one tries to meet those two demands consistently, there is no way to avoid contradictions....

[Answer] First of all, what is historical truth? The notion is verifiable solely in terms of facts. As far as interpretation and evaluation are concerned, it rather stays beyond our reach. The unquestionable historical truth shows that in 1812 Napoleon suffered a major defeat in Russia, or that in 1918

Poland regained her independence. But things are not that simple. For me, for instance, the statement "in the 18th century Poland's downfall was caused primarily by annexationist policies of Russia, Prussia and Austria" reflects the historical truth. There are, however, historians who see the truth in a different light: "In the 18th century Poland's downfall was caused primarily by internal anarchy and the weakness of the Polish-Lithuanian state."

But let us return to your question. First of all, let me quote Tadeusz Manteuffel: a historian describes the truth, and nothing but the truth, as he sees it in light of his sources; that is an axiom. Well, this truth can be used either to raise hearts, when it deals with past accomplishments of our nation and our state, or to sound a warning, to draw proper conclusions from unfortunate experiences of the past. Such a "therapeutic function" of history can play a double role--to bring not only hope and comfort, but profound reflection, too. And another thing: a historian should also be bound by the principle "primum non nocere" [above all, to prevent damage]. I think, therefore, that he should never sow pessimism or despair.

[Question] A historian encounters in his work various restraints. Political demands in particular give rise to ethical problems. That concerns in particular modern history, where falsification and "blank spots" abound, but the issue of external constraints affects experts in other periods just as much. What is, therefore, to be done when total truth cannot be revealed? Should one opt for the lesser evil and reveal partial truth, or keep silent?

[Answer] Ten years ago Prof Stefan Kieniewicz, in his most interesting essay, "On the ethics of historian's profession," tried to answer the question you have just posed. At that time he would not totally condemn compromise, convinced that sometimes there are situations when a certain compromise might be worth accepting in order to save higher values. One cannot, however, talk about compromising when we are urged to distort the truth, or even to propagate lies, as distinct from some kind of toning down, or changes which do not distort the whole picture.

[Question] What kind of behavior do you consider most proper under such circumstances?

[Answer] If I am supposed to reveal partial truth only, but am not allowed to speak or to write about taboo subjects--that is to say, to distort history to a certain extent, since passing in silence over some truth known but at the given moment inconvenient is nothing but falsification--I prefer to keep my silence. Let us be honest: for the last 40 years no one has forced historians to write untruth. They have done it on their own, yielding to suggestions, temptation, pressure, but not to constraints!

[Question] But the entire machinery of pressure has been set in motion....

[Answer] Nonetheless, I am certain that those historians who in the past--and that is particularly relevant for the 1950's--distorted history for reasons of current propaganda were never constrained to do it in a way which would deadlock them in an impasse situation. I am convinced that it was their own decision.

[Question] That is probably the reason why we can now speak about a crisis of public confidence in history writing. How do you assess the credibility of Polish historians and their oeuvre after the experience of recent years?

[Answer] It seems to me that the lack of public confidence has greatly ebbed in recent years. It is my personal conviction that most historians of modern times have deserved credibility for a long while. Even though, now and again, one cannot agree with their assessments, their works are, after all, based upon abundant source material, and the authors have given up lecturing our fathers and grandfathers, on how they should have acted. Sometimes primitive didacticism keeps popping up, mainly in historical journalism, but I am deeply convinced that it has no future whatsoever.

[Question] Such didacticism appears in some official pronouncements. Recently, for instance, the thesis about the quasi-inherent anarchism of the Poles has been propagated.

[Answer] I agree with you that there is a danger of abusing research results for political reasons, and that the thesis about anarchistic propensities of the Poles has indeed been abused and manipulated for current needs. But in one respect I might disappoint many of my readers. There was in our past definitely too much license, derived from feelings of individual freedom subject to no constraints. All the goings-on in our parliaments, from the mid-17th century onward, have been simply appalling.

[Question] But is the use of historical parallels in present-day journalistic or political controversies legitimate and reasonable?

[Answer] In principle, historical analogy might well be false, improper, or even harmful. There are, however, some situations in which past events should be invoked. History never repeats itself, but similar situations do happen. In such cases, it is good to know how our ancestors behaved under such circumstances. But, obviously, no analogy will replace straightforward analysis of the present situation.

[-----] [passage deleted on the basis of the 31 July 1981 law on control of publications and performances, article 2, points 1 and 2 (DZIENNIK USTAW No 20 item 99, amended 1983 DZIENNIK USTAW No 44 item 204)]

[Question] It seems to me that one can, at present, discern an ongoing polarization of attitudes in various domains, as well as among various social groups. Do similar phenomena appear in the historians' community, too?

[Answer] The last 2 years have brought about a major test of character. In difficult situations people's behavior varies. In our community there is a group of people who wave high the banner of professional ethics and care for the scholarly level of their own works, as well as of those written by their students and associates. That is most commendable. But in the everyday public life the very same people frequently assume opportunistic postures. This can be especially vexing, since in that case we have to do with scholars who in their own area of study represent the highest qualifications, the highest

level. To avoid all ambiguity--I do not have in mind advocates of a reasonable and honest compromise; these are always useful, and deserve respect. I refer simply to people who will always acquiesce, who will never object.

[Question] Last year you refused to accept an award from the minister of culture, granted for your book about King Jan Sobieski. Would you care to expound on the reasons for this?

[Answer] It was an affair which has turned out to be most unpleasant for myself. In my letter to the minister of culture I clearly explained why I was doing it. I have been--and still am--convinced that since, after December 1981, I could not acquiesce in various measures taken by the authorities, accepting an award handed by the minister, that is to say, by a representative of the government, would be an immoral act on my part. However, I never intended to slight the award as such, and I fully appreciate its value for all creative writers. In the invectives hurled at me after the fact it has been claimed that I had refused to accept the reward in order to receive another one, awarded by the Polonia Jurzykowski Foundation in the United States. That is--to put it most mildly--not true, and it could have in no way influenced my refusal. The charge that I was granted the Jurzykowski prize only because I had rejected the minister's award was exceptionally unfair. In fact, I published my decision in TYGODNIK POWSZECHNY only on 23 September 1983, while the foundation's letter was dated 15 September. How, then, could the decision made by the foundation panel (voted, by the way, a long time before 15 September) be a response to my rejection? Mr Rem's statement that I immediately conveyed my decision to Radio Free Europe was nothing but an insinuation. Mr Rem also has remained deaf to arguments presented by Professors Gieysztor, Kieniewicz, and Zahorski, who had taken my side by recalling that Polish scholars and artists had accepted Jurzykowski Foundation awards even under martial law (e.g., Prof Juliusz Bardach, Prof Jan Blonski, Prof Jan Zachwatowicz, Tadeusz Kantor and Wojciech Kilar). But I was the only one censured for accepting the award.

I would like to take the opportunity, and to emphasize most strongly, that my decision had nothing to do with any wish to slight either the minister of culture personally or his office, although Mr Rem in his RZECZPOSPOLITA article groundlessly accused me of doing so.

[Question] Was the New York prize awarded to you for the same book?

[Answer] The Jurzykowski Foundation's award was granted for my entire scholarly oeuvre, and thus includes the book about Sobieski. Up till now I have been unable to accept it.

[Question] Can historians, thanks to their research, genuinely influence the shaping of public attitudes, or our national options of goals and values? In other words, do you believe that history is an effective teacher of public life?

[Answer] I would find it hard to believe that a historical work, or even many different ones, or the opinions of one school or another, might tangibly and quickly impact the development of social and political life.

However, the ideal dreamt of by every historian projects a state of historical consciousness and knowledge among the people that would allow us to state that such knowledge has become universal, or at least satisfactory. Obviously, we are still far removed from that objective. In my opinion the popularization has not, up till now, accomplished its prime goal: it has not leveled the deep chasm which separates the research effects of historical scholarship from the state of historical knowledge in our society.

But one might demand, even today, that the ruling elite absolutely acquire such knowledge. No one can at present rule or administer a modern state organism without higher education and adequate knowledge, not only of law or economics but of history as well. Cicero was 100 percent right when he wrote: "historiam nescire hoc est semper puerum esse" (Not to know history means to remain a child forever).

[Interviewer] It seems, therefore, that we will not reach national maturity in a hurry. Thank you for the interview.

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GENERAL STAFF CHIEF URGES SUPERPOWER ARMS TALKS

Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian 17 Jul 84 pp 28-31

[Interview with Col Gen Vasile Milea by correspondent Miroslav Lazanski in Bucharest; date not given]

[Text] Bucharest (From special correspondent of DANAN)--Buildings of the Romanian Army General Staff are in the new area of Bucharest, a quarter which is being rebuilt at an accelerated pace after the catastrophic earthquake of 7 years ago, and that should become the administrative center of the Romanian capital city. Nearby is the army hotel where delegations of the Warsaw Pact stay. From the hotel to the General Staff our car needed only 3 minutes of slow driving. We were announced, and the soldier at the door only glanced at the black Dacia and pressed the button to open the gate. Exactly at 5 p.m., accompanied by Colonel Dumitru Manea, military attache of Romania in Yugoslavia, we entered into the office of the chief of staff and the first deputy defense minister of Romania, Colonel General Vasile Milea. Introductions to him and his associates, Col Dr George Tudor, director of the Center for Study and Research of Military History and Theory, Col Radu Olaru, chief and managing editor of military newspapers MUNCA POLITICA and APARAREA PATRIEI, and Air Force Col Petre Craciunescu.

Before the interview got started, the chief of staff and first deputy defense minister Col Gen Vasile Milea asked about impressions of our journey through Romania. Colonel General Milea is, otherwise, a tank specialist and author of several works on military science.

[Question] Comrade general, negotiations in Geneva between the U.S. and USSR about euromissiles were interrupted some time ago and their future is uncertain. It is known that Romania is in favor of a constructive dialogue. Please explain the actual Romanian position concerning the medium-range missiles in Europe and if you expect rapid progress in the negotiations?

[Answer] Romania and President Nicolae Ceausescu consider the present international situation especially difficult as a consequence of imperialist policy of force and "diktat", meddling in internal affairs of other countries, as well as the policy of maintaining and renewed division spheres of influence. Presently existing conditions of conflict in the world increase the danger

to peace and independence of nations. The most responsible for this is, definitely, the unprecedented arms race, above all in nuclear arms, especially on the European continent. And this is constantly escalating. The tension increased even more after the U.S. started placing medium-range nuclear missiles in some Western European countries and after the USSR started implementing the announced nuclear countermeasures. Our country considers that everything should be done to overcome such a dangerous situation, stop the installation of American missiles and of Soviet retaliatory arms, and resume negotiations between the two superpowers to reach an agreement which will do away with medium-range missiles and open the way to the elimination of any kind of nuclear weapons in Europe and in the whole world.

The president of Romania thinks that at the present time there is no more important problem than to save Europe and the whole world from nuclear annihilation. In this spirit, our party and the state, on the initiative and with the substantive contribution of Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu, developed a detailed and realistic program in spirit of the decisions of the 12th Congress and the National Conference of the RKP [Romanian Communist Party], which contains a series of proposals for the solution of this big problem. Also well known are personal messages that Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu sent to the chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet and to the President of the United States, statements of the Political Executive Committee of the RKP Central Committee, of the State Council and the Government of Romania, invitations by the General National Assembly and other Romanian forums, and the position and evaluations of the president of our country presented at the UN General Assembly and at the Stockholm Conference.

This whole chain of initiatives and recommendations is all-inclusive, realistic and developed gradually. Romania considers that discontinuing the installation of the new missiles and the withdrawal of the existing ones would create conditions to make even greater strides toward solving the problems of general disarmament. The sooner the Geneva negotiations start, the more significant will be the progress in that area for the European nations and for the whole world. Our country is stressing the need to broaden the negotiations on the medium-range missiles by including all European countries, which is not only fair but also an efficient way to reach an agreement. A big role in this belongs to the people and strong antinuclear movements on the European continent who are with their actions able to influence positively the positions of the superpowers which have the largest stockpiles of nuclear weapons. Romania is deeply convinced that the reason will triumph and that Europe will avoid such a dangerous conflict with nuclear weapons.

[Question] Could you comment on the recent Soviet offer for talks on the ban of militarization of the outer space and the American proposal to link this with the problem of intercontinental missiles? Is it reasonable to combine them?

[Answer] In principle, there should be no conditions set for future talks. We think that there is no other way than through negotiations and that both superpowers should sit down at the table.

[Question] The Romanian position on military budgets deserves attention and your country is advocating military budget cuts for both power blocs. How much is this consistent with the Romanian position about the need for gradual dissolution of military power blocs? How realistic is this in the present international situation?

[Answer] It is known that Romania resolutely and consistently advocates the simultaneous disbanding of NATO and of the Warsaw Pact. We think that this process should start with serious negotiations for reduction of any military activities, including reduction and freeze of military budgets at the minimum level. Stressing this position, Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu presented a proposal that the member countries of the power blocs mutually agree to reduce military expenditures by 1985 at the rate of 20 percent in relations to the 1982 expenditures level. Accordingly, Romania decided to keep its military expenditures through 1985 at the expenditures level for 1982. This releases the funds to be used for raising the people's living standard. At the same time, in the document submitted by the Romanian delegation at the Stockholm Conference, the suggestion was made for freezing the military expenditures of the countries participating at the conference at the 1984 expenditures level until an agreement is reached on that question. The measures and proposals formulated by Romania are completely realistic and their implementation will bring about a reduction of international tensions. If other countries followed the Romanian example, it would represent the greatest contribution to the policy of understanding, of reduction or limitation of military expenditures, and that would stimulate the process of economic progress in the world, especially in developing countries.

[Question] Romania is a member of the Warsaw Pact, but it did not participate in any military intervention of that alliance. Romanian soldiers are not taking part in maneuvers outside their frontiers, nor do foreign troops conduct maneuvers on Romanian soil. In those conditions, a foreign observer is wondering what makes Romania a member of the military alliance at all?

[Answer] Romania participates in the Warsaw Pact which has been created, as is known, for defense from imperialistic attack on Europe. We think that such a treaty--if the other pact on our continent is not simultaneously disbanded--should have an exclusively defensive character. The participation of our country in the Warsaw Pact is based on the general principles of Romanian foreign policy: complete equality, strict respect of national independence and sovereignty, non-intervention in internal affairs, mutual benefit, no use of force or the threat of force. Romania is developing friendly relations and solidarity with all socialist countries, above all with neighboring socialist countries. On the basis of that orientation, our army is also strengthening the friendship and cooperation with armies of the Warsaw Pact, organizing some activities in the spirit of decisions of our party, it is being trained, preparing and cooperating so that in the case of need it could fulfill its obligations which it has within the alliance. Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu is emphasizing that, according to our international obligations, the Romanian Army will always fulfill its defense assignments together with the friendly armies and against imperialistic attack.

[Question] Is the Romanian refusal to participate in maneuvers outside its home territory and non-participation of foreign troops in maneuvers on Romanian soil a permanent posture?

[Answer] We do not have a temporary viewpoint on this question.

[Question] Yes, but do you know the Latin saying, "The times change and we are changing."

[Answer] Yes, times change, but we established that by law and this is a permanent position.

[Question] In the Yugoslav constitution there is a provision that nobody has the right to sign a capitulation. What does the Romanian constitution stipulate?

[Answer] The same as yours. This is provided for in the law on the defense of the country.

[Question] The question on relationships of offensive versus defensive in the Romanian military doctrine and the problem of temporarily occupied territory? I heard that you plan to offer decisive resistance to the possible aggressor right at the frontier?

[Answer] As soldiers, we know that the enemy can be defeated only with offensive. Defensive actions are temporary. Only if the enemy is stronger. But nobody achieved victory by standing in trenches.

[Question] The armed forces of Romania consist of the army and the Patriotic Guard. What is their relationship?

[Answer] This is not a hierarchical relationship but one of cooperation. The Patriotic Guard is organized along territorial and workplace lines. It is led directly by the party and there is no place in Romania without such formations. I can tell you about it as a person who had worked on that question for 5 years. The Patriotic Guard has a very long tradition and when the Red Army in the Second World War entered the territory of Romania, all the inhabited places were already liberated. The first units of the Patriotic Guard draw their origin back to 1918.

[Question] Romania is part of the southern wing of the Warsaw Pact, and on the southern wing of NATO, in Italy on Sicily, new cruise missiles are being installed. Could you tell what will be the countermeasures of the southern wing of the Warsaw Pact and if Romania will accept on its territory any new missiles?

[Answer] I want to stress that in Romania there are not now and never were any nuclear missiles. Regarding the placement of new medium-range missiles in Europe, including Italy, Romania resolutely opposes such action and consistently fights for the creation of zones of peace and cooperation without foreign bases and without nuclear weapons. We support the creation of such

zones also in the northern and central Europe, as well as in other parts of the world. As stressed by President Nicolae Ceausescu, chiefs of governments and countries that approve installation of weapons of mass destruction on their territory take on a heavy responsibility before their own people and before the whole world. Romania will also in the future support holding up the installation of new missiles in Europe, destroying or reducing those in existence, as well as freeing our continent of any kind of nuclear weapons, medium-range as well as tactical ones.

[Question] You have FROG and SCUD tactical missiles and the technological potential for the production of a nuclear bomb. Does Romania have nuclear ambitions?

[Answer] Our attitudes are clear. We are against nuclear weapons and against the proliferation of such means.

[Question] Yes, but your tactical ballistic missiles can also carry nuclear warheads.

[Answer] They have only the conventional warheads. They can carry also a nuclear one, but on the territory of Romania there are no nuclear warheads.

[Question] How do you react to the strengthening of the conventional NATO forces on its southern wing? Do you think that the military importance of that wing has increased lately?

[Answer] In the general rearmament race in the world, such a trend is not surprising. Without considering where the actual application takes places, in the north, south or central Europe, it is harmful for the peace and for easing tension among nations.

[Question] What do you think about the role of Albania in the space between the southern wing of NATO and the Warsaw Pact?

[Answer] Romania is pursuing a continuous policy of friendship and cooperation with all Balkan countries. Our country and President Nicolae Ceausescu consider all the countries, regardless of their size, can and should contribute to the strengthening of friendship and security on the regional and universal levels.

[Question] Romania is the only socialist country that has diplomatic relations with Israel, but also with Arab countries. The Romanian position is that the Middle Eastern problem cannot be solved with the Palestinians, but that does not prevent you from carrying on a normal dialogue with Israel too. Tell us something about this, so to speak, special mission of Romania.

[Answer] Diplomatic relations which Romania maintains with Israel and Arab countries are in accord with the foreign policy of our party and the country. Such a policy offers Romania the possibility of learning first hand the views and positions of other countries about specific questions and that way we can realistically appraise controversial issues. Romania, as was pointed

out many times by President Nicolae Ceausescu, considers that a just and long-lasting peace in the Middle East is not possible without Israeli withdrawal from Arab territories occupied in 1967, the solution of the problem of Palestinian people, recognition of their right to self-rule, including creation of an independent Palestinian state, and guaranty for the integrity of all states in that region. In that sense, Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu is emphasizing the need to call an international conference on the Middle East under the sponsorship of the UN, with all concerned parties participating, the USSR, the United States, and also legitimate representatives of the Palestinian people.

[Question] In your opinion, do the Arab nations today have sufficient military potential to resist Israel?

[Answer] It would be better to discuss the readiness and capability of all states in that region to find a solution to their mutual misunderstandings through negotiations. Military confrontations in that region were particularly cruel and showed that they cannot solve anything, but only render the problem more complicated.

[Question] Romania has very strong army, and you manufacture enough modern weaponry. Some projects in that respect are being accomplished in cooperation with Yugoslavia. How do you view this cooperation and what do you expect in the future?

[Answer] Thanks to the concern of our party and state, our army has modern weapons and equipment commensurate to its task to defend, jointly with other elements of our defense system, the revolutionary achievements, independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty of the homeland based on the principles of our military doctrines, so splendidly expressed by RKP general secretary president of Romania and commander in chief of the armed forces, Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu. On the basis of the agreements reached on the higher level, our cooperation with Yugoslavia is very good, and our military relations are developing the same way.

[Question] Comrade General, you are a tank specialist. Tell us whether the development of contemporary weapons changes the role of the man in war?

[Answer] I was a tank officer in my youth....

[Question] Yes, but the first love is never forgotten.

[Answer] Right! Concerning your question, man still plays a decisive role in war, because as the weapons become more sophisticated, they break down more easily. With modern weapons, the smallest defect can obstruct the whole system. Men win wars!